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Monterey, California 

IN THE 1980s 



with JAMES J. TRITTEN, Principal Investigator 

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ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) 

This is the second revised and expanded edition of the Maritime Strategy Debates: A 
5uide to the Renaissance of U.S. Naval Strategic Thinking in the 1980s. This report 
expands upon bibliographic resources first published, in part, in the U.S. Naval 
Institute's Maritime Strategy 'White Paper' of January 1986. It includes approximately 
?00 new annotated entries in a new, alphabetized order. 





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Previous editions are obsolete 
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IN THE 1980s 
Revised Edition 


Capt. Peter M. Swartz, U.S. Navy, and 

Jan S. Breemer, Bibliographers 

and James J. Tritten, Principal Investigator 


This bibliography was prepared for OPNAV OP-06/OP-603J under 
contract N62271-89-M-3250 with James J. Tritten acting as principal 
investigator. Jan S. Breemer was responsible for selecting, annotating and 
incorporating new source materials. 

This bibliography remains the "brainchild" of Capt. Peter M. Swartz, 
U.S. Navy and much of the material newly included in this work was made 
available by Capt. Swartz from his extensive holdings of maritime 
strategical writings. Others who contributed to this work by making their 
files available or by pointing the bibliographer to important sources that 
otherwise would have been overlooked, include Roger W. Barnett of 
National Security Research, Inc., Floyd 'Ken' D. Kennedy, Jr. of the Center 
for Naval Analyses (CNA), James L. George of the Hudson Institute and 
Ger Teitler of the Royal Netherlands Naval Institute (KMI). Dr. Teitler was 
particularly helpful in directing the bibliographer's attention to recent 
European writings on maritime strategy. 

Jan S. Breemer is responsible for the selection and annotation of 
newly included reference sources. 



■ Y CA 93943-5101 

Notes On Revised Edition 

This is the second revised and updated edition of The Maritime 
Strategic Debates: A Guide to the Renaissance of U.S. Naval Strateg ic 
Thinking in the 1980s . The original version, prepared by Capt. Peter M. 
Swarz, U.S. Navy, first appeared in part in the U.S. Naval Institute's 
special "White Paper" supplement to the January 1986 issue of the 
Proceeding s. The first revised edition was published in the spring of 1988 by 
the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School as "Technical Report NPS-56-88-009," " 
again authored by Capt. Swarz. This revision continues to build on Capt. 
Swartz' pioneering work. Key changes from the first two editions include 
the following: 

• annotated entries alphabetized by author's last name; 

• approximately 200 additional entries, including, in particular, an 
extensive sample of overseas views and commentary. 

Since the publication of the bibliography's first edition, the volume 
and range of written commentary on maritime strategical issues has 
grown by leaps and bounds. Accordingly, the 200 new entries in this 
document barely scratch the surface of the recent literature on the subject. 
It is hoped that a later revision will "catch up." 















A. The Public Debates: Criticisms and Kudos 

B. The Public Record: OP-603 

General Introduction 

This is a bibliography with a point of view. It takes as a departure 
point the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, as 
enunciated by the civilian and military leaders of the U.S. Government, 
especially the Department of the Navy. It includes criticism of and 
commentaries on that strategy, as well as items relating the Maritime 
Strategy to overall national and allied military strategy, and to historical 
precedents. In addition, it covers both how the Strategy was developed and 
who developed it, and the important role of wargaming. 

The Maritime Strategy has generated enormous debate. All sides and 
aspects of the debate are presented here. The focus, however, is on that 
Strategy. Absent are discussions of naval affairs which do not have as their 
points of departure — explicitly or implicitly — the contemporary Maritime 
Strategy debate. 

In order to trace the ebb and flow of ideas and events over time, items 
are listed chronologically, by occurrence or publication date, rather than 
merely alphabetically. Authoritative official statements of the Maritime 
Strategy are indicated by an asterisk (*). Explicit direct commentaries on 
the Maritime Strategy are indicated by a double asterisk (**). The other 
items listed deal implicitly with various antecedents. 

Publications on Sister Service and Allied contributions to the 
Maritime Strategy are listed separately, to aid the reader/researcher. 
(Admittedly, this and other artificial topological devices run against a 
central theme of the Maritime Strategy — its global, "seamless web" 
character. Also, only cursory attention is paid to pre-1981 Navy strategic 
thinking on global war, a structural shortcoming that cannot legitimately 
be cited as evidence that such thinking was lacking. 


American military strategy and its maritime component have been 
debated since the foundation of the republic. Following World War II, 
maritime strategy concerns centered around peacetime presence, 
antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and the Navy's role in nuclear strike 
warfare against the Soviet Union. During the late 1950s and 1960s the focus 
shifted to limited war and deterrence through nuclear-powered ballistic 
missile submarine (SSBN) operations. In the early 1970s, the debate 
centered on then Chief of Naval Operations Elmo R. Zumwalt's formulation 
of the "Four Missions of the Navy": strategic deterrence, sea control, power 
projection, and peacetime presence. A major body of literature began to be 
created then on presence. In the mid-1970s, sea control seemed to dominate 

In 1978, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward became Chief of Naval 
Operations. His views on strategy had been heavily influenced by his 
experience as Seventh Fleet Commander and Pacific Fleet Commander-in- 
Chief in the post- Vietnam environment. Admiral Hayward's focus was on 
flexible offensive forward power projection, conducted globally and in 
conjunction with allies and sister services, especially against the Soviet 
Union and its attacking forces. Much of this was a return to concepts 
familiar to U.S. naval officers of the first post- World War II decade. That 
era's focus on nuclear strikes, however, now broadened to encompass a 
much wider range of options, primarily conventional. 

Admiral Hayward outlined his views publicly in his initial 1979 
testimony before Congress, and subsequently in the pages of the 
Proceedings. The naval strategic renaissance and the resultant debate he 
and others sparked continues to this day, fueled by the statements and 
policies of the Reagan Administration, especially its first Secretary of the 
Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr., who served from February 1981 to April 1987. 

The initial public Maritime Strategy discussion of the early 1980s had 
largely taken the form of a debate on the pages of American public and 
foreign affairs and national security periodicals. This debate has focused on 
two themes: the general forward strategic principles (and certain highly 
publicized Norwegian Sea examples) enunciated repeatedly by Secretary of 
the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr. and a perceived "Maritime Strategy versus 
Coalition Warfare" dichotomy incessantly alleged by former Under 
Secretary of Defense Robert Komer and others. 

At the same time, however, the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations 
and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in conjunction with officers of 
their sister services and allied, had been asked to develop for internal use a 
detailed description of the Maritime Strategy component of U.S. national 
military strategy. This Maritime Strategy rigorously integrated into one 
clear, consistent document a number of long held views of Navy and 
Marine Corps senior officers, certain newly refined concepts developed in 
the fleet and at the Naval War College, agreed national intelligence 
estimates, the strategic principles articulated by Secretary Lehman and 
other Reagan Administration officials, and a thoughtful discussion of the 
variety and range of uncertainties inherent in the strategy. 

Concepts developed by the Navy's warfare communities and fleets, as 
well as by Army, Air Force, joint and allied commanders, were examined 
and incorporated as appropriate. Where inconsistencies appeared, hard 
choices were made. Uncertainties and limitations were identified. 
Properly, the job was spearheaded by the Strategic Concepts Group on the 
staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-603). 

The U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Maritime Strategy was codified initially 
in 1982 to focus Navy program development efforts more tightly. Its basic 
premises already had been underlying Navy planning, gaming, and 
exercises. Subsequently, congressional testimony in 1983 released an initial 
edition of the Maritime Strategy to the public. A classified revision to the 
strategy statement was approved by the Navy's Program Review Committee 
(chaired by then Vice Admiral Carlisle Trost) in October 1983 and signed 
and distributed Navy-wide by Admiral James D. Watkins, then Chief of 
Naval Operations, in 1984. 

Various unclassified elements of the strategy began to find their way 
into naval affairs journals, especially the Proceedings . Writings on naval 
strategy that did not take the Maritime Strategy as a starting point began to 
fade. By 1985, enough authoritative congressional testimony, speeches, op- 
ed pieces, journal articles, and letters-to-the-editor, penned by senior naval 
officers and well-placed civilian commentators, had appeared for the 
essential elements of the Maritime Strategy to be accessible to the public. 
Public commentary gradually shifted from exegeses on the press 
conferences, speeches, and articles of Secretary Lehman and Ambassador 
Komer to discussions on aspects of the actual Maritime Strategy developed 
largely by military officers from national and alliance guidance and 
approved by civilian leadership. 

Promulgation of the Maritime Strategy fostered increasing public 
and government discourse. Within the Navy, the interplay among the 
Maritime Strategy, force-level planning, fleet plans and operations, and 
professional education and training became a governing dynamic. In the 
open literature, the number of writings on the strategy rose from a handful 
of newspaper and journal articles in 1981 to an avalanche of government 
documents, books, and articles in 1986, including over 145,000 copies 
distributed of the Proceedings ' watershed "The Maritime Strategy" 
January 1986 supplement alone. This quantitative leap was accompanied by 
qualitative changes in both the background of the commentators and the 
sophistication of their arguments. 

Contrary to much uninformed external criticism of the early 1980s, 
the Maritime Strategy was presented by the Navy as only one, albeit a vital 
component of the national military strategy. It was not presented as a 
recommended dominant theme of that national strategy. Also contrary to 
earlier uninformed criticism, the strategy embodied the views of unified 
and fleet commanders as well as Washington military and civilian 
planners and Newport thinkers. The Navy Department and the fleet were 
now speaking with one sophisticated voice to, and increasingly for, the 
nation and its allies. 

Ackley, R.T., "No Bastions for the Bear: Round 2," Proceedings . 
April 1985, pp 42-47. Also "Comment and Discussion," May 1985, pp 
14-17, July 1985, p 112. More on the anti-SSBN mission. 

Arkin, William M. and Chappell, David, "Forward Offensive 
Strategy: Raising the Stakes in the Pacific," World Policy Journal . 
Summer 1985, pp 481-500. Forward operations in the Northeast 
Pacific seen as "provocative and destabilizing." Similar in tone and 
political coloration to Barry Posen 1 982 critique of Norwegian Sea 

Arkin, William M., "Nuclear Weapons at Sea," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists . October 1983, pp 6-7. Sees U.S. Navy theater 
nuclear weapons under development as destablitizing, despite Soviet 
theater nuclear naval programs. 

Ball, Desmond, "Nuclear War At Sea," International Security . 
Winter 1985-86, pp 3-31. Argues against anti-SSBN operations and for 
more U.S. Navy focus on the escalatory dangers of theater nuclear 
war at sea. Not particularly accurate. 

Betts, Richard K., Cruise Missiles: Technology. Strategy. Politics . 
Washington: Brookings, 1981, pp 537-540. See discussion of carrier 
penetration of Soviet waters as "peacetime deterrent rhetoric" about 
risky "missions that could turn into a naval Charge of the Light 

Bond, Larry, and Ries, Tomas, "Controversy: A New Strategy for the 
North-East Atlantic?" International Defense Review . 12/1984, pp 1803- 
4. USN and NATO naval strategy. 

Bowling, Capt. R.A., USN (Ret.), "Keeping Open the Sea-Lanes, " 
Proceedings . December 1985, pp 92-98. Argues for a return to SLOC 
protection focus for the U.S. Navy. 

Breemer, Jan S., "The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions: Evidence 
Inference, and Alternative Scenarios," RUSI Journal . March 1985, 
pp 18-26. Includes useful review of literature. 

** Brooks, Capt. Linton F., "Escalation and Naval Strategy," 
Proceedings . August 1984, pp 33-37. Also "Comment and 
Discussion," October 1984, pp 28-29; November 1984, pp 18, 24; 
December 1984, p 174. On Maritime Strategy and nuclear weapons by 
an important articulate contributor to development of the Strategy. 
Focus of public debate begins to shift to the Strategy as it actually is, 
rather than the Strategy as it is alleged to be. 

Brown, Harold, Thinking About National Security: Defense and 
Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World . Boulder CO: Westview Press 

1983. By the 1977-1981 Secretary of Defense. Mildly critical of forward 
carrier operations. More strongly critical of the 600-ship Navy build- 
up. See especially pp 100-101, 121-123, 171-187. 

Caldwell, Hamlin, "Arctic Submarine Warfare," Submarine Review . 
July 19892, pp 4-13. Develops further the arguments in his 1981 

Caldwell, Hamlin, "The Empty Silo— Strategic ASW, Naval War 
College Review . September-October 1981, pp. 4-14. Call for anti-SSBN 
operations in Soviet home water bastions. 

Carnegie Panel on U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control, 
Challenges for U.S. National Security: Assessing the Balance: 
Defense Spending and Conventional Forces: A Preliminary Report. 
Part II . Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
1981. Chapter 3, pp 99-148, assesses the naval balance and identifies 
key issues. No policy recommendations. Comprehensive and even 
handed. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, purely budget-oriented. 

Cohen, Eliot A., "The Long-Term Crisis of the Alliance," Foreign 
Affairs . Winter 1982/3, pp 325-343. A Naval War College faculty 
member argues for strengthening the U.S. Navy, creation of a "Fifth 
Fleet," global U.S. military focus and increased European military 
responsibilities in NATO. Seeks to bridge the "Atlanticist vs navalist" 

Collins, Col. John M., USA (Ret.), U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980- 
1985 . Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985. Compares strategy 
and policy as well as force levels. See especially Chapter 11. Also 
Chapters 9, 12 and 16. 

Corddry, Charles W., "Navy Grows Toward 600-Ship Fleet, But 
Sustaining It May be a Problem," Baltimore Sun . May 22, 1985, p 1. 
Cites Congressional Budget Office (CBO) skepticism that the 600-ship 
fleet goal may not be sustainable with the anticipated decline of 
defense budget growth. 

Corry, James, "Strategy of the Navy for the War of the Future," New 
York Times . May 17, 1984, p C-25. Preview of "The Return of the 
Great White Fleet," broadcast on television on May 17, 1984. Finds 
that the program's portrayal of the large vs. small carrier debate was 
"stacked against" John Lehman's 15-carrier battlegroup plan. 

Dunn, Keith A., and Staudenmaier, Col. William 0., USA, Strategic 
Implications of the Continental-Maritime Debate (Washington Paper 
#107) . Washington: CSIS, 1984. Expands arguments made in their 
Foreign Policy article. 

Dunn, Keith A., and Staudenmaier, Col. William O., USA, "Strategy 
for Survival," Foreign Policy . Fall 1983, pp 22-41. Also Komer and 
Dunn and Staudenmaier letters, Winter 1983-84, pp 176-178. The 
"Carlisle School" again. Seeks to synthesize all points in the 
maritime-continental debate. 

Dunn, Keith A., and Staudenmaier, Col. William O., USA, "The 
Retaliatory Offensive and Operational Realities in NATO," Surviva l. 
May- June 1985, pp 108-118. Shows Maritime Strategy similarities to 
Samuel Huntington proposals to adopt retaliatory offensive strategy 
on the ground and in the air in Europe. Argues against both. 

Epstein, Joshua M., "Horizontal Escalation: Sour Notes of a 
Recurrent Theme," International Security . Winter 1983/84, pp 19-31, 
especially pp 23-25. Also reprinted in Art, Raymond and Waltz, 
Kenneth (eds.), The Use of Force (second edition), 1983, and updated 
as Chapter 3 of Epstein's Strategy and Force Planning: The Case of 
the Persian Gulf . Washington: Brookings 1987. Critique of 
'Horizontal Escalation,' not only as a counter to a Soviet invasion of 
Iran, but also apparently as a function of maritime forces in a global 
war with the Soviets. Sees Soviet-Chinese wartime relationship as 
unaffected by naval considerations, and regards Soviet ground force 
numbers as virtually limitless. No discussion of possible Soviet air 
force redeployment, however. 

* Fogarty, Como. William, "Navy Maritime Strategy Moving on 
Offensive," Navv Times . August 20, 1984, pp 25-26. Fogarty outlines 
maritime Strategy. 

* Foley, Adm. Sylvester R., Jr., "Strategic Factors in the Pacific," 
Proceedings . August 1985, pp 34-38. Retiring PACFLT Commander- 
in-Chief discusses his task in context of overall Maritime Strategy. 
Shows one component commander's view of the Strategy. 

** Friedman, Norman, "A Survey of Western ASW in 1985," 

International Defense Review . 10/1985, pp 1587-97. Maritime Strategy 
and the North Atlantic ASW campaign: Open ocean vs close-in vs 
convoy campaigns. 

Friedman, Norman, "U.S. Maritime Strategy," International 
Defense Review . 7/1985, pp 1071-1075. A prominent civilian naval 
affairs commentator analyzes rationale for USN Maritime Strategy. 

** George, James L. (ed.), The U.S. Navv: The View From the Mid- 
1980s . Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. Papers delivered at a 
Center for Naval Analyses conference, Fall 1984. See chapters by Dov 
Zakheim on "Land Based Aviation and Maritime Warfare," Robert 
Wood and John T. Hanley, Jr., on "The Maritime Role in the North 
Atlantic," and "Commentaries," by retired Admirals Robert Long 

and Harry Train. Admiral Long's Pacific Command"Concept of 
Operations: and his Pacific Command Campaign Plan were 
important building blocks for the Maritime Strategy. 

Getler, Michael, "Too Late to Stop Fleet Buildup, says Navy 
Secretary," Washington Post . December 2, 1982, p 16. Reports on a 
Brookings Institution seminar on military budgets, including 
SECNAV Lehman's rejection of calls for reduced Navy spending as 
"too late to stop it." 

Getler, Michael, "Lehman Sees Norwegian Sea as a Key to Soviet 
Naval Strategy," Washington Post . December 29, 1982, p 4. Reports 
Lehman's call for a navy and strategy to fight a global war at sea, 
involving simultaneous operations in multiple theaters. U.S. 
pressure against the Kola Peninsula (which Lehman denied meant 
taking the carriers close to the Soviet mainland) will afford "a 
tremendous bit of leverage because (the Sqviets can't afford to lose 
that. ..They'd lost their whole strategic submarine fleet if they lose 

Geyelin, Philip, "Mr. Lehman's Dream Navy," Washington Post . 
October 2, 1981, p 29. Question's the Navy's need and ability to fight a 
"global Trafalgar conveniently confined to blue water and 
conventional weapons." 

Glenn, Senator John, Carter, Barry E., Komer, Robert W., 
Rethinking Defense and Conventional Forces . Washington: Center 
for National Policy, 1983. Two ex-Army officers, Carter, pp 33-35, and 
Komer, pp 46-48, attack the Maritime Strategy and the 600-ship Navy. 

Gordon, Michael R., "Lehman's Navy Riding High, But Critics 
Question Its Strategy and Rapid Growth," National Journal . 
September 21, 1985, pp 21 20+. Wide-ranging review of many aspects 
of the debate. 

Hamm, Manfred, "Ten Steps to Counter Moscow's Threat to 
Northern Europe," Backgrounder (The Heritage Foundation), No. 
1356, May 30, 1984. Calls for rather modest U.S. and allied maritime 
counters to a greatly increased Soviet threat. 

** Harris, Cdr. R. Robinson, and Benkert, Lcdr. Joseph, "Is That All 
There Is?" Proceedings . October 1985, pp 32-27. Surface combatants 
and the Maritime Strategy. 

Hart, Senator Gary, "Can Congress Come to Order?" Franck, 
Thomas, (ed.), The Tethered Presidency . New York: New York 
University Press, 1981, pp 242-3. A call for a national maritime-only 
strategy and "obvious and indisputable naval superiority." The U.S. 
Navy certainly shares the second goal, but not the first. 

Hayward, Adm. Thomas B., "The Future of U.S. Sea Power," 
Proceedings/Naval Review . May 1979, pp. 66-71; Also Zumwalt, Adm. 
Elmo R., Jr., "Total Force," pp. 103-106; and "Comment and 
Discussion," July 1979, pp. 23-24; August 1979, pp. 87-89; September 

1979, pp. 89-91 ; October 1979, p. 21; December 1979, p. 88; January 

1980, pp. 82-86. Public debate on the new era of U. S. Navy strategy 
begins. Hayward, Zumwalt, Bill Lind, Norman Friedman, et al. See 
also Hayward "Posture Statement" testimony before Congress, 1979- 

Hayward, Thomas B., Adm. USN, Untitled remarks before the 
annual convention of the Association of Naval Aviation, Wing s 
of Gold . Summer 1982, pp 57-60. The former CNO and one of the 
"founding fathers" of the maritime strategy of the 1980s takes on the 
"convoy syndrome" that he claims was being foisted upon the U.S. 
Navy in the 1970s. The key principles of the Navy's strategy today 
(1982), he says, are superiority, rejection of the "short war" theory, 
forward operations, and "to take the fight to the enemy at the time we 
want to, where we want to, at our option and not his." 

Healy, Melissa, "Lehman: We'll Sink Their Subs," Defense Week . 
May 13, 1985, p 18. Reports the SECNAV's oft-publicized comment, 
made on April 19, 1985, that U.S. submarines will attack the Soviet 
SSBN fleet "in the first five minutes of the war." 

Holloway, Adm. James L., Ill, USN (Ret.), "The U.S. Navy— A 
Functional Appraisal," Oceanus . Summer 1985, pp 3-11. 
Reformulation of pre-Maritime Strategy USN positions by Adm. 
Hayward's predecessor as CNO. Similar to the Navy's 1978 Strateg ic 
Concept of th U.S. Navv (NWP-1 ). Focus on sea control and on Soviet 
Navy as anti-SLOC force. 

Huntington, Samuel P., "The Defense Policy, 1981-1982," in 
Greenstein, Fred I. (Ed.), The Reagan Presidency. An Early 
Assessment. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1983, 
pp. 82-116. Initial Reagan overall defense policies and strategy, the 
contest of the Maritime Strategy. 

Ikle, Fred Charles, "The Reagan Defense Program," A Focus on the 
Strategic Imperatives," Strategic Review. Spring 1982, pp 11-18. By 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Especially good on 
administration requirements for naval forces to provide options to 
fight on a variety of fronts. 

International Combat Arms . May 1985, Interview with SECNAV 
John F. Lehman, Jr., pp 12-13. The SECNAV explains why the 
Navy's 600-ship goal must be based on the "worst case" scenario of a 
general conventional war with the Soviet Union. Automatically 

embedded within this scenario, claims Lehman, is "every 
conceivable peacetime crisis (as) a subset." 

Jampoler, Capt. Andrew, "A Central Role for Naval Forces? ... to 
Support the Land Battle," Naval War College Review . November- 
December 1984, pp 4-12. Also "In My View," March-April 1985, pp 96- 
97; July- August 1985 p 83. Mainstream U.S. Navy thinking. 

Jenkins, Ronald Wayne, "Coalition Defense vs. Maritime Strategy: A 
Critical Examination Illustrating a New Approach to Geopolitical 
Analysis," unpublished PhD. dissertation, Pennsylvania State 
University, 1985. A political geographer's take. Buys into 
categorization of "Schools" popularized by Komer, Dunn and 
Staudenmaier. Recognized irrelevance of much of the pre — 1984 
literature to "real-world" USN planning and programming 
problems. Includes a study of the views of Naval War College officers 
on geography and Maritime Strategy. 

Kaufman, William W., Thel985 Defense Budg et. Washington: 
Brookings, 1984, especially pp 29-34. A snide critique of U.S. Navy 
strategy and force level requests. Naval power projection forces seen 
as only needed in Third World areas during a global war with the 
Soviets. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-oriented 
document. See also Kaufmann chapters in earlier 1982 and 1983 
Brookings annuals edited by Joseph Pechman, Setting National 
Priorities: 1983 and 1984 . and his 1981 Defense in the 1980s . 

Kaufmann, William W., The 1986 Defense Budg et. Washington, 
Brookings, 1985, especially pp 32-35. Another sarcastic Kaufmann 
budget-oriented critique, including an unduly sanguine view of allied 
naval capabilities. 

Kennedy, Col. William V., USAR (Ret.), "Tailor military Strategy to 
the Economy," Philadelphia Inquirer . May 26, 1982, p 25. Sees the 
Reagan Administration as building a new maritime strategy on top 
of an old continental strategy. Considers the Soviet Far East as the 
key Soviet vulnerability for naval forces to exploit. 

Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr., "From SLOC Protection to a National 
Maritime Strategy: The U.S. Navy under Carter and Reagan, 1977- 
1984," in Hagan, Kenneth J., (ed.), In Peace and War . (Second 
Edition), Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1984. (Mostly on operations 
and shipbuilding. Sees Secretary Lehman's contribution as a 
reorientation of national strategy rather than simply an 
enhancement of its maritime elements). 

Klare, Michael T., "Securing the Fire Break," World Policy Journal . 
Spring 1985, pp 229-247. Sees forward offensive operations for ships 
with both nuclear and conventional capabilities as eroding the 


firebreak between nuclear and non-nuclear combat and raising the 
likelihood of nuclear war. 

Koburger, Capt. C. W. , USCGR, "Pitts' Choice: An Alternative 
NATO Strategy for the USA," Navv International . December 1981, pp 
730-731. Like that of Sen. Hart, one of the very few real examples of a 
call for a "pure" national maritime strategy, a position often falsely 
attributed to proponents of the U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy. 

Komer, Robert, Maritime Strategy of Coalition Defense . Cambridge, 
MA: Abt Books, 1984. Also review by Dr. Dov Zakheim, Political 
Science Quarterly . Winter 1984-85, pp 721-722. Ambassador Komer's 
last salvo before November 1984 elections, with administration retort. 

Komer, Robert, "Maritime Strategy vs. coalition Defense," Foreign 
Affairs. Summer 1982, pp 1, 124-1, 144. Also Turner, Adm. 
Stansfield, and Thibault, Capt. George, "Preparing for the 
Unexpected: The Need for a New Military Strategy," Fall 1982, pp 125- 
135; "Comments and Correspondence: Maritime Strategies," Winter 
1982/3, pp 453-457. The debate jumps to a wider arena: Komer vs. 
Turner vs. Lehman. Ambassador Komer had been a leading Carter 
Administration Defense Department official from 1977 to 1981. 

Lehman, John F., Jr., "Nine Principles for the Future of American 
Maritime Power," Proceedings . February 1984, pp 47-51. Refinement 
of Secretary Lehman's thought after three years in office. 

Lehman, John F., Jr., "Rebirth of a U.S. Naval Strategy," Strategic 
Review . Summer 1981, pp. 9-15. For more than two years, the basic 
Navy public statement on Maritime Strategy. See also Lehman 
"Posture Statement" testimony before Congress, 1981-1987, especially 
regarding linkages among operations, strategy, and programs. 

Lehman, John F., Jr., "Talking Surface with SECNAV," Surface 
Warfare . September-October 1985, pp 2-10. SECNAV ties the 
strategy, surface warfare and procurement issues together. 

Lehman, John, Remarks before the Jewish War Veterans of the 
USA, Washington, D.C., August 31, 1984. Reaffirms the need for 
a forward strategy to "throw the Soviets on the defensive." 

Lehman, John, "Support for Defense is Still Strong," Washington 
Post . December 16, 1982, p. 23. "The Navy is working to do its part 
in a team effort of forward-based air, land, and naval power. Navy 
strategy is part and parcel of the national strategy of deterrence, not a 
substitute for it". 

Martin, Ben L., "Has There Been a Reagan Revolution in Defense 
Policy?" World Affairs . Winter 1985-86, pp 173-182, especially 175-6. 

Sees Maritime Strategy as the basis for horizontal escalation 
doctrine, and both important only as U.S. Navy budget rationales. 
"The idea of horizontal escalation itself is too inherently implausible 
to find an enduring place in American strategic doctrine." 

Martin, Laurence, NATO and the Defense of the West . New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985, especially pp 30-35 "Flanks," 51-56 
"Warning, Mobilization and Reinforcement"; and 57-67 "The 
Maritime Battle." Features graphics rivaling those in the official US 
Navy Maritime Strategy testimony in their explanatory power and 
often their complexity. 

Maze, Rick, "CNO, SecNav in Agreement on Strategy, Lehman 
Says," Navv Times . June 20, 1983, p 9. Disputes media reports that 
the CNO and SECNAV are at odds over the early forward deployment 
of carrier battlegroups into the Barents Sea. 

McDonald, Adm. Wesley, "Mine Warfare: A Pillar of Maritime 
Strategy," Proceeding s. October 1985, pp 46-53. By the NATO 
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic and Commander-in-Chief 
of the U.S. Atlantic Command and the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. 
Actually on relationship of Maritime Strategy to NATO fleet 
strategy in the Atlantic with emphasis on mine warfare. 

Miller, Steven, "The Northern Seas in Soviet and U. S. Strategy," in 
Lodgaard, Sverre and Thee, Marek, (eds.), Nuclear Disengagement 
in Europe . London: Taylor and Francis, 1983, pp 117.137. 
Comprehensive analysis, especially of tie-in between U.S. Naval 
Strategy and Reagan administration policy. 

Moorer, Adm. Thomas H. USN (Ret.) and Cottrell, Alvin J. "Sea 
Power and NATO Strategy," in Myers, Kenneth A., NATO: The Next 
Thirty Years . Boulder CO: Westview , 1980, pp 223-236. Detailed 
arguments on the necessarily global nature of any major future war 
with the Soviets and the need for forward carrier operations off the 
Kola, Vladivostok, and Petropavlovsk, by the 1970-1974 Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 1967-1970 Chief of Naval Operations. 
Arguments against a "swing" strategy from the Pacific are also 
echoed in "For Want of a Nail: the Longistics of the Alliance" by 
Adm. Isaac Kidd USN (Ret.), former U.S. Navy and NATO 
commander in both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, in the same 
volume, pp 189-205. 

Morland, Howard, "Are We Readying a First Strike?" The Nation, 
March 16, 1985, p 297. Written by the "disarmament coordinator" of 
the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, this article 
charges that the deployment of the Trident D-5 will upset the 
"stability" of MAD, and "could provoke the Russians to launch a pre- 
emptive strike." Urges cancellation of the MX, D-5 and Midgetman 


missile programs, and the establishment of mutually-agreed SSBN 

** Murray, Robert J., "A War-Fighting Perspective," Proceeding s. 

October 1983, pp 66-81. By a former Under Secretary of the Navy and 
the first Director of the Naval War College's Center for Naval 
Warfare Studies. See especially pp 70 & 74 on the maritime strategy 
and the role of the Naval War College. "You have to discard the term 
'naval strategy,' and even the slightly more modern variant, 
'maritime strategy' and talk instead about the naval contribution to 
national strategy... Newport is not, of course, the planning center for 
the Navy. It is, however, one place where naval officers get together 
and try to produce better ideas." 

Nagler, V.Adm. Gordon, USN (Ret.), (ed.) Naval Tactical Command 
and Control . Washington: AFCEA International Press, 1985. See the 
articles in Chapter III: "Tactical Space Assets" and Chapter IV, 
"EW: A Force Multiplier" on how the US Navy uses space and 
electronic warfare systems to resolve a variety of operational 
problems inherent in implementing the Maritime Strategy. 

Nathan, James A., "Leaky Naval Strategy," New York Times . 
January 26, 1983, p 23. Portrays the Reagan administration's "new 
naval strategy" as a "useless military adventure and an "excessive 
pursuit of glory." 

Nathan, James A., "The Return of the Great White Fleet," The 
Nation . March 5, 1983, pp 269-71. Invokes the wrong numbers and 
the wrong arguments to inveigh against the "current wager on naval 
power (as) a dangerous and costly gamble" that "makes nuclear war 
more likely." 

* "NATO Forces Flex Muscles in Norwegian Sea," Virginian-Pilot . 
September 9, 1985, pp 1+. Another fleet view of the strategy. 
V.Adm. Henry C. Mustin, U.S. Second Fleet and NATO Striking 
Fleet Atlantic Commander, on exercising and implementing 
Maritime Strategy in his theater. See also "Protection of Convoy 
Routes a Key Objective for Ocean Safari 85," Jane's Defense 
Weekly . October 5, 1985, pp 749-753. 

* Norton, Capt. Douglas M., "Responding to the Soviet Presence in 
Northern Waters: An American Naval View," in Archer, Clive 
(ed.), The Soviet Union and Northern Waters . London: Croom, 
Helm, 1987. A paper presented in October 1985 at Aberdeen, 
Scotland as part of the dialogue between U.S. Navy strategists and 
allied civilian and military leaders and defense specialists. 

Nunn, Senator Sam, The Need to Reshape' Military Strategy . 
Washington: Georgetown University CSIS, March 18, 1983, p 7. 


Advocates choke point defense, vice carrier-based airpower, vs. the 
Soviet homeland. 

** O'Donnell, Maj. Hugh K, USMC, "Northern Flank Maritime 

Offensive," Proceedings, September 1985, pp 42-57. USN/USMC global 
Maritime Strategy as applied to one region, comprehensive 
commentary on the Maritime Strategy debate. Also "Comment and 
Discussion," October 1985, pp 16, 20; December 1985, pp 20-23. See 
especially January 1986, p 19 letter discussing complementary 
Norwegian Navy operations; and February 1986, pp 19-25 letter by Dr. 
Norman Friedman elaborating on and endorsing the Maritime 
Strategy and placing it in historical context. 

O'Leary, Jeremiah, "Reagan Affirms Goal to Build Navy," 
Washington Times . December 29, 1982, p 6. President Reagan 
reaffirms the necessity for U.S. maritime superiority on the occasion 
of the recommissioning of USS New Jersey in Long Beach, CA on 
December 28, 1982. 

** O'Rourke, Ronald, "U.S. Forward Maritime Strategy," Navv 

International . February 1987, pp 118-122. A thoughtful essay on the 
evolution of the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy during its formative 
years, including a discussion of the "mix of the new and the old" in 
the Navy's strategic thinking, and the relationship between strategy 
and force sizing. O'Rourke makes the important point that rejection 
of the strategy's forward component in favor of reliance on 
"defensive" operations could result in a requirement for more than 
600 ships. 

Oakland Tribune . March 22, 1984, "Reagan's Navy." Editorial attack 
on the U.S. Navy's "preference for big, vulnerable, World War II- 
style fleets," and SECNAV Lehman's "dream of steaming the fleet to 
victory in Soviet home waters." 

Oakland Tribune . March 23, 1984, "A Strategy of Suicide." Compares 
the U.S. Navy's forward strategy with the charge of the light brigade 
during the Crimean War. Cites retired Adm. Stanfield Turner and 
others to the effect that sending the carriers into Northern waters 
would likely result in a "major catastrophe." 

Ownes, Lt. Col. MacKubin Thomas, USMCR, "The Hollow Promise 
of JCS Reform," International Security . Winter 1985-86, pp 98-111, 
especially pp 106-109. Links the strategy debate to the 
contemporaneous debate on JCS "reform": "The JCS reorganization 
debate is really a debate about strategic doctrine." Q£ Best and 
Donatelli February 1987 articles, cited below. 

Perry, Robert, Lorell, Mark A., and Lewis, Kevin, Second-Area 
Operations: A Strategy Option (Publication R-2992-USDP) . Santa 


Monica CA: Rand Corporation, May 1984. Pros, cons, risks and 
uncertainties associated with multi-theater war and "horizontal 
escalation." Historical and analytical survey. 

** "Phoenix," "The SSN-21 and U.S. Maritime Strategy" Submarine 
Review . October 1985, pp 27-31. Discusses linkages between 
threat, strategy and ship design. See also letter by Ulmer, Capt. 
D.M., April i986, pp 58-60, questioning using estimated Soviet 
intentions, vice capabilities, to drive strategy and programs. £|f 
McGruther article cited in Section XI below. 

Pincus, Walter, "Our Carrier Armadas Could Sink the Budget," 
Washington Post . March 25, 1984, pp C-l, C-4. Standard critique of 
the "cost" and "vulnerability" of large-deck aircraft carriers. 

** Polmar, Norman and Truver, Scott C, "The Maritime Strategy," 
Air Force Magazine . November 1987, pp 70-79. A good account 
of the indebtedness of the Maritime Strategy to Adm. Hayward's 
tenure as CNO, and a bleak prognosis for the Navy's "overall 
capabilities to carry out the operational plans, the 'contingency 
operations" that underpin the Maritime Strategy." 

Posen, Barry A., "Inadvertent Nuclear War?" Escalation and 
NATO's Northern Flank," International Security . Fall 1982, pp. 28- 
54. Claims forward U.S. Navy operations in the Norwegian Sea and 
elsewhere are a bad thing. 

Posen, Barry, and Van Evera, Stephen, "Reagan Administration 
Defense Policy: Departure from Containment," in Oye, Kenneth A., 
Lieber, Robert J. and Rothchild, Donald (eds.), Ea gle Defiant: United 
States Foreign Policy in the 1980s . Boston: Little Brown, 1983, pp 67- 
104. Critical of all aspects of Reagan Defense policy and strategy, 
including offensive conventional warfighting, especially with naval 
forces. "Overall, a counteroffensive strategy is a bottomless pit, since 
it generates very demanding missions that cannot be achieved 
without huge expenses, if they can be achieved at all.. .a 
counteroffensive strategy defeats the basic purpose of American 
conventional forces-the control of escalation." Advocates a 10-carrier 

** Powers, Capt. Robert Carney, "Commanding the Offense," 

Proceeding s. October 1985, especially pp 62-63. Central strike warfare 
theme of the Strategy is criticized, along with the tactical 
organization evolved thus far for its implementation. 

Prina, L. Edgar, "Budget Increased Reflect 'A Major Change in 
Naval Strategy,'" Sea Power . April 1981, pp 13-22. Best coverage of 
Secretary Lehman's press conference of March 3, 1981, when he 
unveiled his "major change." See also page 1 of the Wall Street 


Journal . New York Times. Washington Post , and Baltimore Sun . 
March 4, 1981, and George, James L. "US Carriers — Bold New 
Strategy," Navv International . June 1981, pp 330-335. Compare with 
Hayward and Mooer/Cottrell pieces above. 

Record, Jeffrey, and Hanks, R.Adm. Robert J., USN (Ret.). U.S. 
Strategy at the Crossroads . Washington Institute for Foreign Policy 
Analysis, July 1982. Two different arguments for a shift to a national 
maritime strategy, including one by a prominent U.S. Navy strategist 
of the mid-1970s. 

Record, Jeffrey, "Jousting with Unreality: Reagan's Military 
Strategy," International Security . Winter 1983/84, pp 3-18. Also 
"Correspondence," Summer 1984, pp 217-221. Echoes Komer's and 
Turner's stated positions. 

Record, Jeffrey, Revising U.S. Military Strategy: Tailoring Means to 
Ends . Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984. An argument for a 
national maritime strategy, but without the offensive forward 
operations characteristic of the U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy. See 
especially pp 83-86. 

Record, Jeffrey, "Sanctuary Warfare," Baltimore Sun . March 26, 
1985, p 7. Warns that a US attack against the Kola Peninsula could 
trigger Soviet retaliation in kind against the continental United 
States, possibly leading to nuclear escalation. See Adm. Watkins' 
response, "Maritime Strategy: Global and Forward," in the April 16, 
1985 issue of the Baltimore Sun . 

Rivkin, D.B., "No Bastions for thde Bear," Proceedings . April 1984, 
pp 36-43. Also "Comment and iscussion," June 1984, pp 14-15; July 
1984, pp 14-20; August 1974, p 101; September 1984, p 164; October 
1984, pp 97-100; January 1985, p 129, The anti-SSBN mission debate. 

Senate Armed Services Committee, Ninety-Eighth Congress, 
Second Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense 
Authorization for FY85: Part 8 . Washington: GPO, 1985, pp 3851-3900. 
SECNAV and CNO jointly describe Maritime Strategy as component 
of national military strategy, March 1984. Further exposure of the 
Strategy presented by COMO Carolson a year earlier. 

Staudenmaier, Col. William, USA, "One if by Land - Two if by Sea: 
The Continental - Maritime Debate," Army . January 1983, pp 30-37, 
Opening salvo of the "Carlisle School." A leading Army War College 
faculty member contributes to the mispreceptions that the central 
U.S. naval strategy debate is about Maritime Strategy vs. Continental 
Strategy, and that it is driven solely by budgetary considerations. 


Stewart, Maj. Richard A, USMC, "Ships That Can Deliver," 
Proceedings . November 1984, pp 37-43. Amphibious vs. 
prepositioning issues. 

Stockman, David, The Triumph of Politics: How the Reagan 
Revolution Failed. New York: Harper and Row, 1986, pp 280-281. 
Anonymous "experts" ridicule "the theory of 'getting in harm's 
way'" in mid-1981 to President Reagan's gullible budget director. 

"The Defense Budget: A Conservative Debate," Policy Review . 
Summer 1985, pp 12-27, especially pp 20-21. Prominent conservatives 
line up, pro or con, on the 600-ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy 
as they understand it. 

Thomas, Cdr. Raymond E., "Maritime Theater Nuclear Warfare: 
Matching Strategy and Capability," in Essavs on Strateg y. 
Washington: National Defense University Press, 1985, pp 39-51, 
especially p 50. Criticizes US Naval strategy for not addressing 
theater nuclear warfare adequately; disagrees with forward carrier 
operations in high threat areas. 

Tighe, Eugene, Lt. Gen. USAF (Ret.), "We Have a Winning and 
Survivable Navy: Admiral Watkins, CNO," Defense Systems 
Review . June 1983, pp 12-16. Interview with the CNO, covering 
a wide range of mostly procurement-related issues. The Falklands 
War reportedly demonstrated the need for the U.S. Navy to make 
a greater investment in electronic warfare and sealift capabilities. 

Tritten, Cdr. James J., "It's Not Either Or," Wings of Gold . Spring 
1983, pp 49-52. Argues Mahanian concept of U.S. seapower is 
necessary to support U. S. forward defense continental strategy. 

Tritten, Cdr. James J., "Strategic ASW: A Good Idea?," Proceedings . 
January 1984, pp 90, 92. Argues for procuring anti-SSBN systems 
without declaring an anti-SSBN policy. See also his "Strategic ASW," 
Submarine Review . January 1984, pp 52-55, and "The Concept of 
Strategic ASW," Navv International . June 1984, pp 348-350. 

Turner, Adm. Stansfield, USN (Ret.) "Thinking About the Future of 
the Navy," Proceedings . August 1980, pp. 66-69. Also "Comment and 
Discussion," October 1980, p. 101; November 1980, pp 124-127; 
January 1981, p 77. Adm. Turner questions role of power projection 
in general war strategy. 

Turner, Adm. Stansfield, USN (Ret.), "A Strategy for the 90s." New 
York Times Magazine . May 6, 1984, pp 30-40, etc. Argues for focus on 
USN Third World intervention role, amphibious warfare, and 
more/smaller ships. 


Turner, Adm. Stansfield, USN (Ret.), "U.S. Naval Policy," Naval 
Forces . No III/1985, pp 15-25. Update of Turner's thought, 
emphasizing amphibious interventions and North Atlantic SLOC 

U. S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Ninety-Seventh 
Congress, First Session, Nomination of John F. Lehman. Jr.. to be 
Secretary of the Navv. January 28, 1981, Washington: USGPO, 1981. 
"I think the major need of the Navy today is the establishment by the 
President and the Congress of a clearly articulated naval strategy, 
first and foremost." 

* U.S. House Armed Services Committee, Ninety-eighth Congress, 
First Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense 
Authorization for FY84: Part 4 . Washington: GPO, 1983, pp. 47-51. 
COMO Dudley Carlson publicly unveils a version of the U.S. Navy's 
"first cut" Maritime Strategy, February 1983, published later that 

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 
Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session, Report of the Seapower and 
Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee on the 600-Ship Navv . 
November 18, 1985, Washington: USGPO, 1986. The House Seapower 
Subcommittee endorses the Maritime Strategy. Essentially the same 
report is in Bennett, Rep. Charles E., "The 600-Ship Fleet: Is it 
Necessary?" Naval Forces . 11/1986, pp 26-38. 

* U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 
** Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials subcommittee, 

Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session. Hearings: The 600-Ship 
Navv and the Maritime Strategy . Washington: USGPO, 1986. June 
and September 1985 graphics-laden testimony by the Secretary of the 
Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, and several critics and commentators, notably retired 
Admirals Turner and Carroll. With the Proceedings January 1986 
Supplement and related "Comment and Discussion" letters, the most 
comprehensive public statement and discussion of the Navy's official 
views on the Maritime Strategy, although lacking in the in-depth 
discussion of uncertainties which characterized internal Navy 
Maritime Strategy documents. 

** U.S. Navy, First Annual Long Range Planners' Conference: 17-8 

September 1985 . Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
(OP-OOK), 1986. On relationships among the Maritime Strategy 
and U.S. Navy long-range planning, program development, and 

Ullman, Cdr. Harlan K., USN (Ret.), "The Pacific and U.S. Naval 
Policy," Naval Forces . VI/1985, pp 36-48. Sees U.S. Navy Pacific 


experience as a primary driver of Maritime Strategy. Especially good 
as the role of Adm. Thomas Hayward as Pacific Fleet Commander, 
originator of the "Sea Strike" study, and Chief of Naval Operations. 

Ullman, Cdr. Harlan, USN (Ret.), Crisis or Opportunity? U.S. 
Maritime Industries and National Security . Washington: 
Georgetown CSIS, 1984. Pp 4-7 give a good quick summary of the 
basic opposing viewpoints on U.S. naval strategy, eschewing the 
extraneous elements usually dragged in by unknowledgeable would- 
be analysts. 

** Ullman, Harlan K., and Etzold, Thomas H. Future Imperative: 

National Security and the US Navv in the Late 1980s . Washington: 
CSIS, 1985. See especially Ullman's critique of Maritime Strategy, pp 
20-21, and 67. Contrast with Ullman riposte to Turner, Proceedings . 
January 198, p 77. 

Vlahos, Michael, "Maritime Strategy vs. Continental Commitment," 
Orbis . Fall 1982, pp 583-589. Argues that the two approaches are not 
mutually exclusive. 

Vlahos, Michael, "U.S. Naval Strategy: Geopolitical Needs and the 
Soviet Maritime Challenge," in Taylor, William J., Jr., et al. (eds.), 
Strategic Responses to Conflict in the 1980s . Lexington MA: D.C. 
Health, 1984, pp 427-432. 1982 views of a former Naval War College 
faculty member. Especially good on late 1970s internal U.S. Navy 
strategy debates, and as critique of trying U.S. naval strategy too 
closely to the Soviet naval threat. Qf approach taken by McGruther, 
cited in Section XI below. This volume also contains some of 
Ambassador Komer's early and retrospectively most lucid 
arguments, at pp 196-199. 

* Watkins, Adm. James D., "Current Strategy of U.S. Navy, " Los 
Angeles Times . June 21, 1984, p 22 USN rebuttal to Komer, Robert, 
"Carrier Heavy Navy is Waste-Heavy," Los Angeles Times . May 16, 
1984, especially to alleged maritime vs. continental and Navy vs. 
Europe dichotomies. See also Watkins "Posture Statement" testimony 
before Congress, 1983-1986. 

* Watkins, Adm. James D., "Maritime Strategy: Global and Forward," 
Baltimore Sun . April 16, 1985, p 15. USN rejoinder to a variety of 
critics, especially Record, Jeffrey, "Sanctuary Warfare," Baltimore 
Sun . March 16,1 985, p 7. 

** Watkins, Adm. James D., "Reforming the Navy From Within," 
Defense 85 . November 1985, pp 18-20. The CNO on the role of the 
Maritime Strategy within the Navy, and its basic characteristics. 
"We lean heavily on our unified commanders-in-chief and Navy fleet 
commanders to help strengthen, modernize, and then put into 


practice our naval strategy. This plurality of perspective and the 
resulting competition of ideas have made for a robust dynamic 
strategy that recognizes and reflects the complexity of strategic 
issues as viewed by all key U.S. military leaders worldwide, not as 
viewed by a parochial naval bureaucracy in Washington." 

** Watkins, Adm. James D., "The Greatest Potential Problem: Our 

National Willpower," Sea Power. October 1985, p 71. CNO describes 
utility and development process of the Maritime Strategy. 

* Watkins, James D., Adm., USN. "Alliance Maritime Power and 
Deterrence of War." Remarks at the International Seapower 
Symposium, Newport, RI, October 21, 1985. A plea and agenda 
directed at an audience made up largely of allied naval 
representatives for "bringing our common perspectives to bear 
on a common problem" i.e. the integration of U.S. an dallied 
maritime deterrence and war-fighting capabilities and plans into a 
"global coalition deterrence strategy." The CNO's proposed "building 
blocs" toward this goal are: (1) bilateral navy-to-navy talks, (2) 
mutually-supporting bilateral maritime strategy agreements, (3) 
joint regional maritime strategies, (4) war-gaming, and (5) a global 
coalition strategy aimed at maritime deterrence. 

* Watkins, James, D., Adm. USN, "We Are The Real Reformers." 
Remarks at the Current Strategy Forum, Newport, RI, June 19, 1985. 
Declares the Maritime Strategy the centerpiece of contemporary Navy 
strategic thought, tactical developments, force planning, and 
systems procurement. The Maritime Strategy is, reports Watkins, 
the Navy's "strategic vision," initiated and sustained "from within," 
and "without much hoopla and without the help of self-appointed 
military reformers..." 

** West, F.J. "Bing" Jr., "Maritime Strategy and NATO Deterrence," 
Naval War College Review. September-October 1985, pp 5-19. By a 
former Reagan Administration Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
naval strategic thinker, and principal author of "SEAPLAN 2000," a 
1978 progenitor of the Maritime Strategy. Excellent discussion of 
conventional protracted war and deterrence concepts underlying the 

* Wings of Gold . Winter 1981, "CNO Discusses Current Issues." 
Outgoing CNO, Adm. Thomas B. Hayward discusses the need for 

a 600-ship and 15-carrier navy that will "make them worry about our 
being the threat in a very significant way." He predicts that the new 
Reagan administration's "new direction" will make his successor 
"much more able to create havoc in the Kremlin (make Gorshkov 
worry more) which is just what we want to do." 


Wood, Robert S. and Hanley, John P., Jr., "The Maritime Role in 
the North Atlantic," Naval War College Review . November- 
December 1985, pp 5-18. The Naval War College faculty begins to 
weigh in heavily in the public debate. 

Zakheim, Dov S., "The Role of Amphibious Operations in National 
Military Strategy," Marine Corps Gazette . -March 1984, pp 35-39. 
(Deputy Under Secretary of Defense explains Marine missions and 
programs in context of overall administration strategy.) 

Zakheim, Dov., "The Unforeseen Contingency: Reflections on 
Strategy," Washington Quarterly . Autumn 1982, pp. 158-166. (Reagan 
administration maritime strategy in overall military context, by a 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense. 

Zimm, LCdr. Alan D., "The First Salvo." Proceeding s. February 
1985, pp 55-60. Also"Comment and Discussion," April 1985, p 16; 
June 1985, p 132; July 1985, p 106. See especially for timing fo forward 
carrier battle group moves and for strategy issues. 

Zumwalt, Adm. Elmo R., Jr., USN (Ret.) "Naval Battles We Could 
Lose," International Security Review , summer 1981 pp 139-155. (By 
the 1970-1974 U. S. Navy CNO. Argues for more stress on the U.S. 
Navy as "geopolitical cavalry" for low-to-middle-level conflict, and for 
a "distributed force" building program as optimum for the full 
spectrum of naval warfare requirements, including nuclear war at 



In late 1985, Secretary Lehman, Admiral Watkins, and General 
Kelley, having ensured that the Maritime Strategy met their requirements 
and represented both their thinking and that of their superiors, submitted 
manuscripts containing the strategy's basic tenets (less its uncertainties 
and limitations) to the Naval Institute, following the publication of "The 
Maritime Strategy," a special supplement to the January 1986 Proceedings , 
public discussion of the strategy took on a new, sophisticated tone, more 
relevant to the actual requirements of U.S. national security decision 
making. Subsequent statements by President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger and others confirmed for the public that the 
strategy was consistent with higher civilian and military defense guidance. 

In the United States and abroad, discussions ranging from global 
warfare with the Soviets to naval history, fleet balance, and peacetime and 
crisis operations became suffused with the vocabulary and concepts of the 
Maritime Strategy. Much of the writing was now done by senior military 
officers. Most notably, a spate of broad-gauged articles by naval aviation, 
surface, and submarine warfare specialists appeared, transcending 
narrow "unionism." Knowledgeable civilian strategic thinkers and 
historians also offered their cogent commentary on the Strategy. 

Proceedings now served as the primary forum, along with the Naval 
War College Review, Sea Power, and Naval Forces. The arena, however, 
also broadened to include more newspapers and popular magazines. The 
public affairs and national security journals rediscovered the Maritime 
Strategy, but now in a manner that brought together not only academics, 
pundits, and military retirees, but also serving naval professionals. By 
1987, the uniformed naval officer corps once again, as in the days of Alfred 
Thayer Mahan or of the pre-World War II War Plan Orange, had captured 
the high ground and catalyzed thinking about the Navy's role in national 
an alliance strategy. 

"Aircraft Carriers Use Technology, speed to Stage Vanishing Acts 
on High Seas," Baltimore Sun . August 17, 1986, p 16. Discusses U.S. 
Navy countermeasures to Soviet intelligence and targeting at sea, a 
key element in carrying out the Maritime Strategy. 

Archer, Clive and Scrivener, David (eds), Northern Waters: Security 
and Resource Issues . Totowa NJ: Barnes and Noble, 1986. A series of 
survey papers focusing on the Norwegian Sea. See especially Geoffrey 
Till on Strategy, David Hobbs on Military Technology, and Steven 
Miller on Reagan Administration Strategy. The Miller piece is 
essentially an update of his 1983 paper, cited in Section I above. 


Ausland, John C, Nordic Security and the Great Powers . Boulder, 
CO: Westview, 1986. Comprehensive and detailed treatment of the 


Maritime Strategy in peace and war within the overall context of 
Nordic military security. See especially Chapter 20, "The Battle for 
the Norwegian Sea," the author's "climax." 

** Ausland, John, "The Silence on Naval Nuclear Arms Should Be 
Broken," International Herald Tribune . March 12, 1986, p 25. A 
critical look, at naval theater nuclear weapons and war fare and the 
Maritime Strategy. 

Bagley, Adm. Worth H., USN (Ret.), "U.S. Military Power in the 
Pacific: Problems and Prospects," in International Security Council, 
National Security in Northeast Asia . New York: CAUSA Publication, 
April 13-15, 1986. Reverses the usual argument by treating NATO as 
a "second front threat" diverting the Soviets from the Far East. 

** "Bridge Over Troubled Waters," Defense and Foreign Affairs . May 
1986, pp 38-9. On the U.S. Navy's efforts to link technology and 
weapons acquisition to the Maritime Strategy. 

** Brooks, Capt. Linton, "Naval Power and National Security: The Case 
for the Maritime Strategy," International Security . Fall 1986, pp 58- 
87. One of the Strategy's contributors definitively expands on its basic 
elements and on its rationale. Especially useful in discussing the 
rationale for anti-SSBN operations and the Strategy's inherent 
uncertainties, integral aspects of the Maritime Strategy often 
slighted in public official U.S. Navy discussions. 

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Game Plan: The Geostrategic Framework for 
the Conduct of the U.S. — Soviet Contest . Boston: Atlantic Monthly 
Press, 1986. Views role of the Navy as one of "Sea Control" and 
projecting American power into "distant local conflicts," rather than 
carrier strikes on "Soviet home ports" or "strategic nuclear 
warfare." See pp 183-4, 191-2. 

Bunting, Glenn F., "Navy Warms up to Idea of Presence in Cold 
Bering Sea," Los Angeles Times . August 31, 1986, p 3. Maritime 
Strategy as reflected in increased U.S. Navy peacetime North Pacific 

Canby, Steven L., "South Korea's Defense Requires U.S. Air Power, 
Not Troops," Wall Street Journal . July 17, 1986, p 24. Sees limited 
utility of Pacific Fleet carriers in a war with the Soviets. Advocates 
naval force level cuts. 

Chicago Tribune . February 1, 1986, "The 600-Ship Mistake," p 3. 
Worn out argument that the Navy is building the "wrong" fleet for 
the "wrong" problem, and should concentrate instead on building 
"cheap" diesel submarine for offsetting the Soviet Union's 3:1 
underwater advantage. 


, 21 

Clancy, Tom, Red Storm Rising . New York: Putnam, 1986. Fiction. 
Wartime Maritime Strategy implemented under drastically changed 
assumptions, some plausible and some fanciful, to suit the 
storyteller's needs. Soviet fear of global forward pressure leads to pre- 
emptive seizure of Iceland, SSN surge to the Atlantic, but operations 
are somehow limited to Central and Northern Europe only. Inherent 
flexibility and lethality enables NATO navies to adapt rapidly and 
successfully, but with heavy losses. In this vein, see reviews by Capt. 
David G. Clark in Naval War College Review . Winter 1987, pp 139- 
141, and Adm Thomas B. Hayward, USN (Ret.) in Proceedings . 
March 1987, p 164. £f Hackett and McGeorch et al, The Third World 
War; The Untold Storv . cited in Section V below; and Hayes et al, 
American Lake , below, Chapter 19, which addresses the Pacific in a 
hypothetical global war, although probably not in a manner in which 
Capt. Clark or Adm. Hayward would agree. 

Cohen, Eliott A., "Do We Still Need Europe?" Commentary . January 
1986, pp 28-35. A Naval War College faculty member views NATO 
flanks and the Far East as of increasing importance. Sees little utility 
in discussions of stark strategic alternatives, e.g. "Europe vs. the 
Pacific, going it alone vs. having allies, keeping resolutely to the sea 
vs. preparing to engage the Red Army on the continent. 

Connell, John, The New Maginot Line . New York: Arbor House, 
1986, pp 71-81. Another journalist, this time British, for whom the 
strategy debate is largely between Secretary Lehman and 
Ambassador Komer, and solely driven by budgetary considerations. 
Arguments totally derivative from other journalists. It would have 
been news four years earlier. 

* Cropsey, Seth, "Forward Defense or Maginot Line? The Maritime 

Strategy and its Alternatives," Policy Review . Fall 1986, pp 40- 46. 
An excellent restatement of the Navy's arguments by the Deputy 
Under Secretary of the Navy for Policy. Particularly useful on the 
historical background of the Maritime Strategy. 

Daniel, Donald C, Anti-Submarine Warfare and Superpower 
Strategic Stability . Champagne IL: University of Illinois Press, 1986. 
An excellent survey by a Naval War College faculty member. 
Concludes that "It seem(s) implausible the U.S. could so reduce the 
number of Soviet SSBNs that the U.S.S.R. might be pushed into using 
the remainder." See especially pp 151-157. 

** Defense Choices: Greater Security with Fewer Dollars . Washington: 
Committee for National Security, 1986. The Committee's annual 
attack on the Maritime Strategy and the 600-Ship Navy. "There is no 
need to ask the U.S. Fleet to take on high risk missions close to Soviet 
shores." Advocates a "return to a more sensible naval strategy." 


Unlike the Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-driven document. 
This study achieved a certain notoriety due to its endorsement by Dr. 
Larry Korb, a former Reagan Administration defense official and 
earlier advocate of a 600-ship Navy. 

* Demars, V.Adm. Bruce, "The U.S. Submarine Force," Naval 

Forces. IV/1986, pp 18-30 and "Speech at the Submarine 
Symposium, Lima, Peru," Submarine Review . January 1987, pp 
5-12. By the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine 
Warfare. See especially pp 20-21 of the former and 8-11 of the latter on 
the role of U.S. and allied submarines in the Maritime Strategy: "We 
dare not go it alone." 

** Doerr, Capt. P.J., "CWC Revisited," Proceeding s. April 1986, pp 39- 
43. Organizing the Battle Force to implement the Maritime Strategy. 
Contrast with Capt. Powers' October 1985 Proceedings views. 

** "Dossier: U.S. Report," Naval Forces . VI/1986, p 132. Alleges there is 
current "indecision about what a U.S. Maritime Strategy should 
comprise. A remarkable piece of reportage for October 1986, there's 
always 10 percent who don't get the word. 

** Drury, F., "Naval Strike Warfare and the Outer Air Battle," Naval 

Forces . IV/1986, pp 46-52. Sees the Maritime Strategy as merging the 
two concepts, which he feels had grown apart, into one coherent plan 
to defeat the Soviet air threat. 

Elliott, Frank, "Exon Says Maritime Plan Could Trigger War," 
Defense Week, December 8, 1986, p 16. Senator Exon opposes the anti- 
SSBN aspects of the maritime Strategy. "There are good elements in 
that strategy, but much of it concerns me." 

** Epstein, Joshua M., The 1987 Defense Budg et. Washington: 
Brookings, 1986. Brookings' annual attach on the Maritime 
Strategy. Pp 13, 41-45 and 55-58 reject the Maritime Strategy as 
"inefficient and potentially escalatory: and recommend U.S. Navy 
force posture cuts accordingly. Sees defense of Norway as not 
requiring significant U.S. naval forces. Arguments derived from 
Kaufmann, Komer, Posen, and the Congressional Budget Office. 
Unlike the Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-driven document. 

** Fouquet, David, "NATO Soldiers March Into Autumn, Testing 

Tactics, Equipment, Systems," Defense News . September 15, 1986, p 
14. The Allies test the Maritime Strategy on the Northern Front. 

** Friedman, Norman, "U.S. Strategy and ASW," Jane's Defense 
Weekly . November 19, 1986, pp 1269-1277. An update of Dr. 
Friedman's thought on the Maritime Strategy, ASW, and the SSN-21. 


** Gordon, Michael R., "Officials say Navy Might Attack Soviet A- Arms 
in Nonnuclear War," New York Times . January 7, 1986, p 1. See also 
(New York) Daily News . January 8, 1986, p C-10; The Oregonian . 
January 9, 1986, p CIO; Los Angeles Times . January 10, 1986, p 4; 
Boston Globe . January 11, 1986; New York Times . January 12, 1986, p 
E-l; and The Times (London), February 26, 1986. Initial press 
comment on publication of "The Maritime Strategy" by the Naval 
Institute. Ignores all strategy issues except the anti-SSBN operations 

* Gray, Colin S., "Keeping the Soviets Landlocked: Geostrategy for a 

Maritime America," The National Interest . Summer 1986, pp 24-36. 
Masterful discussion of the relationships between geopolitics and the 
Maritime Strategy. 

** Gray, Colin S., Maritime Strategy. Geopolitics, and the Defense of the 
West . New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1986. An 
extension of his classic 1977 work on geopolitics, focusing on 
implications for U.S. national military strategy. The footnotes 
include some excellent rebuttals to the arguments of Ambassador 
Komer. A new classic. 

** Gray, Colin, "Maritime Strategy," Proceedings . February 1986, pp 34- 
42. Supportive commentary by a top-ranked civilian geopolitician and 
strategist. Especially helpful in untangling arguments regarding 
"horizontal escalation." 

Greeley, Brendan M., Jr., "Third fleet Increases North Pacific 
Operations to Counter Soviet Activity," Aviation Week and Space 
Technolog y. December 22, 1986, pp 28-29. On V.Adm. Diego 
Hernandez and the Third Fleet North Pacific buildup, especially joint 
and allied coordination. 

** Halloran, Richard, "A Silent Battle Surfaces," New York Times 
Magazine . December 7, 1986, pp 60, 94-97. On the anti-submarine 
warfare component of the Maritime Strategy. 

Hampton, L.Cdr. J. P., "Integrated Air Defense for NATO," 
Proceeding s. September 1986, pp 114-116. On integrating U.S. Navy 
carrier battle groups with U.S. and allied air force aircraft to counter 
the Soviet air threat on the NATO Southern Front: an essential 
component of the maritime Strategy too often overshadowed in the 
public debate by discussion of the Northwest Pacific and especially 
the Norwegian Sea. 

** Hart, Senator Gary, with Lind, William S., America Can Win: The 
Case for Military Reform . Bethesda MD: Adler & Adler, 1986, pp 77- 
81 . Criticizes the Maritime Strategy for its linkages to the land war in 
Europe, its early forward focus, and its relationship to current force 


structure. Major concern, however, seems to be with the semantics of 
the term "Maritime Strategy." 

** Hayes, Peter, Zarsky, Lyuba, and Bello, Walden, American Lake: 
Nuclear Peril in the Pacific . New York: Penguin, 1986. Thorough 
and extensive analysis of the Maritime Strategy and much else, but 
in a shrill, leftist, Australian context. See especially Chapters 8 and 
16, and Chapter 19, a fictional scenario. They understand that "What 
appeared a mere budget battle was in fact a conflict over military 

Hinge, Lt. A., RAN, "The Strategic Balance in the Asia-Pacific 
Region: Naval Aspects," Journal of the Australian Naval Institute . 
August 1986, pp 31-50. Poses important questions regarding USN 
force posture requirements in each oceanic theater, and potential 
naval roles of Pacific allies, China, and ASEAN. Very sanguine 
regarding Western maritime superiority in the Pacific. 

* Huges, V.Adm. Thomas J., Jr., "Logistics Became Legitimate," Sea 
Power . May 1986, pp 17-24, especially p 22. By the Deputy Chief of 
Naval Operations for Logistics. "The logistics of the Navy are 
matched to our maritime strategy." 

Hughes, Capt. Wayne P., Jr., USN (Ret.), Fleet Tactics: Theory and 
Practice . Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986. By a Naval 
Postgraduate School faculty member. Shot through with important 
insights on naval strategy and its relationship to tactics. See 
especially Chapter 1 on the relationship between war at sea and war 
ashore, and Chapter 9 on the relationship between peacetime and 
wartime naval missions. 

Isherwood, Julien, "Russia Warns Oslo on U.S. Base," Daily 
Telegraph . August 13, 1986. Cites major Soviet propaganda offensive 
against forward battle group operations in the Norwegian Sea, the so 
called "Lehman Doctrine." 

* Jervell, Sverre and Nyblom, Kare (eds.), The Military Buildup in ** 
the High North: American and Nordic Perspectives . Lanham MD: 
University Press of America, 1986. 1985 Harvard conference. Eliot 
Cohen, Robert Weinland, Barry Posen, V.Adm. Henry Mustin and 
a number of distinguished British and Nordic officials, military 
officers, and thinkers debate the Maritime Strategy and much else. 

Kaufmann, William W., A Reasonable Defense . Washington: 
Brookings, 1986, especially pp 72-92. Kaufmann's annual attack on 
his own highly personal interpretation of the Maritime Strategy, 
ceding the Mediterranean totally to indigenous allied naval forces but 
sailing a major fleet into the Indian Ocean. Unlike the Maritime 
Strategy, solely aimed at influencing legislative budgetary decisions. 


* Kelley, Gen. P.X., "The United States Marine Corps Today," Sea 
Power . April 1986, pp 82-97. See especially pp 83-86 for an overview of 
the Maritime Strategy from the Commandant of the Marine Corps 

Kennedy, Col. William V., USAR (Ret.), "New NE Asian 
Geography?", Naval War College Review . March- April 1986, pp 91-92. 
An extreme view of the role of Pacific operations. Calls for a North 
Pacific Maritime Strategy to split the Soviet Far East from the rest of 
the country at the Urals. 

Landersman, Capt. S.D., USN (Ret.), "Naval Protection of Shipping: 
A Lost Art?" Naval War College Review . March- April 1986, pp 23-34. 
By a member of the initial U.S. Navy Strategic Studies Group at 
Newport. Excellent critique of U.S. Navy attitudes and practices 
regarding Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) as well as Naval 
Protection of Shipping (NPS), essential but too-little-discussed aspects 
of the Maritime Strategy which are often overshadowed by discussion 
of concomitant forward operations. See also his "I am a... Convoy 
Commodore," Proceeding s. June 1986, pp 56-63. 

** Lapham, Lewis H., "Notebook: Pictures at an Exhibition," Harper's . 
March 1986, pp 8-9. A bizarre, overwritten exposition on the 
Maritime Strategy as propaganda and the U.S. Navy as incompetent. 

* Lehman, Hon. John F., Jr., Maritime Strategy in the Defense of 
NATO . Washington: CSIS, September 25, 1986. His 1986 views: 
"No maritime strategy can be a successful strategy without an 
effective land deterrent on the continent of Europe. The forward 
strategy articulated by the Reagan administration is, in fact, 
orthodoxy of the oldest sort, conforming precisely to NATO alliance 
doctrine. In summary, we have a maritime strategy in the defense 
of NATO that is universally accepted by the maritime forces of 
Europe and the United States." 

* Lehman, John F., "The U.S. Secretary of the Navy: Towards the 
600-Ship Fleet," Naval Forces . No. 1/1986, pp 14-23. Update of 
Lehman's thought. 

Liska, George, "From containment to Concert," Foreign Policy . 
Spring 1986, pp 3-23, and "Concert Through Decompression," 
Summer 1986, pp 108-129. U.S./Soviet rivalry seen as "fed primarily by 
its own momentum and, at bottom, by the timeless asymmetry 
between land and sea powers." Argues, however, for a "land-sea 
power concert" by the two. "The salience of sea-over land-based power 
has diminished as the principal maritime power finds it increasingly 
difficult to maintain clear naval superiority." 


* "Maritime Strategy Seminar," Proceeding s. August 1986, pp 8-**10. 
Former SACLANT/CINCLANT Adm. Wesley McDonald, former 
Undersecretary of Defense Robert Komer, former Assistant Secretary 
of Defense Bing West, and then-U.S. Second Fleet/NATO Striking 
Fleet Atlantic Commander V.Adm. Henry Mustin debate the 
Maritime Strategy. For more details, see the excellent Maritime 
Strategy Seminar Transcript . Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1986. 

** Mather, Ian, "NATO Row Over Boundary Shift," Sunday London 

Observer . June 16, 1986. Sees Secretary of Defense Weinberger's call 
for an expanded NATO reach beyond Europe as derived from the 
Maritime Strategy. 

* Matthews, William, "Marines Would Storm by Air, Not Sea if NATO 
Attacked," Navv Times . December 1, 1986'. Despite the misleading 
headline, an otherwise generally accurate rendering of the views of 
the principal USMC global strategist, B. Gen. Michael Sheridan, on 
the role of the Marines in North Norway as part of the Maritime 

** Mearsheimer, John, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy 

and Deterrence in Europe," International Security . Fall 1986, pp 3-57. 
Despite its biases, distortions, and misleading discussions of the 
development of the Maritime Strategy over time, probably the most 
important piece of writing critical of the Strategy to date. Faults the 
Maritime Strategy for its "elastic quality," actually regarded by U.S. 
naval officers as one of its great deterrent and warfighting strengths. 
This West Point graduate and former U.S. Air Force officer's bottom 
line: "The key to deterrence is not the Navy, but the forces that will be 
fighting on the Central Front. Those forces would be given first 
priority when deciding how to allocate defense budgets." 

* "Message to Moscow: Be My Guest," The Navy," Newsweek . 
February 3, 1986, pp 16-17. V.Adm. Henry C. Mustin on U.S. 
Second Fleet implementation of the Maritime Strategy. 

** Morring, Frank, Jr., "Navy Chief: 'Forward Defense' Doesn't Mean 
Kamakazi Missions," Nashua (NH) Telegraph . November 26, 1986. 
First reported public discussion of the Maritime Strategy by the new 
CNO, Adm. Carlisle Trost, with a critique by Brookings Institute 
researcher Joshua Epstein. 

* Mustin, V.Adm. Hebry C, "Maritime Strategy from the Deckplates," 
Proceedings . September 1986, pp 33-37. U.S. Navy Second 
Fleet/NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic Commander's positive views on 
the utility of the Maritime Strategy to an operational commander. See 
also "Comment and Discussion," November 1986, p 14. 


* Mustin, V.Adm. Henry C, "The Role of the Navy and Marines in the 
Norwegian Sea," Naval War College Review . March- April 1986, pp 2- 
6. The NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic Commander on U.S. and NATO 
Maritime Strategy in the Norwegian Sea. See also "In My View...," 
Autumn 1986, pp 101-2. 

** O'Neil, W.D., Capt., USNR, "Executing the Maritime Strategy," U.S. 
Naval Institute Proceedings . December 1986, pp 39-42. Argues that 
Soviet technological strides in submarine quieting, anti- submarine 
warfare, and air defenses will make the execution of an anti-SSBN 
bastion offensive increasingly difficult. The "solution" for the U.S. 
Navy, concludes the author, will lie especially with the further 
development of "stealth" technologies. 

O'Rourke, Ronald, "Tomakhawk: The U.S. Navy's New Option," 
Naw International . July 1986, pp 394-398. Good coverage of the 
benefits and problems associated with integrating sea-launched 
cruise missiles into the Maritime Strategy. 

** O'Shea, James, "U.S. Sink Billions into New Attack Sub," Chicago 
Tribune . July 20, 1986, p 1. On the role of the SSN-21 Seawolf in the 
future Maritime Strategy. 

** "Ocean Safari "85: Meeting the Threat in the North Atlantic," All 
Hands . January 1986, pp 20-29. Publicizes close-in convoy defense, 
coastal defense, and mine countermeasures aspects of the strategy, 
as well as strike warfare and tactical innovations. 

Oliver, James R. and Nathan, James A. "Concepts, Continuity and 
Change," in Cimbala, Stephen, (ed), The Reagan Defense Program: 
An Interim Assessment . Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources, 1986, 
pp 1-22. See Reagan Administration naval strategy and force 
planning as derived essentially from concepts and goals developed by 
the Navy in the late 1970s. 

Parry, Don, "U.S. Navy's Role in Space," Naw International . August 


1986, p 477. Quotes Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for C° and 
Space Ann Berman on the role of space in the Maritime Strategy. 

* Pendley, R.Adm. William, "Comment and Discussion: The Maritime 
Strategy," Proceedings . June 1986, pp 84-89. This ostensible response 
to an earlier "Comment and Discussion" item is actually an 
important official amplification of the Maritime Strategy by the 1985- 
86 Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy (OP-60), the Navy's 
principal global strategist. 


Polmar, Norman, "600 Ships-Plus or Minus?," Proceeding s. 
August 1986, pp 107-108. The author's views on the relationship 
between the Strategy and the 600-Ship Navy force level goals. "While 


some would argue with specific components of both the strategy and 
the ships that Lehman seeks, it is a coherent and long-term plan... 
one that Congress has long demanded from the Navy and the other 

** Polmar, Norman, "The Soviet Navy: Nuclear War at Sea," 
Proceedings. July 1986, pp 111-113. See also "Comment and 
Discussion," Proceeding s , September 1986, p 90. "The Maritime 
Strategy must be challenged for its lack of definition in how we are to 
deter nuclear war at sea." 

** Reed, Fred, "Soldiering: Navy's Sensitivity Works Against It," 
Washington Times . March 27, 1986, p 2. Criticizes U.S. Navy 
explanations of the strategy as lacking in "strategic substance," 
a rather ironic criticism given the author's own arguments. 

"Rust to Riches: The Navy is Back," U.S. News and World Report . 
August 4, 1986, pp 28-37. SECNAV John Lehman's influence on 
naval strategy seen as paramount. 

Ryan, Capt T.D., "SUBDEVRON TWELVE: In the Global War 
Games," Submarine Review . July 1986, pp 39-40. Good examples of 
uses of Naval War College Global War Games to test the Maritime 
Strategy and to identify problems needing new technological and 
tactical solutions. 

* "Sailing the Cold Seas," Surface Warfare . May-June 1986, pp 6-8. On 
the steps being examined and taken to increase U.S. Navy ability to 
operate in northern latitudes as required by the Maritime Strategy. 

* Samuel, Peter, "State Dept., Navy Agree on Opening Pacific Front in 
** Case of War in Europe," New York Citv Tribune . June 23, 1986, p 1. 

State Department's Director of Policy Planning espouses views 
congruent with the Maritime Strategy, especially regarding global 
nature of war with the Soviet Union and early anti-submarine 
operations. For an updated version of these views, see Solomon 1987 
article cited below. See also Bedard, Paul, "Pacific Waters Boil With 
American and Soviet Warships," Defense Week . June 23, 1986, p 1; 
and Elliott, Frank, "U.S. Looks to Pacific Fleet to Help Europe" and 
"Soviet Power Grows," Navv Times . July 7, 1986, pp 29 & 32. 

* Schoultz, V.Adm. Robert F., "Strikefleet: Cost-Effective Power," 
Armed Forces . October 1986, pp 446-448. Deputy Commander-in- 
Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe and former Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations for Air Warfare on the role of the Carrier Battle Group in 
Maritime Strategy. 

Smith, Lee, "How the Pentagon Can Live On Less," Fortune . July 21, 
1986, pp 78-85. See especially p 87. Fortune and ex-Reagan 


Administration official Richard DeLauer oppose as misguided the 
"Lehman developed forward strategy," construed as carrier strikes 
on Murmansk, Vladivostok, and Petropavlovsk. For more on 
DeLauer's negative views, see "Interview: Richard DeLauer on 
Defense," Technology Review . July 1986, pp 58-67. 

** Stefanick, Tom A., "America's Maritime Strategy — The Arms 
Control Implications," Arms Control Today . December 1986, pp 
10-17. Appears to favor the Maritime Strategy more than he did in 
July. "The implicit threat to Soviet ballistic missile submarines 
during a conventional naval conflict would be likely to yield an 
advantage to the U.S. Navy in the conventional balance at sea. ..The 
likelihood of widespread escalation of the use of nuclear weapons as a 
direct result of threats or even attacks on Soviet SSBNs in their home 
waters appears to be low." 

** Stefanick, Tom, "Attacking the Soviet Sea Based Deterrent: Clever 
Feint or Foolhardy Maneuver?", F.A.S. Public Interest Report . 
June- July 1986, pp 1-10. The author seems to lean more to the 
"foolhardy maneuver" persuasion. "The U.S. must reduce the 
current emphasis on submarine operations in waters heavily 
defended by the Soviet Union." But cf his December article, below. 

* "Surface Warfare: What Does The Future Hold?" Annapolis: U.S. 
Naval Institute Professional Seminar Series Transcript, February 12, 
1986, pp 19-20. R.Adm. Dennis Brooks, COMCARGRU 7, on the 
Maritime Strategy. Another Admiral whom Stansfield Turner never 

** Tellis, Ashley J., "The Soviet Navy, Central America and the 

Atlantic Alliance," Naval Forces . IV,1986, pp 54-60. Endorse the 
Maritime Strategy for its geopolitical logic, especially regarding 
forward operations. 

* "The Future Mix of Subs and Strategy," Proceeding s. December 1986, 
** pp 11-12. The Director of U.S. Navy Attack Submarine Programs, the 

Naval War College Professor of Submarine Warfare, and two noted 
civilian naval analysts debate the role of the U.S. submarine force in 
the Maritime Strategy. For more than this brief summary, see "The 
Future Mix of Subs and Strategy," Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute 
Professional Seminar Series, September 25, 1986. 

** "The United States Navy: On the Crest of the Wave," The Economist . 
April 19, 1986, pp 49-65. Strategy and programs. 


Train, Adm. Harry, USN (Ret.), "Seapower and Projection Forces," 
in American Defense Annual . 1986-1987, Lexington MA: Lexington 
Books, 1986, pp 128-129. This former Sixth Fleet and Atlantic Theater 
Commander updates his views on the Maritime Strategy. Book also 


contains routine arguments by Ambassador Komer. More detailed 
and controversial views by Adm. Train can be found in George, 
James L. (ed), The Soviet and Other Communist Navies: The View 
from the Mid-1980s . Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986, pp 283- 

** Truver, Scott C, "Can We Afford The 15-Carrier Battle Group 
Navy?", Armed Forces Journal International . July 1986, pp 74- 
81 . On the relationship between the Maritime Strategy and carrier 
force levels. 

* U. S. House of Representative, Committee on Appropriations, 
Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second Session, Hearings on the 
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1987: Part 1 . February 26, 
1986, pp 500-504 and 547-550. Admiral Watkins and Secretary 
Lehman respond to congressional questioning by Rep. Les AuCoin on 
the Maritime Strategy. "The decision to go after an SSBN in time of 
conflict would be a presidential decision." 

* U. S. Navy Appears to Expand Operations in Pacific Ocean," Jane's 
Defense Weekly . December 17, 1986, pp 1474-1475. Interview with V. 
Adm. Hernandez on new peacetime measures to more successfully 
deter war or, should deterrence fail, conduct wartime operations in 
the North Pacific in accordance with the Maritime Strategy. 

** "U.S. Maritime Strategy for the 1980s," Security Dig est. The Wilson 
Center, November 1986. Capt. Linton Brooks and Prof. John 
Mearsheimer debate the Maritime Strategy. 

* U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Ninety-Ninth Congress, 
Second Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense 
Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987: Part 1 . 
February 5, 1986, Washington: USGPO, 1986, pp 82-83. The Secretary 
of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testify on the 
budget and, in response to questioning from Senator Nunn, on anti- 
SSBN operations. A key Maritime Strategy element enunciated by the 
highest Defense Department officials. See also Wilson, George C. and 
Weisskopf, Michael, "Pentagon Plan Coldly Received," Washington 
Post . February 6, 1986, p A14; Weinberger, Caspar, "U.S. Defense 
Strategy," Foreign Affairs . Spring 1986, p 695; and Andrews, Walter, 
"Weinberger Warns of 'Hollow Strategy,'", Washington Times. July 
30, 1986, p 4. 

** Ullman, Cdr. Harlan K., USN (Ret.), "Precept for Tomorrow: A Busy 
Agenda Awaits the Next CNO," Sea Power. May 1986, pp 48-51. Sees a 
need for the new Chief of Naval Operations to examine the future 
maritime environment as well as the reactions of U.S. and foreign 
political and military leaders to the Maritime Strategy. 


Watkins, Adm. James D., "Laurels, Accomplishments, and Violent 
Peace," Sea Power . April 1986, pp 6-20. See especially pp 9-10, on the 
rationale for publishing the Maritime Strategy. 

* Watkins, Adm. James D., "Power Projection — Maritime Forces 
Making a Strategic Difference," NATO's Sixteen Nations . February- 
March 1986, pp 102-106. CNO discusses Maritime Strategy within a 
NATO context. N.B. This annual special issue contains articles 
signed by most of NATO's naval chiefs. 

* Watkins, Adm. James D., "The Maritime Strategy," Kelley, Gen. 
**P. X., and O'Donnell, Maj. Hugh, "Amphibious Warfare Strategy," 
and Lehman, John F., Jr., "The 600-Ship Navy," Proceedings . 
January 1986 "The Maritime Strategy" Supplement. Also "Comment 
and Discussion," February 1986, pp 26-28; March 1986, pp 18-21 by 
Col. John Collins USA (Ret.) raises 20 questions; May 1986, p 25; 
June 1986, p 83 questions nuclear aspects of the strategy; and pp 84- 
89, by R.Adm. William Pendley answers Collins' questions and 
elaborates on the strategy; July 1986, pp 24-27, posits significant 
Soviet forward submarine operations; August 1986, p 10, still more 
questions from the insatiable Col. Collins; January 1987, pp 25-30, 
argues for new role for PHMs in the Maritime Strategy; and April 
1987, pp 22-27, another response to Col. Collins by the indefatigable 
R.Adm. Pendley. 

* Weinberger, Casper, "The Spirit and Meaning of the USS Theodore 
Roosevelt," Defense Issues . Vol 1 No 76, November 24, 986. The 
Maritime Strategy as a component of national military strategy by the 
Secretary of Defense. 'The greatest value of President Reagan's 
maritime strategy is that it focuses on the crucial issue of how we 
can best use our maritime forces and those of our allies to achieve the 
basic goal of deterrence, and deny the adversary his preferred 
warfighting strategy." Summarized in Wilson, George, "USS 
Theodore Roosevelt Joins Active Service as 15th Carrier," 
Washington Post . October 26, 1986, p A21; and Mathews, William, 
"Carrrier Theodore Roosevelt 'Charges' to Life," Navv Times . 
November 10, 1986, pp 33 & 37. 

** West, Francis J., Jr., et al., Naval Forces and Western Security . 

Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986. Contains two essays: "U.S. 
Naval Forces and NATO Planning" by West, pp 1-9; and "NATO's 
Maritime Defenses" by Jacquelyn K. Davis, James E. Dougherty, 
R.Adm. Robert J. Janks USN (Ret.) and Charles M. Perry, pp 10-53. 
West restates his 1985 Proceeding s article assertion that there is a 
profound divergence between U.S. and West European prespective, 
on the purpose and potential contribution of naval forces in NATO 
contingency planning, although it is sometimes difficult to 
understand which Americans and Europeans he is talking about. 


The other essay offers an overview of current issues regarding the 
role of naval forces in NATO strategy. 

** Wettern, Desmond, "Maritime Strategy: Change or Decay," Navv 
International. May 1986, pp 304-308. Endorsement of the Maritime 
Strategy by a prominent British naval affairs writer. Questions, 
however, whether SLOC interdiction remains as low a Soviet priority 
under Adm. Chernavin as it did under Adm Gorshkov. 

Williams., Cdr. E. Cameron, USNR, "The Four 'Iron Laws' of Naval 
Protection of Merchant Shipping," Naval War College Review . May- 
June 1986, pp 35-42. An argument for convoying. Sees the SLOC 
protection debate as between convoying and "sanitized lanes." 
Oblivious, however, to the debate between either or both of these 
options and forward defense, the more topical issue. See also "In My 
View," Naval War College Review . Autumn 1986, pp 108-109, and 
Spring 1987, pp 91-92. 

** Winkler, Philippa, "A Dangerous Shift in Naval Strategy," Oakland 
Tribune . July 7, 1986. Decries the Navy's "forward offensive strategy" 
for going "beyond legitimate defense purposes." 

** Winnefeld, Lt. James A., Jr., "Topgun: Getting It Right," 

Proceeding s. October 1986, pp 141-146. The Navy Fighter Weapons 
School seen as a key contributor to the Maritime Strategy's execution, 
by the School's training officer, one of the new generation of naval 
officers for whom the Maritime Strategy is truly the cornerstone of 
his profession. 

** Wood, Robert and Hanley, John, "The Maritime Role in the North 

Atlantic," Atlantic Community Quarterly . Summer 1986, pp 133-144. 
Latest incarnation of this oft reprinted article by two Naval War 
College faculty members. 

** Wood, Robert S., "Maritime Strategy for War in the North," Journal 
of Defense & Diplomacy . September 1986, pp 17-20. Portrays the U.S. 
Navy's maritime strategy as a conventional long-war alternative to 
NATO's avowed reliance to early recourse to nuclear weapons. 




The first half of 1987 saw the Maritime Strategy firmly in place as an 
acknowledged vital element of U.S. and allied military strategy. President 
Reagan, Defense Secretary Weinberger, Deputy Defense Secretary Taft, and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Crowe, all publicly cited its 
importance and utility. Likewise, James H. Webb, Jr. (John Lehman's 
successor as SECNAV), Admiral Carlisle Trost (Admiral Watkins' 
successor as CNO), and a number of other top flag officers provided 
numerous examples of the extent to which it had become the common 
strategic framework of the naval leadership. Perhaps the best illustration of 
this phenomenon was, however, the July 1987 issue of the Proceeding s. 
Therein, the Maritime Strategy formed the baseline for a wide range of 
discussions of specific U.S. and allied peacekeeping and warfighting 
issues: by active duty U.S. Navy junior officers, senior officers, and 
admirals; by naval aviators, surface warfare officers, submariners and a 
Marine; and by officers concerned with inter-allied relations, regional 
strategic objectives, fleet operations, and weapons system employment and 

** "Analysis: U.S. Carriers," RUSI . March 1987, pp 1+2. Drags out yet 
again the false choice between a Continental or Maritime Strategy as 
an issue. Claims West Germany "would object strongly if moves were 
made to convert the Maritime Strategy into the U.S.'s general war 
strategy." It is, in part, and they haven't at all. Q£ Bonn's actual 
White Paper 1985 . cited in Section V below. 

Arkin, William, A., "Our Risky Naval Strategy Could Get Us All 
Killed," Washington Post . July 3, 1988, p C-l. A "sampling" of recent 
U.S. Navy exercises that Arkin claims "prove" the deliberately 
provocative nature of the Navy's maritime strategy. He concludes 
with a call for an investigation of the Navy's "practices and strategies 
(that) threaten international peace in a way that land-based military 
activity does not." 

Arkin, William, "Troubled Waters: The Navy's Aggressive War 
Strategy," Technology Review . January 1989, pp 54-63. Contrary to 
appearances, charges Arkin, the Navy has not abandoned its "actual 
war plans" which, he says, are "belligerent, dangerously 
ambiguous," the "most likely avenue for escalation all the way to 
nuclear war," and too "provocative" and "de-stabilizing" to be left to 
an "intransigent naval bureaucracy." Arkin proposes that maritime 
strategy be replaced with an all-encompassing arms control strategy 
that, if consummated, would, in fact, relegate the U.S. Navy to a 
chapter in history. 

** Baer, George W., Manila Bav to the Norwegian Sea: Dimensions of 
U.S. Naval Strategy Since 1890 (forthcoming in 1988). By a Naval War 
College faculty member. 


** Barnett, Capt. Roger W., USN (Ret.), "The Maritime Continental 
Debate Isn't Over," Proceedings . June 1987, pp 28-34. Still more on 
the two famous alleged "mindsets," by one of the most prominent 
crafters of the Maritime Strategy. Also, see "Comment and 
Discussion," August 1987, p 30. 

** Barnett, Capt. Roger, USN (Ret.), Bernstein, Alvin, and Gray, Colin 
(eds.), Maritime Strategy: A Textbook (forthcoming in 1987). 
Collaboration by a former pre-eminent U.S. Navy strategist, a Naval 
War College Strategy Department head and a distinguished civilian 
strategic thinker. 

** Barnett, Roger W., "U.S. Maritime Strategy: Sound and Safe," 

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists . September 1987, pp 30-33. Written as 
a contribution to the Bulletin 's special issue on "Superpower Arms 
Race at Sea," this is one of the best strategic explanations of the 
maritime strategy. Barnett makes the point that the maritime 
strategy's principal value is its contribution to the deterrence of 
Soviet-initiated war. The maritime strategy's value as a deterrent, he 
explains, rests with its escalatory options — vertical, horizontal, or 
temporal. Barnett points out that the maritime strategy addresses 
coalition warfare against the Soviet Union, and not "other conflict 
possibilities or adversaries." 

** Beatty, Jack, "In Harm's Way," The Atlantic . May 1987, pp 37-53. 
Having listened to naval leaders and to college professors, Beatty 
sides with the college professors. His criticisms, however, place 
beside Theo Rudnak's sensationalist artwork. See also August 1987, 
pp 6-10, for retorts by Norman Friedman, Richard Best, Mark 
Jordan, Bing West and Colin Gray, and a final rejoinder by Beatty, 
who apparently believes the Maritime Strategy calls for carrier 
operations in the BJack Sea. 

** Bennett, Charles E., "The Maritime Strategy" in "Comment and 

Discussion," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings . January 1988, pp 91- 
92. A spirited rebuttal by the chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee's Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials 
Subcommittee to key critics of the maritime strategy, including 
Mearsheimer, Gould, and Beatty. Rejects their arguments that (a) 
the 600-ship fleet is being built at the expense of Army and Air Force 
needs in the NATO area, (b) a "static" defense of the North Atlantic is 
preferable to a forward offensive, and (c) war can be won with a 
defensive strategy. The Navy's failure to prepare against mines in 
the Persian Gulf is blamed on "leadership, either in the White House 
or in the Pentagon," not the Maritime Strategy. 


Best, Richard, "Will JCS Reform Endanger the Maritime Strategy?" 
National Defense : February 1987, pp 26-30. "The passage of JCS 
reform will provide a future administration with a handle on defense 


policy that will allow it to override previous strategic conceptions, 
including the Navy's maritime strategy, (which) will come under 
heavy criticism by those using arguments derived from the approach 
of the systems analysts." Best decries this since "only the Navy has 
thought through the implications of the continuum of operations in a 
way which will not cause civilian populations to shrink in horror." 

Bliss, Elsie, "Fleet Hardening: Responding to the Nuclear Threat," 
All Hands . April 1987, pp 30-31. On USN efforts to "harden" its ships, 
aircraft, and equipment against nuclear attack. 

** Brooks, Capt. Linton, "Conflict Termination Through Maritime 
Leverage," in Cimbala, Steven and Dunn, Keith (eds.), Conflict 
termination and Military Strategy: Coercion. Persuasion, and War . 
Boulder CO: Westview, 1987. Actually written a year before his 1986 
International Security article, for a 1985 Naval War College 
conference on war termination. 

** Brooks, Capt. Linton, "The Nuclear Maritime Strategy," 

Proceedings . April 1987 pp 33-39. A major contributor to the 
Maritime Strategy thinks it through under the highly unlikely 
conditions of nuclear war at sea. An important and prize-winning 
essay. See also "Comment and Discussion," May 1987, pp 14, 17, and 
August 1987, pp 27-28. 

Brooks, Linton F., Capt. USN, and Miller, Franklin, C, "Nuclear 
Weapons at Sea," U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding s. August 1988, pp 
41-45. A thoughtful analysis of the political and military value to the 
U.S. Navy and its strategy of (non-SLBM) nuclear weapons. Brooks 
and Miller conclude that, although the deterrent value of naval 
capabilities in and of themselves is small, the Navy must retain at 
least selected nuclear warfare area (e.g., ASW, AAW) assets in order 
to: (a) influence the Soviet pre-war calculation of the correlation of 
forces, and (b) shore up its war-fighting capabilities. In any event, 
report the authors, strong nuclear forces are an important 
ingredient in international perceptions of military power. 

** Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists . October 1988, "Maritime Strategy 
Submerges," p 55. Claims that budget cuts and public criticism have 
forced the U.S. Navy to lower the profile of its forward operations in 
the northern Pacific and Atlantic, and emphasize the use of 
submarines in place of carrier battlegroups. 

Byron, John L., Capt. USN, "No Quarter for Their Boomers." U.S. 
Naval Institute Proceedings . April 1989, pp 49-52. The author 
reiterates the deterrence value and war-fighting importance of 
placing the Soviet SSBNs at risk, but recommends against 
committing more than a fraction of the U.S. SSN fleet to this purpose. 
An American assault on the Soviet SSBN bastions, says Byron, 


should have the appearance of an "apparently large" strategic ASW 
campaign, yet holds back most of the SSNs for other missions. 

** Caldwell, Hamlin A., Jr., "A Flaw in the U.S. Maritime Strategy," 
National Defense . July/August 1987, pp 48-51. A sharp critique of 
plans to carry out offensive SSN operations in Soviet "bastion" waters. 
Calling the idea a possible "blueprint for disaster," Caldwell 
enumerates what he believes are the Soviet submarine fleet's 
important tactical and logistical advantages in home waters. He 
concludes that a "more realistic opening move must be selected that 
insures that U.S. naval power would truly influence the outcome of 
any war with the Soviet Union." 

** Cimbala, Stephen J., Extended Deterrence: The U.S. and NATO 

Europe . Lexington, MA: Lexington Books (forthcoming in 1987). Has 
a thoughtful chapter on the Maritime Strategy and the Defense of 

* Connors, L.Cdr. Tracy, "Northern Wedding '86," All Hands . 
January 1987, pp 18-26. See also "Cape Wrath Feels Iowa's Fury," 
"Nimitz and Northern Wedding," and "Alaska," in same issue. 
V.Adm. Charles R. Larson, Commander Strikign Fleet Atlantic: 
"We went north to test tactics designed to support NATO's maritime 
strategy of forward defense. I am proud to report those tactics 

** Cross, Lt. Col. Michael J., USMC, "No More Carrier Debates, 

Please," Proceeding s. April 1987, pp 79-81. Relates the Maritime 
Strategy's requirements to the CVN-CW debate. 

* Crowe, Adm. William J., "Statement on National Security Strategy," 
U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, One-Hundredth 
Congress, First Session, Hearings on National Security-Strategy . 
January 21, 1987, Washington: USGPO, 1987 (forthcoming). Solid 
concurrence in the Maritime Strategy by the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff: "In recent years we have benefited from some 
excellent conceptual thinking by the Navy about global maritime 
strategy — how to phase operations in a transition from peace to war, 
clear the way of submarines opposing military resupply or 
reinforcement shipping and use our carrier battle groups for either 
offensive strikes or in direct support of such allies as Japan, Norway, 
Greece and Turkey. It is imperative, of course, to fold these concepts 
into our larger military strategy and that is exactly what we are 

Cushman, John H., Jr., "A Dialogue: What King of Navy Does the 
** U.S. Need?" New York Times . May 31, 1987, p 4-3. V.Adm. Joseph 
Metcalf III vs. Dr. William W. Kaufmann on the Maritime Strategy 
and other naval issues. 


** Cushman, John H., Jr., "Navy Warns of Crisis in An ti- Submarine 
Ware," New York Times . March 19, 1987, p 19, Outgoing Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Engineering and Systems Melvyn 
Paisley on need for increased Navy ASW research: "We are faced 
with a crisis in our anti-submarine warfare capability which 
undermines our ability to execute maritime strategy." For context, 
however, see actual Paisley statements before congressional 
committees, 1987. 

** Daggett, Stephen and Husbands, Jo L., Achieving an Affordable 
Defense: A Military Strategy to Guide Military Spending . 
Washington: Committee for National Security, March 10, 1987. The 
annual CNS attack, using the usual W.W. Kaufmann "data" and 
arguments. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, solely designed to 
influence the U.S. legislative budget process. A summary is in Korb, 
Lawrence J. and Daggett, Stephen, "A 15-Carrier Navy: Is it Really 
Necessary?" Defense News . March 30, 1987, p 27, reprinted as "15 
Carrier Navy Leaves Forces Out of Balance," Navv Times . April 6, 
1987, p 32, and criticized by R.C. Mandeville in "Experts Only," Navv 
Times . April 27, 1987, p 22. 

** Daniel, Donald and Wood, Robert, Presuppositions of the Maritime 
Strategy . Elmsford, NY: Pergamon-Brassey's (forthcoming in 1987). 
By two Naval War College faculty members. 

Daniel, Donald C, "The Future of Strategic ASW," Paper presented 
at the Dalhousie University Conference on "The Undersea 
Dimension of Maritime Strategy," Halifax, N.S., Canada, June 24, 
1989. One of the most respected American commentators on the 
subject of strategic ASW concludes that, despite contrary declaratory 
policies, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union will be 
capable within the next ten years, of threatening the other's SSBNs 
with sufficient credibility to make the costs, risks and possible pay-off 
worthwhile. Daniel proposes that the only possible benefit of an 
American anti-SSBN campaign would be to tie up defending Soviet 
general purpose forces. But he warns that the U.S. effort ought to be 
"modest," and that it must guard against the possibility that the 
Soviets use their bastioned SSBNs as "bait" to "trap" the most capable 
Western ASW assets. 

** Daskal, Steven E., "Added Sealift Protection in Time of War," 

National Defense . March 1987, pp 38-41. Recommends a variety of 
merchant ship self protection measures for wartime, given the 
realities of the Maritime Strategy and U.S. allied force levels. 

* Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

"Naval Strategic Perspectives in the Context of Arms Control," 
Washington, DC, February 1989. This OPNAV "white paper" 


summarizes the U.S. Navy's current (early 1989) position on the 
various naval arms control proposals and "trial balloon" that have 
emanated from the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev years. It 
recommends that a public strategy of "damage control" will not 
suffice, and that the service embrace instead a "pro-active approach" 
with the aim of educating the public and allies on the necessity that 
naval arms, control calculations be guided by strategic considerations 
rather than the wishful urge for controls for their own sake. 

** Doerr, Capt. Peter J., USN (Ret.), "Comment and Discussion: Large 
Carriers: A Matter of Time," Proceedings . February 1987, p 78, on the 
"defense within an offense within a defense" nature of the putative 
Battle of the Norwegian Sea and, by implication, other potential 
wartime operations implementing the Maritime Strategy globally. 

** Donatelli, Thomas, "Go Navy," The American Spectator . February 
1987, pp 31-33, on the linkages between defense reorganization and 
the maritime elements of the national military strategy. Supports the 
Maritime Strategy, and fears for its future under the new Defense 
Department set up. 

* Dorsey, Jack, "NATO Navy Called A Constant Source of Price," 
Vir ginian Pilot . March 28, 1987, p 133. Deputy Secretary of Defense 
William H. Taft IV: It is "naive and dangerous to believe that strong 
naval forces are merely expensive competitors to ground forces in 
Europe, an argument that has become fashionable in recent years for 
critics of naval programs and maritime strategy." 

* Dunn, V. Adm. Robert F., "NANiews Interview," Naval Aviation 
News . March-April 1987, p 4. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
for Air Warfare comments on "today's maritime strategy in terms of 
its effects on Naval Aviation: Tactical commanders must deal with 
the strategy on a day-to-day basis. From that derives a new tactical 

Freedman, Lawrence, "Arms Control at Sea," paper presented at the 
Royal. Naval Staff College Conference, "Decade of the '90s: Response 
to Change," Greenwich, UK, February 14, 1989. Finds that the 
characteristics and capabilities of naval forces are far more complex 
than those on land, and are, therefore, much less amenable to 
"traditional" arms control "solutions" (cooperation, predictability, 
parity, and stability). Freedman concludes that naval arms control 
"will remain a not-very-good idea whose time has not yet come." 


Friedman, Norman, "The Maritime Strategy and the Design of the 
U.S. Fleet," Comparative Strategy . No. 4, 1987, pp 415-35. Emphasizes 
the role of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy as an interactive force- 
sizing methodology. Most post- World War II naval planing, reports 
Friedman, proceeded (inappropriately) on the basis of narrowly 


defined scenario-dependent systems analytical measures of 
effectiveness, and ignored the hallmark of naval force — flexibility 
and ambiguity. Urges that naval forces cannot and should not be 
optimized to a given scenario — "flexibility, or ambiguity, rather than 
actual striking power is (their) great virtue." Most controversial is 
Friedman's idea of using the carrier battlegroup for a "bait-and-trap" 
strategy whereby Soviet submarines and bombers would be 
deliberately drawn into a (losing!) shoot-out within carrier strike 
range of the Soviet homeland. The skeptic is reminded of Den, Bien 

Friedman, Norman, "The U.S. Navy, 1990-2010: Prospects and 
Problems," paper presented at the Royal Navy Staff College 
Conference, "Decade of the '90s — Response to Change," Greenwich, 
UK, February 15, 1989. A wide-ranging prognosis of the possible 
implications of East/West political change, technological progress, 
and budgetary and manpower pressures for the foreseeable size and 
structure of the U.S. Navy. Among Friedman's "predictions" are the 
following: (1) larger, self-maintaining combatants may become more 
economical to buy in the long run, (2) ships should be built for longer 
life expectancies than is presently the norm, (3) cheaper electronics 
may lower the cost of ships, and (4) a smaller military-age population 
will force a heightened degree of shipboard automation. 

** Froggett, S.J., CDR, USN, "Tomahawk's Roles," U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceeding s. February 1987, pp 51-54. Posits that the Tomahawk 
SLCM is the material linchpin to the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy. 

"From the Editor," Submarine Review . January 1987, pp 3-5. 
Challenges some of the basic strategic concepts of the Maritime 
Strategy regarding the employment of SSNs. 

Gaffney, Frank, Jr., "Navy Steers Risky Course on Tac-Nukes," 
Defense News . June 12, 1989, pp 31-32. Strong criticism of the U.S. 
Navy's recent announcement that it will phase out and not replace 
obsolete shipboard nuclear weapons. Warns that a "non-nuclear" 
navy could tempt the Soviet Union to start a nuclear war at sea, and 
worse that West German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, 
"who has made a career of weakening Western security," will use 
the Navy's decision to advance his own campaign at eliminating 
short-range nuclears from West German soil. 

** George Lt. James L., USN (Ret.), "INNF," Proceedings . June 1987, 
pp 35-39. A Center for Naval Analyses staffer on the effect on the 
Navy and its Maritime Strategy should European Intermediate 
Nuclear Force arms control be achieved. 

** George, James L., "La nuova strategia navale degli Stati Uniti (The 
U.S. Navy's New Maritime Strategy)," Revista Marittima . November 


1987, pp 17-32. An explanation of the U.S. Maritime Strategy and the 
principal criticisms against it in the prestigious Italian "Maritime 

** George, James L., "Maritime Mission or Strategy?" Naval War 

College Review . Winter 1989, pp 47-55. Proposes that the purposes of 
the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy might be better understood if its 
three "phases" were explained in "traditional" mission 
terminology — deterrence, presence, sea control, and power 

** Glaser, Charles L. and Miller, Steven E. (eds.), The Navv. the 
Maritime Strategy and Nuclear War , (forthcoming in 1988). 
Examines whether the strategy might cause escalation and the 
results if it did. 

* Goodman, Glenn W. Jr. and Schemmer, Benjamin F., "An 

Exclusive AFJ Interview with Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost," Armed 
Forces Journal International . April 1987, pp 76-84, especially p 79. 
The Chief of Naval Operations discusses his views on the Maritime 
Strategy, including forward pressure, anti-SSBN operations, and 
relations with the NATO allies. "Our intent is to hold Soviet maritime 
forces at risk in the event of war. That includes anything that is out 

** Gray, Colin S., and Barnett, Roger W., "Geopolitics and Strategy," 
Global Affairs. Winter 1989, pp 18-37. Offers a geo-strategic 
prescription for the hierarchy of American national security 
interests and military force allocation (strategic nuclear, land, 
maritime). Rejects a deterministic view of the continental-maritime 
divide, while arguing its long-term (frequently subconscious) 
conditioning effect on national security policy choices. The American 
geo-political "window" on the world, say the authors, mandates that 
a NATO-Warsaw Pact war be seen in campaign terms, and that the 
U.S. contribution emphasize (maritime) access to the Eurasian land 
mass first, and only indirectly a commitment of forces on land. 

** Gray, Colin S., "Maritime Strategy and the Pacific: The Implications 
for NATO," Naval War College Review . Winter 1987, pp 8-19. A 
thoughtful, wide-ranging, and often provocative article examining 
linkages, especially between continental and maritime power, 
between the European and Pacific theaters, and between strategic 
and conventional deterrence. The article is notable also for the 
contributions of Capt. Roger W. Barnett, USN (Ret.), one of the 
foremost original architects of the Maritime Strategy. 

** Gray, Colin S., "Maritime Strategy: Europe and the World Beyond," 
Naval Forces . No. 5, 1988, pp 28-41. Western naval power, harnessed 
to a global maritime strategy, argues Gray, is critical to the 


successful deterrence and, if necessary, the defeat of Soviet war- 
fighting objectives in Europe. He exemplifies his case by citing the 
precedents of World Wars I and II, and suggesting the military 
advantage over the long haul of a maritime coalition over a 
continentally-based opponent. Elsewhere in his article, however, 
Gray at least intimates that it was not so much seapower as the 
Allies' superior economic and industrial strength that won both 

** Gray, Colin S., "The Maritime Strategy in the US/Soviet Strategic 
Relations," Naval War College Review . Winter 1989, pp 7-18. 
Geopolitics, not incompatible ideologies, claims Gray, determine the 
necessity for the United States to offset Soviet power on the Eurasian 
continent. Geopolitics also dictate that U.S. and U.S. -led strategies 
are centered on seapower. Only superior maritime power, argues 
Gray, can serve to exhaust the Soviet Union's superior continental 
position, produce "domestic unraveling," and ultimately defeat 
Moscow. The author notes that, over the past 400 years, no maritime- 
led coalition has ever lost a great war against continental coalitions; 
others, Paul Kennedy in Rise and Fall of the Great Powers , for 
instance, would interject that superior economic power has been the 
decisive factor. 

** Grove, Eric, "The Future of Sea Power," Naval Forces . 11/1987, pp 12- 
28. Excellent tour d' horizon, showing where the Maritime Strategy 
fits in the context of total world sea power issues today. 

Halloran, Richard, "Navy Setting Course for the 21st Century," New 
York Times . November 11, 1988, p 28. Reports on the Navy's "Quo 
Vadis" and "Navy 21" studies that seek to .project the service's 
technological "shape" into the 21st century. 

** Hartmann, Frederick, A Force for Peace: The U.S. Navv. 1982-1986 . 
(forthcoming in 1988). By a Naval War College faculty member. 

Hendrickson, David C, The Future of American Strategy . New York: 
Holmes and Meiser, 1987. A new and different perspective. Advocates 
a scaled-back mix of continental and maritime strategies and forces. 
Sees some U.S. naval forces particularly useful in Third World 
contingencies, especially carriers, but would cut back on naval, air 
and ground forces he sees as only useful for highly unlikely forward 
global operations against the Soviets. Wrongly believes this includes 
Aegis cruisers and destroyers. 

* Hernandez, V. Adm. D.E., "The New Third fleet," Proceeding s. July 

1987, pp 73-76. Commander Third Fleet on the revitalization of his 
organization to implement its share of the load in carrying out the 
Maritime Strategy. 


* "Individual Human Beings and the Responsibilities of Leadership," 
Sea Power . April 1987, pp 81-96. Valedictory interview with Secretary 
Lehman. See p 85 for his parting views on the Maritime Strategy. 

* Inside the Navv . May 8, 1989. Report on the U.S. Navy Secretary- 
designate Lawrence Garrett confirmation hearings before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee. A summary of written answers by 
Garrett to the Senate Armed Services Committee during 
confirmation hearings in the first week of May 1989. As such, they 
probably offer the first insight into the new Navy Secretary's views on 
the maritime strategy. Garrett reportedly defined the latter as a "set 
of strategic principles" and a "global view of fleet operations, for 
deterrence and crisis control," as well as a "dynamic concept which 
both influences and reacts to fleet operations and budgetary issues." 

* "Interview: James A. Lyons, Jr., Admiral, U.S. Navy," Proceedings . 
July 1987, p 67. CINCPACFLT on the importance of the Pacific in the 
Maritime Strategy, despite media focus on Euro-Central Atlantic 
theater considerations. 

Journal of Commerce . "Navy Dream of 600-Ship Fleet May be 
Fading," February 18, 1989, p 3. "The U.S. budget crunch and 
shifting U.S. defense spending priorities are combining to sink the 
Navy's dream of a 600-ship fleet." 

** Kalb, Cdr. Richard, "The Maritime Strategy and our European 

Allies: Cold Feet on the Northern Flank?" Proceeding s (forthcoming). 
By a former member of the OPNAV Strategic Concepts Branch (OP- 
603) and contributor to the development of the Maritime Strategy. 

Kaufmann, William W., A Thoroughly Efficient Navv . Washington: 
Brookings, 1987. The annual Kaufmann broadside, this time 
designed to influence the congressional votes on carrier construction. 
See especially Chapter 2, "The Maritime Strategy." 

** Keller, Lt. Kenneth C, "The Surface Ship, in ASW," Surface Warfare . 
Jan/Feb 1987, pp 2-3. "Any future ASW conflict, by necessity, will be 
fought in accordance with the maritime strategy." Another of the 
new generation of naval officers gets, and passes, the word. 

** Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr., "The Maritime Strategy in a New 

Environment: Maritime Sufficiency," National Defense . March 1989, 
pp 10-13. National Defense 's maritime editor offers practical 
suggestions to "stimulate discussion on the parameters of maritime 
sufficiency" in an era in which "Cold War rhetoric" can no longer 
suffice to justify American naval strength. His principal proposal is 
to create an active/reserve naval force structure sized to the dual 
requirements of (1) day-to-day (active) peacetime naval presence, and 
(2) emergency (reserve) NATO mobilization and reinforcement. 


** Korb, Lawrence J., "A Blueprint for Defense Spending," Wall Street 
Journal . May 20, 1987, p 34. "The Navy's proper wartime job is. 
secure the sea lands necessary to support a ground campaign and to 
take the Soviet Navy out of the war, not primarily by seeking it out 
and destroying it, but by bottling it up. For this, a 12-carrier Navy 
should suffice." 

* "Lehman on Sea Power." U.S. News and World Report . June 15. 

1987, p 28. "The maritime strategy I've promoted is not new; it is 
NATO strategy that was never taken seriously, a formula for holding 
Norway and the Eastern Mediterranean, two high-threat areas." 

** Lessner, Richard, "Quick Strike: Navy Secretary's Wartime Strategy 
is Conteste Legacy," Arizona Republic . March 29, 1987 pp C1+. 
Comprehensive discussion of the issues, including a lengthy 
interview with Secretary Lehman on the eve of his departure from 
office, on his Maritime Strategy opinions. Contributes, however, to 
the erroneous view running throughout America journalism that 
the Strategy was solely his creation. 

Liebman, Marc, "Soviet Naval Initiatives in the Pacific: 1942 
Revisited?" Armed Forces Journal International . April 1987, pp 58- 
64. On Pacific maritime operations during a global war with the 

** Lind, William S., and Gray, Colin S., "The Maritime Strategy— 

1988," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings . February 1988, pp 53-61. Two 
noted strategic commentators debate the "maritimeness" of the U.S. 
Navy's maritime strategy. Lind, relying on Mahan and Corbett's 
classic definition, finds that, "what the Navy has been calling its 
maritime strategy is, indeed, no such thing," but instead, "merely 
the naval component of the continental strategy that the United States 
has followed since the end of World War II. "He advocates expanding 
the debate and address the issues of a "true maritime strategy." 
Gray, on the other hand, sounds much more comfortable that the 
Navy, after 100 years of "strategically undisciplined tracts," has come 
to fully recognize the benefits and limits of naval power. At sea, he 
maintains, the offense has historically proven the strongest form of 
warfare. The long striking range of modern seabased weapons, Gary 
believes, will force the Soviet fleet to "come out and do battle in the 
Norwegian Sea." 

Linder, Bruce R., "What Happened to the 600-Ship Navy?" Navv 
International . July/August 1988, pp 382-85. Blames OSD "political 
expediency" more so than budgetary pressures per se for the Navy's 
failure to reach the 600-ship goal. Foreseeable of older combatants, 
reports the author, will not likely be matched by new construction, so 


that fleet levels will probably continue to decline, mostly at the 
expense of amphibious and support forces. 

** Luttwak, Edward N., Strateg y. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1987, pp 156-164 and 268. Cursory discussion of the Maritime 
Strategy as "nonstrategy." 

** Lynch, David J., "Maritime Plan A 'Prescription for Disaster* 

Educator Says," Defense Week . February 23, 1987, p 12. Professor 
Mearsheimer again, this time at the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science. 

Matthews, William, "Lehman's Daring Forward Strategy May Fade 
Under Webb," Defense News . May 4, 1987, p 25. Headline prompted by 
Secretary of the Navy James Webb's remark that he saw "nothing 
new in what is being called the maritime strategy." 

Matthews, William, "U.S. Navy's Exercises in Aleutians, 
Underscore Pacific Interest Concern," Defense News . February 9, 
1987, p 25. Reprinted as "Marines, Navy Test Amphibious Skills in 
Aleutians," Navv Times . February 16, p 27. The Navy and Marine 
Corps practice cold-weather operations to oimplement the Maritime 
Strategy in the North Pacific. 

Matthews, William, "Webb Downplays 'Forward Strategy' Issue," 
Navv Times . May 4, 1987, p 33. A new Reagan Administration 
SECNAV takes over. His first publicly reported statements on the 
Maritime Strategy. 

** Metcalf, Joseph, III, V.Adm., USN (Ret.), "The Maritime Strategy in 
Transition," paper presented at the Royal Navy Staff College 
Conference, "Decade of the 90s: Response to Change," Greenwich, 
UK, February 15, 1989. Discussion by the former Commander Second 
Fleet of the impact of long-range cruise missiles on the U.S. Navy's 
strike capabilities, notably the "new dimensions" that have been 
brought to the "forward" meaning of forward strategy. 

Morris, Clark R., "Our Muscle Bound Navy," New York Times 
Magazine . March 1988. Derides the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy as 
a "desperate improvisation to justify yearned-for weapons systems," 
especially the "1 , 000-foot chunk(s) of floating metal." Invokes the 
standard litany of objections against large-deck carriers and forward 
operations, while applauding small carriers and the convoy escort 


"Naval Strategy: America Rules the Waves?" Science . April 3, 1987, p 
24. Another journalist attempts to summarize the debate. A little 
better than most. 


** Navv News & Undersea Technology . "The Navy's Maritime Strategy 
Has to Evolve.. .But is it the Right Strategy at All?" August 1, 1988, pp 
4-5. Reports the comments made by Capt. James Lynch, USN, 
member of the Navy's Strategic Think Tank (STT), and William S. 
Lind of the Military Reform Institute at the 1987 U.S. Naval Institute 
symposium, "Future U.S. Naval Power" in San Diego, CA. Lynch 
and Lind agree that the Soviet threat can no longer be the sole object 
of American maritime strategy, but disagree on the implications for 
U.S. national security in general, and the Navy's purposes in 
particular. Lynch maintains that a proliferation of international 
centers of political, economic and military power heightens the 
importance of a maritime strategy aimed at the protection of trade, 
chokepoints, and SLOCs. Lind calls for "re-uniting the West," to 
include the Soviet Union, against the future specter of a resurgent 

** Nelson, Cdr. William H., "Peacekeeper at Risk," Proceedings . July 

1987, pp 90-97. On applying the Maritime Strategy to the Persian Gulf 

** Newell, Ltc. Clayton R., USA, "Structuring Our Forces for the Big 
Battle," Armed Forces Journal International . July 1987, p 6. Takes 
on both the U.S. Navy's "vaunted maritime strategy: and the U.S. 
Army's "large complex corps designed to fight the Soviets in Western 
Europe." Prefers force structures and strategies enabling the United 
States to "Apply its military power sparingly in small well-focused 
engagements in unexpected parts of the world." 

** O'Rourke, Ronald, "Nuclear Escalation, Strategic Anti-Submarine 
Warfare and the Navy's Forward Maritime Strategy," Washington: 
Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, February 27, 
1987. Especially useful for Navy staff officer views. 

** O'Rourke, Ronald, "The Maritime Strategy and the Next Decade," 
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings . April 1988, pp 34-38. The U.S. 
Naval Institute's 1988 Arleigh Burke prize- winning essay by the 
Congressional Research Service's leading naval analyst offers the 
U.S. Navy some salient words of advice on how to keep its reborn 
strategic awareness from "falling through the cracks." O'Rourke 
warns that the Navy must take steps to ensure that its maritime 
strategy is further developed and articulated publicly, and not "tossed 
out of the window" as a Lehman "artifact" or a meaningless catch-all 
rubric for any and all routine activities and contingencies. 

O'Rourke, Ronald, "U.S. Forward Maritime Strategy," Navv 
International . February 1987, pp 118-122. Especially good on the 
"complex, interactive relationship: between the Maritime Strategy 
and the 600-ship Navy, and on "the issues." Less useful because 


occasionally inaccurate in tracing the prehistory and history of the 
Strategy, probably because of deficiencies in the public record. 

** Peppe, Lt. P. Kevin, "Accoustic Showdown for the SSNs," 

Proceedings . July 1987, pp 33-37. On the effects of "accoustic parity" 
on the Maritime Strategy. He makes similar points in the July 1987 
Submarine Review . 

Piotti, R. Adm. Walter T., Jr., "Interview," Journal of Defense and 
Diplomacy . Vol 5 #2, 1987, pp 14-16. The Commander of the U.S. 
Military Sealift Command on global wartime planning for sealift. 

** Pocalyko, L.Cdr. Michael, "Neutral Swedin Toughens NATO's 

Northern Tier," Proceedings . March 1987, pp 128-130. By a 1985-86 
member of the Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603). On the 
interrelationships among Swedish, Soviet, and NATO strategies and 
the Maritime Strategy. 

** Prisley, Jack, "Submarine Aggressor Squadron — Its Time has 
Come," Submarine Review . July 1987, pp 63-86. A call for a "Top 
Fish" program, to enable submariners to better practice what they 
must do to implement the Maritime Strategy. 

** "Push Anti-Mine Work, Navy Urged," Defense Week . March 2, 1987, 
p 5. R. Adm. J.S. Tichelman, RNLN, argues that emphasis on 
minesweeping "should go hand in hand with the forward strategy" 
at a U.S. Naval Institute Seminar on Mine Warfare. 

Reagan, President Ronald, National Security Strategy of the United 
States . Washington: the White House, January 1987. The framework 
within which the Maritime Strategy operates. Clear focus on global, 
forward, coalition approach, especially vs. the Soviets. See especially 
p 19: "U.S. military forces must possess the capability, should 
deterrence fail, to expand the scope and intensity of combat 
operations, as necessary," and pp 27-30: "Maritime superiority is 
vital. (It) enables us to capitalize on Soviet geographic vulnerabilities 
and to pose a global threat to the Soviet's interests. It plays a key role 
in plans for the defense of NATO allies on the European flanks. It 
also permits the United States to tie down Soviet naval forces in a 
defensive posture protecting Soviet ballistic missile submarines and 
the seaward approaches to the Soviet homeland..." 

Rostow, Eugene V., "For the Record," Washington Post . June 30, 
1987, p A18. Extract from a Naval War College lecture by a former 
high Reagan Administration Arms Control official: "I can imagine 
no better antidote for the frustration and irritability which now 
characterize allied relationships than allied cooperation in mounting 
successful applications of counter- force at outposts of the Soviet 


empire and shifting geographical points around its periphery. The 
Soviet empire is extremely vulnerable to such a peninsular strategy." 

RUSI Newsbrief . April, 1988, "NATO's Challenge on the Northern 
Flank," pp 29-31 . An error-filled "analysis" of the northern thrust of 
the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy. Proposes that the maritime 
strategy must prove successful in a "30-day" European war, that the 
Soviets "would probably launch their SLBMs rather than have them 
destroyed by NATO," and that the Walker- Whitworth and Kongsberg- 
Toshiba affairs have "called into question the credibility of the 
strategic missile submarine," and have "invalidate(d) the use of 
Western hunter-killer submarines to close in on Soviet home 

Sakitt, Mark, Submarine Warfare in the Arctic: Option or Illusion? 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University International Strategic Institute, 
1988, 93 pp. This monograph considers the tactical and 
environmental (read accoustic) problems the U.S. Navy can expect to 
encounter when carrying out a strategic ASW campaign in Arctic 
waters. Using the results of a series of simple search, attrition and 
accoustic propagation models, the author concludes that "reasonable 
expected outcomes for the U.S. Navy do not appear very promising," 
and that the "Arctic naval game sems to be one in which the 
defenders, the Soviets can dominate." Tactical and environmental 
difficulties aside, the book cautions against the risk of unwanted 
escalation, and recommends that possible naval arms controls might 
consider a trade-off between U.S. agreement on Soviet SSBN 
sanctuaries, and Soviet acceptance of a numerical SSN cap. 

Sea-War Plan All Wet?" Columbus Dispatch . April 7, 1987, p 10A. A 
call for a "vigorous review" by the Pentagon of "Lehman's plan," 
including "aircraft carrier battle groups. ..sent to the. ..Barents, (a 
plan) never... formally approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense 
Secretary Caspar Weinberger, or NATO." As has often been the case 
with public journalistic commentary on the Maritime Strategy, no 
mention was made of the extent to which the Strategy reflects 
longstanding JCS, SECDEF, or NATO policy and strategy, or of its 
roots in the naval officer corps. 

Smit, E.D., Jr., Capt. USN, "The Main Utility of the Navy," Naval 
War College Review . Autumn 1988, pp 105-107. Recommends that the 
strategic purposes of the U.S. Navy in a European conflict be re- 
directed away from attacking the Soviet SSBN fleet, to sinking the 
Soviet (general purpose) Navy. The author acknowledges that a 
successful outcome will contribute little to the events on land, but 
avers that it is a worthwhile objective on its own merits and with a 
pay-off that will become evident "after the war is over." 


* Smith, Lt. Gen. Keith A., "The Posture of Marine Aviation in FY88 - 

FY89," Marine Corps Gazette , May 1987, pp 46+. U. S. Marine Corps 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation on Marine aviation requirements to 
support the national, maritime, and amphibious strategies. A 
reprint of earlier Congressional testimony. 

** Solomon, Richard H., "The Pacific Basin: Dilemmas and Choices for 
American Security," Naval War College Review . Winter 1987, pp 36- 
43, especially pp 38-39. The Director of the State Department Policy 
Planning staff updates his June 1986 Naval War College Current 
Strategy Forum lecture: "We must be prepared to open a second front 
in Asia." 

** Stefanick, Tom A., Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare and Naval 
Strategy . Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987. 

** Stefanick, Tom, "The U.S. Navy: Directions for the Future," F.A.S. 

Public Interest Report . June 1987, pp 1+. Mostly about the budget, but 
some discussion of the Maritime strategy, most elements of which 
the author opposes. 

** "The Navy Sails on Rough Seas," Newsweek . June 1, 1987, pp 23-26. 
A summary of the arguments, pro and con, as influenced by 
reactions to the Iraqi attack on the U.S.S. Stark in the Persian Gulf. 

** Thomas, Capt. Walter R., USN (Ret.), "Deterrence, Defense, Two 

Different Animals," Navv Times . January 26, 1987, p 23. Critique of 
John Mearsheimer's Fall 1986 International Security article. 

** Trainor, Lt. Gen. Bernard E., USMC (Ret.), "NATO Nations 

Conducting Winter Maneuvers in Northern Norway," New York 
Times . March 29, 1987, p 14. Practicing the reinforcement of North 
Norway. B.Gen Matthew Caulfield USMC: "Marine reinforcement is 
part of our maritime strategy." Gen. Fredrik Bull-Hansen RNA: 
With or without American carriers, northern Norway will be 

** Trainor, Lt.Gen. Bernard E., USMC (Ret.), "Lehman's Sea- War 

Strategy is Alive, But for How Long?", New York Times. March 23, 
1987, p 16. Another article in the "Will-the-Strategy-survive- John- 
Lehman?" vein. General Trainor's understanding of the uniformed 
navy, joint and allied aspects of the strategy do not appear to be on a 
par with his understanding of the Marine Corps aspects. 

Tritten, Cdr. James J., "Nonnuclear Warfare," Proceedings . 
February 1987, pp 64-70. By the Chairman of the National Security 
Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School. On the 
symbiotic nature of nonnuclear and nuclear warfare, at sea and 


ashore, under conditions of crisis response, intra-war deterrence, 
and warfighting. 

"Trost Wants Flexibility in U.S. Thinking, Assessment of Soviets," 
Aerospace Daily. June 22, 1987, p 462; and "Naval Strategy Must 
Change Says Admiral Trost," Jane's Defense Weekly . June 27, 1987, 
p 1345. The Chief of Naval Operations warns against rigid 
assumptions about Soviet naval options. 

Trost, Adm. Carlisle, "Looking Beyond the Maritime Strategy," 
Proceedings . January 1987, pp 13-16. Also "Comment and 
Discussion," July 1987, pp 19-20. Admiral Watkins' successor as 
CNO briefly reaffirms the Maritime Strategy's fundamentals: 
deterrence, forward defense, alliance solidarity, the global view, 
coexistence with other vital components of our national military 
strategy and, most important, flexibility. Highlights anti-submarine 
warfare in particular. 

Trost, C.A., Adm., USN, "The Goal and the Challenge," Sea Power . 
October 1988, pp 13-30. In an interview the CNO acknowledges that 
the 600-ship goal will not be reached in 1989, but that forward strategy 
will remain central to the Navy's peace and wartime deployment 
philosophy. According to Trost, "carriers sailing into the Kola Gulf 
and lots of other things. ..are not, nor have ever been, envisioned as 
part of our forward-based maritime strategy." 

Trost, C.A.H., Adm., USN, "Two Bells Into the Watch," remarks at 
the annual Submarine League Conference, Washington, DC, July 9, 
1987. A future-looking depiction of submarine roles and missions in 
the 21st century, including the use of "underseas cruisers" for 
integral fleet support with offensive and defensive anti-air warfare 
(AAW) capabilities. 

Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Bringing Down the Bird of 
Thought," speech at the Current Strategy Forum, Naval War 
College, Newport, RI, June 18, 1987. The CNO cautions maritime 
strategy planners on the risks of "set-piece thinking," and on the 
need to guard against drawing conclusions about Soviet naval 
intentions "through their writings or through their military 
capabilities themselves." 

Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Global Role Demands a 15- 
Carrier Navy," Los Angeles Times . March 16, 1989, p II-9. Reiterates 
that 15 is the minimum number of carrier battlegroups necessary to 
support the Nation's global commitments in war and peace "at a 
prudent level of risk." 

Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Looking at the Future of the 
Navy," remarks at U.S. Naval Institute Conference, San Diego, CA, 



July 27, 1988. The CNO foresees a 21st century naval threat 
environment that will differ little from current international 
conditions, but that will feature important technological changes in 
all three warfare dimensions — surface, subsurface and air. Even so, 
reports the CNO, the Nimitz-size aircraft carrier will remain "the 
centerpiece of naval warfare." 

Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "My Frustration," speech at the 
New York Navy League, New York, NY, November 14, 1988. The 
CNO voices his exasperation with critics who claim, "You don't have 
a strategy." 

Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Requirements Drive Navy Force 
Levels," U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding s. May 1989, pp 34-38. The 
CNO warns that a "precipitate rush to dismantle naval forces 
because of premature optimism over the presumed evolution of the 
global balance of power could be a most costly misreading of history." 
Trost projects a future international environment that will be 
increasingly complex, politically and technologically, and that will, 
therefore, heighten the importance of forward deployed and 
sustained naval forces, including a minimum of 15 aircraft carriers. 

Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "This Era and the Next: American 
Security Interest and the U.S. Navy," speech at the Naval War 
College, Newport, RI, January 10, 1989. A plea to preserve a forward- 
deployed 15-carrier Navy while the West guardedly watches the 
progress of the "Gorbachev era." 

Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Would You Run Your Company 
This Way?" Remarks before the Navy League, March 30,1988. The 
CNO voices his dissatisfaction with recent congressionally-mandated 
budget and force cut-backs, and Soviet Gosplan-like 
"mismanagement of the Navy's affairs." 

Trost, Carlisle H., Adm., USN, "In the Sail Left, Thinking of U.S. 
Seapower," remarks at Military Sealift Command (MSC) Change-of- 
Command Ceremony, December 19, 1988. The CNO decries the 
disappearance of America's maritime industry and warns that the 
country "will lose its identify as a maritime nation..." 

Truver, Scott C. and Thompson, Jonathan S., "Navy Mine 
Countermeasures: Quo Vadis?", Armed Forces Journal 
International . April, 1987, pp 7074. An adequate survey of the 
problems and prospects. No discussion, however, of the primary U.S. 
mine countermeasures concept of operations embedded in the 
Maritime Strategy: killing minelayers far forward, in transit, and 
offshore, before they sow their mines. Illustrative of the dangers of 
discussing any one warfare area in isolation from the total Strategy. 


Truver, Scott, "Phibstrike 95 - Fact or Fiction?" Armed Forces 
Journal International . August 1987, pp 102-108. A case study of how 
the Maritime Strategy has been used as a framework by the Marine 
Corps to develop an amphibious warfare concept of future operations. 

* U. S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, One-hundredth 

** Congress, First Session, Hearings on National Security Strateg y. 
January-April 1987, Washington: USGPO (forthcoming in 1987/8). 
Testimony by administration civilian and -military officials, and by 
government and non-government defense specialists. Includes much 
discussion of the Maritime Strategy. See especially testimony by 
Adm. Lee Baggett, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and 
Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command. 

* U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, One-hundredth 
Congress, First Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense 
Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 . 
Washington, DC: USGPO (forthcoming in 1987/8). Prepared annual 
"posture" statements by SECDEF, CJCS, SECNAV, CNO and other 
officials. Also hearings repartee, and responses to questions for the 
record. Maritime Strategy permeates the entire Navy budget 
legislative process. In addition to those just cited, see especially 
statements by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Melvyn Paisley, 
CINCLANTFLT Adm. Frank Kelso, and Deputy Chiefs of Naval 
Operations for Surface and Air Warfare, V. Adms. Joseph Metcalf 
and Robert Dunn. 

** Van Cleave, William R., "Horizontal Escalation and NATO Strategy: 
A Conceptual Overview," in E.D. Gueritz et al (eds.), NATO's 
Maritime Strategy: Issues and Developments . Washington: 
Pergamon - Brassey's, 1987. A leading conservative defense thinker 
argues that "the Navy's version of Horizontal Escalation," the 
Maritime Strategy, "fails because it does not come to grips with the 
nuclear factor; indeed, it seems to attempt ignoring it." 

* Webb, James H., Jr., "The Aircraft Carrier: Centerpiece of Maritime 
Strategy," Wings of Gold . Summer 1987, pp S-2 and S-3. The new 
Secretary of the Navy on the national military strategy, the Maritime 
Strategy, and the role of the carrier. Continuity of the Reagan- 
Weinberger-Lehman view of maritime strategy confirmed. 

* Weinberger, Caspar., Report of the Secretary of Defense to the 
Congress on the FY 1 988/FY 1 989 Budget and Fv 1 988-92 Defense 
Pro grams . Washington: USGPO, 1987, p 165. Reconfirms the 
Maritime Strategy as a component of declared U.S. national military 
strategy. See also Offley, Ed, and Sanger, S.L. "Backing at Top for 
Home Port," Seattle Post-Intelligence . April 28, 1987, p 1. SECDEF, in 
Seattle, "agrees with the Navy's controversial wartime strategy." 
SECDEF direction and endorsement is no flash in the pan. 


** Weltman, John J., "The Short, Unhappy Life of the Maritime 

Strategy," The National Interest . Spring 1989, pp 79-86. The author 
reports that the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy under the Reagan 
Administration was largely the produce of budgetary plenty and the 
intra-service dominance of the carrier and submarine communities. 
Both conditions, he claims, have ceased to exist, so that planning and 
force procurement will shift to a strategy "emphasizing defensive sea 
control in support of the land battle..." This development, Weltman 
concludes, "can only strengthen the constraints against any assault 
upon the Western alliance." 



West, F.J. (Bing), Jr., "The Maritime Strategy: The Next Step," 
Proceeding s. January 1987, pp 40-49. By a former Assistant Secretary 
of Defense, Naval War College faculty member, lead author of 
Seaplan 2000 and U.S. Marine Corps officer. One of the most 
imortant analyses of the Maritime Strategy by an outside observer to 
date. Develops further his 1985 and 1986 views, cited in 
"Contemporary Naval Strategy" and Section II above, on the 
relationships between the Strategy and U.S./NATO doctrine. Cf . 
however, actual statements by allied military leaders in Section V 
below. See also "Comment and Discussion," March 1987, pp 14-15; 
July 1987, pp 19-20, and August 1987, pp 31-32. 

Wettern, Desmond, "The Paradox of Decline: Are Convoys the Only 
Alternative?" Sea Power . April 1989, pp 147-159. The writer, a long- 
time British commentator on maritime affairs, seems to think so. 
The decline of the West's accoustic advantage, he says, has made the 
protection of the Atlantic SLOCs by way of a "Ramboesque" forward 
offensive a doubtful proposition. He concludes that, unless the West 
successfully develops active towed sonar arrays, alternative ship 
protection strategies such as "Moving barriers" and patrolled lanes," 
will probably prove as great a failure as the "patrolled sea lanes" and 
"hunter-killer" concepts of the two world wars. Accordingly, the one 
remaining option may well be the re-adoption of the convoy system. 

White, David F., "Atlantic Sealife Commander Says Containerization 
Hurts Readiness," Journal of Commerce . April 7, 1988, p 12B. 
Reports the concern expressed by the new chief of the Military Sealift 
Command, Atlantic, Capt. Thomas J. Batzel, USN, that the 
progressive containerization of merchant fleets will leave his 
command short of enough breakbulk freighters to carry odd and 
oversize cargoes such as tanks, trucks and artillery. 

Wilson, George C, "600-Ship Navy is Sailing Toward Rough Fiscal 
Seas," Washington Post . March 16, 1987, pp Al and A6. Sees forward 
anti-SSBN operations as a "Watkins scenario" and forward carrier 
battle group operations as a "Lehman scenario," with little backing 
in the officer corps. Cites a "number of (nameless) Navy officers" as 


predicting that the latter "Aspect of the forward strategy will start 
fading as soon as Lehman leaves the Navy Department." This seems 
doubtful, given the primary role of the officer corps in drafting the 
Maritime Strategy; time will tell. See also retort by Bennett, Rep 
Charles E., "A 600-Ship Fleet is What's Needed," Washington Post . 
April 22, 1987, p 19. 

** Wilson, George, "Soviets Score Silent Success in Undersea Race with 
U.S.," Washington Post . July 17, 1987, p A20. Claims Adm. Crowe, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "has never been enamored of 
the forward strategy" and that "other Defense Department officials 
said the forward strategy started to sink as soon as Lehman left the 
Pentagon." On the former, see Crowe testimony earlier in 1987, cited 
above. On the latter, see Mark Twain's cable from London to the 
Associated Press 1897. 

** Winnefeld, Lt. James A., Jr., "Fresh Claws for the Tomcat," 

Proceedings . July 1987, pp 103-107. On the relationship between the 
Maritime Strategy, CVBG operations, and hardware requirements. 
"The F-14D is not just another nice fighter; it offers a significant 
enhancement of the CVBG's ability to execute the maritime strategy. 
The aircraft's true worth is apparent only in this light." 

Wood, Robert, "The Conceptual Framework for Strategic 
Development at the Naval War College," Naval War College Review . 
Spring 1987, pp 4-16. Further development of the views of this Naval 
War College strategist/faculty member. His focus is now on 
integrated national military strategy and its teaching and gaming. 
See also commentary by R.Adm. J. A. Baldwin, President of the 
Naval War College, pp 2-3. 



The Maritime Strategy fully incorporates U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, 
Coast Guard, Air Force and Army contributions to the global maritime 
campaign. In fact, the case can be made that more thought has been given 
to actual joint cornbat operations (as opposed to problems of command 
relationships or lift) by the Navy and Marine Corps in codifying the 
Maritime Strategy than by either the Air Force or the Army in developing 
their own "cornerstone" publications. The open literature on potential 
Army contributions to maritime warfare, such as air defense batteries 
based in islands and littoral areas, is particularly weak. 

Alberts, Col. D. J., USAF, "U.S. Naval Air and Deep Strike," Naval 
Forces . No. 1/1986, pp 62-75. The strike warfare elements of the 
Maritime Strategy from an Air Force officer's point of view. 

Atkeson, MG Edear, USA (Ret.), "Arctic Could be a Hot Spot in 
Future Conflicts," Army . January 1986, pp 13-14. Fanciful proposal 
for expanded U.S. Army role in helping implement the Maritime 
Strategy, "An Army air cavalry force, properly tailored for the 
mission, should be able to locate submarine activity under the ice as 
well as, if not better than, another submarine." 

** Breemer, Jan S. and Hoover, SSG Todd, USAF, "SAC Goes to Sea 

with Harpoon," National Defense . February 1987, pp 41-45, a history 
and an update. Qf Chipman and Lay article cited in Section XI below. 

Builder, Carl H., The Army in the Strategic Planning Process; Who 
Shall Bell the Cat? . Bethesda, MD: U.S. Army Concepts Analysis 
Agency, October 1986. A study done for the U.S. Army to "try to find 
out why the Army doesn't seem to do very well in the strategic 
planing process." Analyzes Army, Navy and Air Force strategic 
planning, especially the Maritime Strategy. Looks for and, therefore, 
"finds" differences rather than similarities. To be revised and 
reissued as a Rand Corporation publication in 1987. 


Chipman, Dr. Donald D., "Rethinking Forward Strategy and the 
Distant Blockade," Armed Forces Journal International . August 
1987, pp 82-88. Argues for joint integrated USN-USAF wartime 
operations in NATO's Northern Region, the GUIK gap, and the 
Norwegian Sea. Well in keeping with the Maritime Strategy. 

Cooper, Bert H., Maritime Roles for Land-Based Aviation Report No. 
83-1 51 F, Washington: Library of congress Congressional Research 
Service, August 1, 1983. Analyzes recent classified studies, identifies 
problems and issues, and discusses recent USN-USAF initiatives. 


Correll, John T., "The Power Projection Shortfall," Air Force 
Magazine . August 1988. In October 1987, US sea and airlift 
capabilities were reorganized under a new unified command, the 
U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). The new organization 
promised to improve the efficiency and coordination of the Nation's 
trans-Atlantic reinforcement assets, but the article reports, it has 
been unable to stop the growing decline in national life resources, 
especially shipping. 

** Estep, Col. James L., USA, "Army's Role in Joint Global Military 

Strategy," Army . August 1987, pp 11+. Decries "lack of a more global, 
jointly oriented strategy" by the U.S. Army and applauds the Navy's 
development of same. 

** Fraser, Ronald, "MDZ Mission Defines Coast Guard Wartime Role," 
Naw Times . October 20, 1986, p 27, on the role of the Maritime 
Defense Zones. 

** Grace, L.Cdr. James A., "JTC 3 A and the Maritime Strategy," 

Surface Warfare . July/August 1986, pp 22-24. On the role of the Joint 
Tactical C 3 Agency in fielding joint and allied programs and 
procedures to ensure implementation of the Maritime Strategy. 

Griggs, Roy A., Maj., USAF, "Maritime Strategy on NATO's Central 
Front," Military Review . April 1988, pp 54-65. Urges that the United 
States and its Navy develop capabilities and doctrinal concepts for 
using the conventional warhead Tomahawk (TLAM-C) in support of 
the NATO/US Army follow-on forces attack (FOFA) AirLand Battle 
concepts. Deep-interdiction TLAM-C strikes from disperses surface 
and subsurface combatants early in a conflict, says the author, would 
be "one way the maritime strategy could effectively support ground 
forces on the central front." A key problem still to be solved, 
concludes the article, is the creation of quick-reaction, on-scence 
shipboard TLAM strike planning centers. 

** Harned, Maj. Glenn, USA, "Comment and Discussion: The 

Maritime Strategy," Proceedings . February 1986, pp 26-28. Argues 
U.S. Army suffers from lack of a Maritime Strategy equivalent and 
from Navy reticence in explaining its operational tactical doctrines. 

Hooker, Richard D., Capt., USA, "NATO's Northern Flank: A 
Critique of the Maritime Strategy," Parameters . June 1989, pp 24-34. 
An Army officer criticizes, in his words, the "narrow prescriptions 
called for in the Maritime Strategy," urging that the Navy's sister 
services "enter and participate in the debate" over the defense of the 
Northern Flank in particular, and the "tone and substance of the 
strategic vision that must guide all our forces into the next century." 
Hooker's specific objections to the maritime strategy's northern flank 
gambit center on the risk of nuclear escalation, and the concession, 

. 57 

to the Soviets, of important geo-strategic and force-ratio advantages. 
Also disputed is the maritime strategists' claim that submarine 
SLOC interdiction has relatively little priority in Soviet Navy 
planning. The author concludes with the recommendation that 
options for the defense of northern Europe be "rigorously submitted to 
the discipline of an articulated and integrated conception of national 
military strategy," notably consideration of ground and air force 
equipment pre-positioning in Norway. 

** Kennedy, Col. William V., USAR (Ret.), "There Goes the U.S. Navy- 
Steaming the Wrong Way," Christian Science Monitor . June 23, 1986, 
p 14. Calls for the Navy to refocus on Asia, crediting a U.S. Army 
"counterattack with having turned the Maritime Strategy from an 
alleged early Pacific orientation to a current European one. Attempts 
to drive a wedge between the Navy and Marine Corps, and 
alleges "only nominal mention of the Army and the Air Force" in the 
Proceedings "Maritime Strategy" Supplement, charges belied by 
actually reading the Supplement. 

Killebrew, Lt.C. Robert B., USA, Conventional Defense and Total 
Deterrence: Assessing NATO's Strategic Options . Wilmington DE: 
Scholarly Resources, 1986. Unique among studies of NATO defense 
in its attempt at an integrated discussion of U.S. and allied land, sea, 
and air force. Argues NATO conventional defense is possible. 
Advocates early employment of naval forces as a defensive barrier 
"guarding" force. Sees a potential role for carrier air on the Central 
Front in a protracted war. 

Lewis, Kevin N., Combined Operations in Modern Naval Warfare: 
Maritime Strategy and Interservice Cooperation (Rand Paper #6999) . 
Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, April 1984. See especially for 
arguments on alleged unique "Navy Planning Style," many of which 
are belied by the Maritime Strategy. 

Ley, Capt. Michael USA, "Navy Badly Needs to Beef Up Land 
Operations Fire Support," Army . May 1987, pp 12+. Argues for more 
large-caliber naval guns to support Army operations ashore. 

* Pendley, R.Adm. William, "The U.S. Navy, Forward Defense, and 

the Air-Land Battel," in Pfaltzgraff, Robert, J.r, et al. (eds.), 
Emerging Doctrines and Technologies . Lexington, MA: Lexington 
Books, forthcoming in 1987. Official views of the Navy's Director of 
Strategy, Plans, and Policy (OP-60) as of April 1986. Argues that 
Maritime Strategy and Air-Land Battle doctrine are similar and 
complementary. Sees both as essential parts, along with nuclear 
deterrence, of an "essential traid" of U.S. defense strategy. A short 
summary is on pp 15-16 of Emerging Doctrines and Technologies: 
Implications for Global and Regional Political-Military Balance: A 
Conference Report: April 16-18. 1986 . Cambridge, MA: Institute for 


Foreign Policy Analysis, 1986. Cf Dunn and Staudenmaier May-June 
1985 Survival article; March-April 1986 views of V.Adm. Mustin on 
linkage between the Maritime Strategy and "Deep Strike," cited 
above; and West German government official views on lack of 
linkage, cited in Section V below. 

Prina, E. Edgar, "The Tripartite Ocean: The Air Force and Coast 
Guard Give the Navy a Helping Hand," Sea Power . October 1986, pp 
32-45. Good update on tri-service contributions to implementing the 
Maritime Strategy. 

U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (JCS Pub.2) . 
Washington: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 1986. Reflecting the 
National Security Act of 1947, as amended, The Goldwater-Nichols 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Title 10 and Title 
32 U.S. Code, as amended, and DOD Directive 5100.1 (The "Functions 
Paper"), JCS Pub. 2. governs the joint activities of th U.S. armed 
forces. See especially Chapter II, Sections 1 and 2-3, charging each 
Military Department, including the Navy, to "prepare forces. ..for the 
effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war." 
This responsibility (and not, as some critic charge, a desire to 
somehow usurp the authority of the JCS or the Unified and Specified 
Commanders) was the primary impetus and justification for Navy 
and Marine Corps development, promulgation and discussion of the 
Maritime Strategy. It is the Navy Department's framework for 
discharging its responsibilities to "organize, train, equip and provide 
Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and 
sustained combat incident to operations at sea." 

U.S. Air Force, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air 
Force (AFM 1-1) . Washington: Department of the Air Force, March 
16, 1984. The "cornerstone" Air Force doctrinal manual and, 
therefore, a building block of the Maritime Strategy. Takes a 
somewhat narrower view of potential areas of mutual support than 
does the Navy. See especially the discussion of objectives of naval 
forces on p 1-3, neglecting projection operations, e.g., strike or 
amphibious warfare; and pp 2-15, 3-1, and 3-5/3-6, covering possible 
Air Force actions to enhance naval operations, virtually all of which 
are incorporated in the Maritime Strategy. Note, however, the lack of 
mention of any concomitant naval role in enhancing "aerospace" 
operations, and the lack of discussion of USAF AAW contributions to 
maritime warfare, a key element of the Maritime Strategy. 

U.S. Army, Operations (FM 100-5) . Washington: Department of the 
Army, August 20, 1982. The Army's "keystone warfighting manual" 
and, therefore, a building block of the Maritime Strategy. Almost no 
discussion of Army/Navy mutual support, however, e.g., air defense 
and island/littoral reinforcement. Included on p 17-7 a useful 
discussion of the importance and essentially maritime nature of the 


NATO northern and southern European regions. Superseded in May 
1986; distribution now restricted to U.S. government agencies. 

Wilkerson, Lt. Col. Thomas, USMC, "Two if by Sea," Proceedings . 
November 1983, pp 34-39, on important role of the U.S. Air Force in 
Maritime Strategy by the principal Marine Corps contributor to the 
Strategy's development. 

Yost, Adm. Paul, USCG, "The Bright Slash of Liberty: Today's Coast 
Guard: Buffeted But Unbowed," Sea Power . August 1986, pp 8-24. See 
especially pp 11-12 and 21-22, on the Maritime Defense Zones, an 
important Navy-Coast Guard element of the Maritime Strategy, by 
the Commandant of the Coast Guard. 



The Martitime Strategy as developed by the U.S. Navy of the 1980s is 
heavily oriented toward combined (and joint) operations, and this was 
reflected in the Proceeding s January 19867 Supplement, 'The Maritime 
Strategy." The postwar U.S. Navy had never been "unilateralist." Allied 
contributions to the global campaign were worked out years ago and then 
had been continually updated in the drafting aof allied war plans, 
Memoranda of Agreement, and other documents. They have been routinely 
discussed at annual Navy-to-Navy staff policy talks and CNO-to-CNO visits, 
held betwen the U.S. Navy and each of its most important allied associates, 
thus, most of the hard bargaining and tardeoffs had alreacy been done, and 
integrating allied efforts with the U.S. Navy component of the Maritime 
Strategy was not particularly difficult. Once the Maritime Strategy was 
drafted, it was briefed to key allied CNOs and plannign staffs and to NATO 
commanders. Allied feedback was considered and utilized in updating 
revisions to the Strategy, and the process continues today. 

Alford, Jonathan, "The Current Military Position on the Northern 
Flank," Marineblad (The Hague), December 1986/January 1987, pp 
601-08. speaking at a May 1986 conference on "Britain and the 
Security of NATO's Northern Flank," the former deputy director of 
the London International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 
invokes the syllogism, "Who controls the Norwegian Sea depends on 
who controls the North Norwegian airfields. Who controls those 
fields depends on who gets there first, and who gets there first 
depends on who controls the Norwegian Sea." Alford concludes that 
the growth in strategic importance of NATO's northern region has 
turned Great Britain in "at least as much as a flank country as (a) 
central" alliance member. Accordingly, for Britain the maritime vs. 
continental alternative "falsifies and obscures the issue." If British 
military capabilities must be cut, they should fall on the Central 

Archer, Clive, Britain's surface Fleet: How Little is Enough? 
Centrepiece Paper No. 13, Aberdeen, Scotland: University of 
Aberdeen, Centre for Defense Studies, Summer 1988, 28 pp. Reports 
that national and allied security requires that Britain reverses the 
numerical decline of its surface fleet, and take a more active role in 
the defense of the North Atlantic. Early Royal Navy forward 
deployment in the Norwegian Sea, says Archer, would serve these 
purposes: (1) demonstrate allied solidarity and deter precipitated 
Soviet action, (2) "hold the fort" and (3) "sanitize" the South 
Norwegian and North Seas in preparation of the arrival of U.S. Navy 
reinforcements, and (4) influence possible naval arms control 
negotiations. On the latter, the author notes that the European voice 
in matters will be "relatively proportionate to their naval strength." 


** Arkin, William M. and Shallhorn, Steve, "Canada Even More Under 
U.S. thumb in Sub Plan," Globe and Mail (Toronto), July 17, 1987, p 7. 
Decries the Maritime Strategy, the new Canadian defense policy and 
the linkage between the two. 

Armitage, Richard, "The U.S./Japan Alliance," Defense/86 . July- 
August 1986, pp 20-27. Reagan Administration defense policy vis-a- 
vis Japan, by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs. The context of the Maritime Strategy in Northeast 
Asis and the Northwest Pacific. See also his "Japan's Defense 
Program: No Cause for Alarm," Washington Post . February 18, 1987, 

Auer, Cdr. James, USN (Ret) and Seno, Cdr. Sadao, JMSDF (Ret.), 
"Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force," Naval Forces . 11/1987, pp 
178-190. Stress on the diffusion of labor between the U.S. Navy and the 
Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force in the Northwest Pacific and 
on the deterrent value of same. 

Ausland, John C, "The Heavy Traffic in Northern Seas," 
International Herald Tribune . September 16, 1986, on some effects of 
the Maritime Strategy in Norway. 

Barresen, Jacob, Capt. Royal Norwegian Navy, "U.S. Carrier 
Operations in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea." Paper 
presented at the International Comparative Workshop on Soviet 
Seapower, Sortland, June 1988, 24 pp. This paper takes aim at the 
conventional wisdom that the forward deployment of carrier 
battlegroups into the Norwegian Sea will amount to a charge-of-the- 
light brigade. Capt. Barresen concludes instead that a two or three- 
carrier battlegroup, provided it is afforded adequate land-based AAW 
and ASW support, can establish sea control north of the Greenland- 
Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap and possibly "profoundly 
change the correlation of forces on NATO's northern flank." Such a 
force, he reports, will increase allied air defense and anti-submarine 
capabilities in the North by factors of five and five-to-ten, respectively. 

Bjarnason, Bjorn, "Iceland and NATO," NATO Review . February 
1986, pp 7-12. By one of Iceland's leading journalists. "It is crucial 
that in any defense of sea routes between North America and 
Western Europe, ...the Soviet fleet is confined as far north towards its 
home base at the Kola Peninsula as possible. ..the Greenland- 
Iceland-UK gap.. .is not an adequate barrier; instead, NATO 
envisages a forward defense in the Norwegian Sea." Includes update 
on the defense debate in Iceland. 


Boerresen, Capt. Jacob, RNN, "Norway and the U.S. Maritime 
Strategy," Naval Forces . VI/1986, pp 14-15, by the military secretary 
to the Norwegian Minister of Defense. "During the 1970s, NATO and 


the USA expressly limited their carrier operations... to the waters in 
and south of the GIUK gap, Norway... found this situation rather 
uncomfortable. ..The official Norwegian reaction to (forward 
deployment of CVBGs) has been positive, (but) Norway is... sensitive 
to all developments that it fears may threaten the low level of 

Boerresen, J., Capt. Royal Norwegian Navy, "Norway and the U.S. 
Maritime Strategy," Naval Forces . When this article was published, 
the author was military secretary to Norway's Minister of Defense 
Johan J. Hoist. The views expressed can, therefore, be read as a 
reliable statement of Norway's defense preferences. In this case, 
Boerresen stresses his country's "reluctant embrace" of the U.S. 
Navy's maritime strategy. Occasional forward deployments of 
American carrier battlegroups, he says, are desirable, but not as 
permanent presence. The writer also has misgivings with an anti- 
SSBN strategy, and he worries over the "well-known phenomenon 
that American commitments fluctuate over the years." He cautions 
his American readers that they should not presume that permission 
to station their carriers inside Norway's territorial waters will be 
timely and automatic. 

Bouchard, Lt. Joseph, and Hess, Lt. Couglas, "The Japanese Navy 
and Sea-Lanes Defense," Proceedings . March 1984, pp 88-97. On the 
concurrent Japanese Maritime Strategy debate. See also Lehrack, Lt. 
Col. Otto, "Search for a New Consensus," same issue, pp 96-99. 

Breemer, Jan S., "The Euro-Atlantic Dimension." Paper presented at 
the Dalhousie University Conference on'The Undersea Dimension of 
Maritime Strategy," Halifax, N.S., Canada, June 23, 1989. 
Summarizes the Western European perspective on maritime security 
in the North Atlantic as codified in the evolving "European Maritime 
Concept 2010" studies, notably the "Sub-Concept's" plan for creating 
extra-NATO decision-making mechanisms that would permit the 
early and timely forward "crisis-deployment" of an all-European task 
force into the Norwegian Sea. 

** Breemer, Jan S., "The Maritime Strategy: One Ally's View," Naval 
War College Review . Summer 1988, pp 41-46. Discusses the (official 
and unofficial) views within the Dutch Navy on the possible 
implications of the U.S. Navy's "new strategic thinking" for Dutch 
and Western European maritime planning. Highlights NATO- 
European planning toward early "Phase I" crisis response 
operations in the Norwegian Sea. 

British Atlantic Committee, Diminishing the Nuclear Threat: 
NATO's Defense and New Technology . London: February 1984. A 
group of retired British generals and others rail against the 
"practicality" and "very purpose" of the NATO reinforcement 


mission, given their assumptions of a short conventional war phase 
in Europe and overwhelming surface ship vulnerability. See also 
Mitchell, Lt. I.G., RN., "Atlantic Reinforcement — A Re-Emerging 
Debate," Armed Forces . September 1986, pp 399-400. 

Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, "Arms 
Control and the Defense White Paper," Arms Control Bulletin . June 
18, 1987. Condemns Canada's nuclear submarine acquisition plan as 
providing involuntary support for the U.S. Navy's "Forward 
Maritime Strategy," which the authors imply is provocative and 
destabilizing rather than a deterrent. 

Caufriez, Chaplain G., "Comment and Discussion: Plan Orange 
Revisited," Proceedings . March 1985, pp 73 & 79. From Home Forces 
Headquarters, Belgium, a plea for Norwegian Sea vice GIUK Gap 
defense, lest "at one go, the northern flank would have crumbled." 

Challenge and Commitment: A Defense Policy for Canada . Ottawa: 
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987. June 1987 official 
Canadian Ministry of Defense "White Paper," the first since 1971. 
Current Canadian contributions to allied Maritime Strategy and 
future plans. See especially maps pp 13, 52, 64 and discussion of 
proposed changes in Canadian policy, which will increase the 
requirements for USN and USMC forces in the Norwegian Sea and 
elsewhere, but which should help improve other elements needed to 
carry out the Strategy. 

Chichester, Michael, "The Western Alliance: Politics, Economics 
and Maritime Power," Navv International . January 1987, pp 4-6. 
While warning that the U.S. naval largesse on behalf of Western 
Europe's maritime security may not outlast the Reagan 
Administration, Chichester repeats his call for the creation of a 
"European maritime pillar," organized under the umbrella of the 
EEC or Western European Union (WEU), and headed up by Great 
Britain, "the leading maritime power in Europe." 

Chichester, Michael, "NATO's Maritime Power: Its place in a New 
Strategy," Navv International . August 1986, pp 504-06. Between the 
U.S. Navy's global (over) commitments, the possibility that the Soviet 
Union will re-direct its expansionary appetite away from the Central 
Front, and European desires for a louder voice in Western coalition 
strategy, the time has come, says the author, for a "combined 
European maritime defense policy" that will take charge of the 
security of the eastern Atlantic. 

Chichester, Michael, "Towards a European Maritime Policy," Navv 
International . November 1988, pp 538-40. One of the most vocal 
spokesmen for the creation of a European "maritime pillar" deplores 
the failure by the Western European Union (WEU) to translate the 


recent dispatch of Western European flotillas to the Persian Gulf into 
a "European standing naval force" for use "outside the NATO 

Childs, Nick, "The Royal Navy: Which Way Forward?" Navv 
International . April 1989, pp 169-71. Proposes that perhaps only 
significant (including British) arms reductions on the European 
Continent will "save" the Royal Navy's surface fleet from declining 
below the stated force objective of "about 50" destroyers and frigates. 
Still, child's questions if it may not be wiser to "balance" the fleet in 
favor of submarines and maritime patrol aircraft as opposed to 
surface combatants if the Royal Navy, in concert with its European 
allies, intends to "hold the ring" preparatory to the arrival of 
American reinforcements. Given the Royal Navy's weakness in air 
defense capabilities, concludes Childs, doing so effectively "must be 
considered fanciful." 

Cole, Paul M. and Hart, Douglas M. (eds.), Northern Europe: 
Security Issues for the 1990s . Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986. See 
especially Col. Jonathan Alford, BA (Ret.), "The Soviet Naval 
Challenge," pp 43-56, and Lt. Gen. Heinz von zur Gathen, FRGA 
(Ret.), "The Federal Republic of German's Contribution to the 
Defense of Northern Europe," pp 57-82. The former sees forward U.S. 
operations in the Norwegian Sea as unlikely, and argues that the 
Royal Navy should, therefore, concentrate on the Channel, the North 
Sea, and the Norwegian Sea, rather than either "unspecific 
flexibility" or "keeping open the sea lines of communication to the 
United States," options that parallel those discussed in the 
concurrent U.S. Maritime Strategy debates. The latter discusses the 
increasing West German role in Baltic, North, and Norwegian Sea 
defense. Both authors base their arguments for enhanced European 
naval power on the premise that the U.S. Navy will not be available, 
at least not in strength, in the Norwegian Sea early in a war. 

Cremasco, Maurizio, "Italy: A New Definition of Security?" in 
Kelleher, Catherine M. and Mattox, Gale A. (eds.), evolving 
European Defense Policies . Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987, 
pp 257-272. On the Italian military policy debate and Italian Navy 
views on strategy. 

Crickard, F.W., R.Adm., RCN (Ret.), "The U.S. Maritime Strategy- 
Should Canada Be Concerned?" See entry under Yost, William J. 

Crickard, R.Adm. F.W., CN, "Three Oceans— Three Challenges: 
The Future of Canada's Maritime Forces," Naval Forces . V/1985, pp 
13-27. On complementary Canadian strategy, especially area ASW in 
the North Atlantic SLOC. 


** Crickard, R.Adm. Frederick, "The Canadian Navy — New 

Directions," Naval Forces . 11/1987, pp 78-87. Sees the Maritime 
Strategy as forcing hard choices on Canadian naval planners. Cf his 
views of a year earlier, cited above. 

De Savornin-Lohman, J.P., "De Nederlandse Politieke Benadering 
van het 'Out-of-Area' Probleem ("The Dutch Political Approach to the 
'Out-of-Area' Problem"), Marineblad (The Hague), May 1988, pp 192- 
198. Synopsis of the Dutch Government's policy on NATO "out-of- 
area" issues, which includes: (1) rejection of a NATO out-of-area 
"strategy" per se in favor of preparations to deal with situations on an 
ad hoc basis, (2) a preference for political solutions through 
international forums such as the United Nations, (3) a rejection of - 
out-of-area military operations under NATO auspices, and (4) an 
emphasis on indirect contributions in support of the direct 
contributions by the larger NATO members, e.g., the provision of 
transit facilities or force compensations. The article includes a useful 
discussion of the Dutch decision to send mine warfare forces to the 
Persian Gulf. Note is also made of existing NATO plans to protect 
shipping outside the treaty area in the event of a crisis with the Soviet 

Defense Agency (Japan), Defense of Japan: 1986 . Includes latest 
official Japanese defense policy and strategy views. See especially pp 
99 and 154. Outlines agreed division of labor between the Maritime 
Self-Defense Force and the U.S. Navy in the event of an attack on 
Japan, as understood by the Japanese government. The Maritime 
Strategy was developed in full accordance with these concepts. 

Delaere, Martijn, "Dutch Seek Naval Specialization," Jane's Defense 
Weekly . June 3, 1989, p 1059. Reports on the jointly British-Dutch- 
West German produced "Sub-Concept for the Northern Maritime 
Region 2000-2010" plan for the creation, in time of a Norwegian Sea 
crisis, of an integrated northern European naval force-in-being. 
According to Delaere, the Dutch Navy is seeking to translate this 
plan into an argument for mission specialization. He is wrong. 

Department of Defense (Australia), The Defense of Australia: 1987 . 
Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, March 19, 
1987. The first official Australian Defense "White Paper" since 1976 
ensures continued RAN cooperation within the Maritime Strategy. 
"In the remote contingency of global conflict.. .our responsibilities 
would include those associated with the Radford-Collins Agreement 
for the protection and control of shipping. Subject to priority 
requirement in our own area the Australian Government would then 
consider contributions further afield. ..for example, our FFGs...are 
capable of effective participation in a U.S. carrier battle group well 
distant from Australia's shores." 


Dibb, Paul, Review of Australia's Defense Capabilities . Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986. Against 
Australian involvement with United States and other allied 
contingency planning for global war. Claims that Radford-Collins 
Agreement "convoying and escort connotations which extend more 
than 2000 nautical miles west of Australia to the mid-Indian Ocean 
suggest a disproportionate commitment of scarce resources to 
activities which may be only marginally related to our national 
interest and capabilities." An input to the March 1987 government 
White Paper on defense. 

Diehl, David, "Norwegian Admiral Watns Maneuver Limits," 
European Stars and Stripes . September 17, 1988, p 3. V.Adm. Torolf 
Rein, NATO's allied commander northern Europe, comments on 
exercises "Teamwork '88," and proposes that, while he is pleased 
with the Alliance's new forward strategy, Norway's resources "can't 
go on to exercises of this type a year." 

Dunn, Michael Collins, "Canada Rethinks Its Defense Posture," 
Defense and Foreign Affairs . November 1985, pp 12-19. Discusses 
Canadian ground and air contributions to NATO's Northern Front 
and naval contribution to Atlantic ASW and Arctic defense. 

Ebata, Kensuke, "Ocean Air Defense Japanese Style," Proceedings . 
March 1987, pp 98-101. On Japanese AAW concepts and programs, 
essential elements of the Maritime Strategy in the Pacific. 

Eberle, Adm. Sir James, RN, "Defending the Atlantic Connection," 
in Till, Geoffrey, (ed.), The Future of British Sea Power . Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1984, pp 146-150. See especially for frank 
overview of four Royal Navy tasks in the Atlantic. 

** Eberle, Adm. Sir James, RN, "Editorial," Naval Forces . IV/1986, p 7. 
By a former top Royal Navy and NATO Commander-in-Chief. "The 
New Maritime Strategy is to be welcomed as a brave effort to bring 
some much needed clarity into the filed of* maritime strategic 
thinking, but it is more likely to be welcomed in Europe by naval 
officers than it is by political leaders." 

Espersen, Morgens, The Baltic — Balance and Security . Copenhagen: 
The Information and Welfare Service of the Danish Defense 
Ministry, 1982, 71 pp. A very useful Danish portrayal of the historical 
evolution and contemporary security and international legal status of 
the Baltic Sea and Danish Straits. Includes a valuable summary of 
Soviet Warsaw pact naval activities and exercises along the seaward 
flank of NATO's Central Front. 

Federal Minister of Defense (Federal Republic of Germany), White 
Paper 1985: The Situation and the Development of the Federal Armed 


Forces . Includes latest official West German defense policy and 
strategy views. See especially pp 27-29, 76-77, 111, and 211-216. 
Declares unequivocal German support for "forward defense at sea in 
accordance with the NATO commanders' maritime concept of 
operations, which "calls for countering the threat far from friendly 
sea routes and shores. Interdiction of enemy naval forces should be 
effected immediately in front of their own bases." Differentiates 
clearly, however, between such use of naval (and air) forces and 
"aggressive forward defense by ground operations in the opponent's 
territory," which "NATO strategy rules out." 

Gann, L.H. (ed.), The Defense of Western Europe . London: Croom 
Helm, 1987, surveys all the defense forces of all the Western 
European nations. Particularly useful is Nigel de Lee's "The Danish 
and Norwegian Armed Forces," pp 58-94, which examines in some 
detail their wartime sea and air concepts of operations in the 
Norwegian Sea, the Baltic approaches, the Baltic itself and inshore 
waters. These concepts are well integrated into the Maritime 
Strategy. As regards Denmark, de Lee notes: "Plans for naval action 
are based on aggressive tactics in depth, and this entails a forward 
defense." Particularly useless is the highly parochial chapter by Col. 
Harry Summers USA (Ret.), allegedly on "United States Armed 
Forces in Europe," which should have been styled "The U.S. Army in 

Garrod, Sir Martin, Lt. Gen., Royal Marines, "Amphibious Warfare: 
Why?" The RUSI Journal . Winter 1988, pp 25-30. A useful reminder 
by the Commandant General of the British Corps pf Marines of the 
"Basics" of amphibious warfare. Garrod's specific "target audience" 
are those within the British Ministry of Defense and Government 
who question the contemporary relevance of the "sea soldiers." But 
his quotation of Liddell-Hart's observation how "amphibious 
flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a sea-based power 
possesses," has perhaps even greater relevance for the amphibious 
component of the American maritime strategy. 

Greenwood, David, "Towards Role Specialization in NATO," NATO's 
Sixteen Nations . July 1986, pp 44-49. Argues against a significant 
Eastern Atlantic naval role for Belgium, the Netherlands, West 
Germany and Denmark. This translates out as largely an attack on 
the existence of the Dutch Navy, one of the world's best. 

Grimstvedt, R.Adm. Bjarne, RNN, "Norwegian Maritime 
Operations," Proceedings . March 1986, pp 144-149. By the Norwegian 
CNO. Stresses Norwegian Navy intent and capabilities to defend 
North Norway, including same Vestfjorden area that focused 


Grove, Eric J., "After the Falklands," Proceeding s. March 1986, pp 
121-129. Questions and wisdom of the Royal Navy functioning 
primarily in conjunction with Striking Fleet Atlantic and USN SSNs 
in the Norwegian Sea. Would prefer RN focus to return to Naval 
Control and Protection of Shipping in the Eastern Atlantic and 

Grove, Eric J., "The Convoy Debate," Naval Forces . No. III/1985, pp 
38-46. Update of classic post-war Royal Navy pro-convoy/anti-forward 
ops arguments by a leading British civilian naval analyst. 

** Grove, Eric, "The Maritime Strategy and Crisis Stability," Naval 

Forces . No. 6, 1986, pp 34-44. Excellent discussion of how the Soviet 
Union and the West might agree on a set of formal or informal 
"rules" for routinizing the periodic forward deployment of NATO 
naval forces in the Norwegian Sea without upsetting the "Nordic 
balance." Were such "normal times" rules to be broken, says Grove, 
this would serve as a "tripwire" for the West to initiate the maritime 
strategy's "Phase I" crisis reinforcement. 

Grove, Eric, "The Maritime Strategy," Bulletin of the Council for 
Arms Control (UK), September 1986, pp 5-6. Regards the Strategy as 
"self-consciously offensive" and "self-consciously coalition-minded, 
yet, another example of the growing difference in mood between the 
two sides of the Atlantic." Challenges fellow Europeans to inject 
amendments reflecting their own "interests and fears." The 
"difference in mood" he sees, however, may well be more between 
military leaders and some political writers on both sides of the ocean 
than between Americans and Europeans. 

Hackett, Gen. Sir John, BA (Ret.), McGeoch, V.Adm. Sir Ian, RN, 
(Ret.), et al, The Third World War: The Untold Story, New York: 
MacMillan, 1982. Fiction. Sequel to T he Third World War: Aug ust 
1985 (1978). A British vision, stressing the war at sea and on the 
northern front, and all but ignoring the Mediterranean and Pacific. 
"Swing" and carrier strikes on the Kola understood (as in 1978) as 
normal NATO modus operandi. (XClancy's 1986 Red Storm Rising , 
and Hayes et al American Lake . Chapter 19, cited in Section II above. 

Haesken, Ole, et al, Confidence Building Measures at Sea . FFI 
Rapport-88/5002, Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defense Research 
Establishment, November 10, 1988. An exhaustive study of the 
desirability/feasibility of 14 different types of possible confidence 
building measures (CBMs) at sea for the Nordic region. The study 
finds 5 possible measures "clearly promising" (e.g., notification of 
exercises, incidents-at-sea agreements), 6 with "uncertain value" 
(e.g., limitation of exercises, exchange of shipboard exercise 
observers), and 3 "clearly unsuitable." Each of the latter would entail 
the creation of "permanent zones" of naval exclusion, e.g., limited 


presence, weapons (SLCM) limitations, and limited base access. This 
is requisite reading for anyone concerned with the possible impact of 
maritime CBMs on operations efficiency, deterrence, and forward 
naval planning generally. 

Heginbotham, Stanley, J., "The Forward Maritime Strategy and 
Nordic Europe," Naval War College Review . November/December 
1985, pp 19-27. Notes that U.S. Navy's maritime strategy means 
different things to different people, and that the European allies will 
accept or reject the strategy, depending on their particular 
interpretation (e.g., "deployment doctrine" vs. "horizontal escalation 
doctrine"). The author concludes that, "it is important to bear 
European sensitivities in minds and to shape a strategy in ways that 
are most likely to draw European support rather than opposition." 

Heginbotham, Stanley, "The Forward Maritime Strategy and Nordic 
Europe, Naval War College Review . November-December 1985, pp 19- 

Hoist, Johan Jorgen, "Arms Control and Security on NATO's 
Northern Flank," NATO Review . October 1988, pp 10-16. A 
comprehensive statement of the Norwegian position on European 
arms control objectives, including the need for limiting or 
(preferably) prohibiting nuclear-armed SLCMs. 

Hoist, Johan Jorgen, et al. (eds.), Deterrence and Defense in the 
North . Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1985. See especially 
authoritative chapters by high Norwegian government officials and 
Hunt, Kenneth, "The Security of the Center and the North," pp 66-76: 
"The Stronger the North, the Stronger the Center." 

Hoist, Johan Jorgen, "The Security Pattern in Northern Europe: A 
Norwegian View," Marineblad (The Hague), December 1986/ 
January 1987, pp 622-33. Excellent discussion by Norway's defense 
minister of his country's "security calculus," including, in 
particular, the country's relationship with the Soviet Union based on 
the "trade-off between considerations of deterrence and 
reassurance." Most treatments of the linkage between the Central 
Front and the Northern flank focus on the first as the"dependent 
variable." Hoist reminds the reader that this relationship is much 
more synergistic: "The size and topography of North Norway would 
require a Would-be attacker to commit fairly large forces which 
would then not be available for allocation to the central front or the 
Baltic region. ..and. ..NATO's ability to hold the central front is vital, 
therefore, also from the point of view of constraining Soviet options 
for diverting forces to the Nordic area." Hoist is less than sanguine 
about some of the declaratory aspects of the U.S. Navy's maritime 
strategy. He specifically cautions against putting the Soviet SSBNs at 
risk, against using Norwegian territory for "horizontal escalation," 


and against a U.S. Navy "permanent naval presence in the 
Norwegian Sea." By contrast, he does support the idea of a 
"reasonable frequency of presence. order to emphasize the 
American commitment to the defense of Norway." 

Howlett, Gen. Geoffrey, BA., "Interview," Journal of Defense and 
Diplomacy . September 1986, pp 13-16, NATO Commander-in-Chief 
Allied Forces Northern Europe rejects a GIUK Gap maritime 
defense line. Advocates forward defense on land and sea in North 
Norway and the Baltic, and containment of the Soviet Northern and 
Baltic fleets in their home waters. 

** Huitfeldt, Lt. Gen. Tonne, RNA, "The Threat from the North- 
Defense of Scandinavia," NATO's Sixteen Nations . October 1986, pp 
26-32. The former NATO International Military Staff Director's 
endorsement of the Maritime Strategy as "making a more effective 
contribution to deterring the Soviet Northern Fleet from any 
adventurism in the Norwegian Sea, and Soviet aggression in 
general," with the caution that it "not go beyond what is essential for 
deterrence and defense." 

Huitfeldt, Lt. Gen. Tonne, RNA, NATO's Northern Security . London: 
Institute for the Study of Conflict, September 1976, by the retired 
Director of the NATO International Military Staff. "United States 
maritime strategy is in harmony with the agreed NATO strategy." 
Good coverage of the 1981 NATO concept of Maritime Operations, a 
major building block of the Maritime Strategy. 

Huldt, Bo, "The Strategic North," The Washington Quarterly . 
Summer 1985, pp 99-109. Reviews the evolution of the Nordic area 
from a regional "buffer zone" to a central area in global strategy. The 
Swedish author suggests that, given the transition of the region from 
being a flank area to "being perhaps directly in the line of fire," a 
renewed Danish and Norwegian interest in NATO's nuclear 
deterrent "should not be ruled out as totally inconceivable." 

Hunter, Robert, (ed.), NATO— The Next Generation . Boulder, CO: 
Westview, 1984. See especially, and unexpectedly, Japanese Maritime 
Self Defense Force role in closing off Far Eastern straits and 
protecting Western Pacific sea lines of communication in chapters by 
Jun Tsunoda and Shunji Taoka. 

Jane's NATO & Europe Today . May 3, 1989, "NATO Votes New Navy 
War Rules," p 3. Reports the adoption by NATO of new roles of naval 
engagement, defining when naval commanders may open fire 
against potential adversaries. Does not spell out whether ROEs have 
been tightened or liberalized. 


Jansson, C. Nils-Ove, Cdr., Royal Swedish Navy, "The Baltic: A Sea 
of Contention," Naval War College Review , pp 47-61. Notes that the 
Baltic Sea is a "backwater maritime theater" no longer due to three 
key developments: (1) the forwardness of the U.S. Navy's maritime 
strategy, (2) NATO's FOFA concept, and (3) the rejuvenation of the 
Soviet TVD system. The article goes on to postulate a wide range of 
possible Soviet offensive and defensive scenarios for the region. 

"Japan, U.S. Map Out Sea Defenses," Washington Times . December 
1, 1986, p 6. On the wartime division of labor between the U.S. Navy 
and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. 

Kampe, V.Adm. Helmut, FGN, "Defending the Baltic Approaches," 
Proceedings . March 1986, pp 88-93, by the NATO Commander, Allied 
Naval Forces, Baltic Approaches. Complementary German and 
Danish naval strategies: "In the Baltic Sea, forward defense begins at 
the Warsaw Pact ports." 

Kawaguchi, Hiroshi, "Japan's Evolving Defense Policy," NATO's 
Sixteen Nations. April 1989, pp 21-24. An explanantion of how 
Japan's decision, in January 1987 to repeal the one percent of GNP 
ceiling on defense expenditures will provide for a robust defense and 
will not likely be reversed despite the prospect of regional detente. In 
the area of Far East maritime security, Kawaguchi (a research 
fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National 
Defense University in Washington, DC) suggests that a START 
agreement will likely result in the elimination or at least important 
reduction of the Soviet SSBN fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk. The result 
may be that the Soviet Pacific Fleet, relieved of its task of SSBN 
protection, "would have more room for other activities." 

King-Harman, Col. Anthony, BA, "NATO Strategy — A New Look," 
RUSI . March 1984, pp 26-29. By a former long-time member of the 
International NATO Staff. Alleges and decries a NATO "lack of 
political direction in the maritime sphere. It has been largely left to 
SACLANT himself to develop and implement a maritime strategy for 
deterrence... There is also a Tri-MNC concept of operations again 
carrying no political endorsement." Calls for a new NATO "strategic 
review," one result of which, he anticipates would be a finding that 
"reinforcements.. .would only need the minimum of maritime 

Leenhardt, Adm. Yves, FN, "France — The Need for a Balanced 
Navy," NATO's Sixteen Nations . February-March 1986, pp 41-46. 
Rowing to the beat of a different drum. Authoritative statement by the 
French CNO. Heavy emphasis on nuclear deterrence, crisis 
prevention and control, and allied cooperation. Minimal discussion 
relating to global or regional forward conventional operations against 


the Soviets, however, in contrast to U.S. Maritime Strategy and other 
allied writers. 

Longbottom Squadron Leader S.P., RAAF, "Maritime Strike Strategy 
for the Royal Australian Air Force," Defense Force Journal . 
March/April 1987, pp 5+. Argues for increased RAAF attention to 
mine warfare. 

Mabesoone, Capt. W.C., RNLN, and Buis, Cdr. N. W.G., RNLN, 
"Maritime Strategic Aspects of the North Sea," RUSI . September 
1984, pp 12-17. Dutch Navy view of North Sea operations. 
Complements the Maritime Strategy. Stresses need for land-based 
air forces in air defense and possibility of SSN TLAM-C support of 
Central Front operations. Emphasis on barrier vice close-support 
Naval Protection of Shipping operations. 

** Mackay, Cdr. S.V., RN, "An Allied Reaction" Proceedings . April 
1987, pp 82-89. Concludes that a peacetime USN Norwegian Sea 
CVBG presence is required with concomitant "greater commitment 
from Norway," and "a firm and agreed-upon line. ..on ROEs. There 
are clear indications from recent exercises that this Maritime 
Strategy is the way ahead for U.S. maritime forces and not solely to 
support the cause for a 600-ship Navy... the supporting maritime 
nations in NATO must follow the lead. (But) We in Europe must be 
sure that the Maritime Strategy is a genuine U.S. policy for the 
future and not just a product of the current administration." See also 
"Comment and Discussion," July 1987, pp 19-20. 

Margolis, Eric, "Will Canadian Waters Become the Next Maginot 
Line?" Wall Street Journal . February 21, 1986, p 23. A Canadian call 
for increased U.S./Canadian ASW capabilities in the Arctic. 

Matsukane, Hisatomo, "Japan and Security of the Sea Lanes," Global 
Affairs . Spring 1989, pp 49-64. The director of the Japanese Center for 
Strategic Studies and a former lieutenant general in the Japanese 
army warns that the Soviet Pacific Fleet threat is aimed mainly at the 
Pacific sea lines of communications, to prevent the Soviet fleet from 
breaking out into the open ocean, the author makes three main 
recommendations: (1) a change from "passive to active defense" by 
Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces, including teaming up with 
U.S. forces for "coordinated strikes on regional Soviet facilities," (2) 
tighter integration of U.S. and Japanese command and control 
capabilities, and (3) the creation of a "well-articulated regional 
defense, involving far-reaching cooperation and collaboration" 
between the United States, Japan, and other regional Far East- 
Pacific nations. 

** Nakanishi, Terumasa, "U.S. Nuclear Policy and Japan," 

Washington Quarterly . Winter 1987, pp 81-97, especially pp 84-85 and 


p 90. The Maritime Strategy in the context of the overall military 
situation in Northeast Asia. "The new 'Full-Forward' strategy of the 
U.S. Pacific Fleet.. .is certainly in the interest of Japan's conventional 
security." He is less sanguine regarding Japan's nuclear security, 

Nathan, James A., "How's the Strategy Playing With the Allies?" 
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings . August 1988, pp 57-62. The author 
asserts that American's overseas allies, especially in the Pacific 
region, are skeptical about the intent, manageability, and 
wherewithal of the U.S. Navy's "global" maritime strategy. Fearing 
that Pacific Fleet carriers may need to be "swung" to the Atlantic, 
countries such as Japan and Australia are allegedly reluctant to join 
with the United States in early forward operations and perhaps be left 
to "hold the bag." 

** Naval Forces . No. 7, 1986, "Norway and the U.S. Maritime Strategy," 
pp 14-15. An anonymous, but presumably Norwegian, author 
explains the "reluctant Norwegian embrace of the maritime 
strategy." While acknowledging Norway's "uncomfortable" security 
situation vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the article expresses worry 
nevertheless that a heightened U.S. military profile in northern 
waters could negate Norway's past efforts to strike a balance between 
"deterrence and reassurance." Cited are these specific concerns: (1) 
an American submarine campaign against Soviet SSBNs might 
trigger nuclear escalation, as well as serve to denude the Norwegian 
Sea-deployed carier battlegroups of their own SSN protection; (2) the 
Soviet Union could counter U.S. forward deployment with its own 
increase in force levels, the latter could become a permanent feature 
of the Nordic "strategic landscape," whereas the U.S. presence may 
turn out to be a passing phenomenon; and (3) there is no guarantee 
that U.S. Navy forces will arrive in time and at places of Norwegian 

Netherlands Advisory Committee on Peace and Security, Burden 
Sharing: A Political Task . The Hague, May 1989. Report prepared for 
the Dutch ministries of defense and foreign affairs. Concludes that 
the American perception (real and imagined) of an inequitable 
Alliance defense burden should be re-dressed less through higher 
European defense expenditures than by way of a broader "European" 
responsibility for its own security. The revival of the Western 
European Union (WEU), and the dispatch of European naval units to 
the Persian Gulf are reported as "signals" to the United States that 
"Europe" is indeed prepared to share burdens outside the Atlantic 
treaty area. The Report acknowledges that a "united Western 
Europe" may not always make itself heard to U.S. liking, and must 
guard against living up to the fears of some Americans that "1992" 
will inaugurate a "fortress Europe." 


Newman, Peter C, "Business Watch: About-Face in Defense 
Strategy," Maclean's Magazine . January 1,2, 1987, p 28. Naval 
aspects of the defense debate in Canada on the eve of publication of 
the 1987 "White Paper." 

Nishihara, Masashi, "Maritime Cooperation in the Pacific: The 
United States and its Partners," Naval War College Review . Summer 
1987, pp 37-41. "The U.S. strategy of horizontal escalation by which 
the United States would open up armed tensions in different parts of 
the world, in order to force the Soviets to disperse their forces, may 
not meet Japanese interests." 

Okazuki, Hisahiko, Japan's National Security Strategy . Maryland: 
Abt Books, 1986. Ambassador Okazuki presents persuasive 
arguments why Japan could not stay out of large or small conflicts 
involving its interests. 

** Olsen, Edward R., "The Maritime Strategy in the Western Pacific," 
Naval War College Review . Autumn 1987, pp 38-49. A reminder that 
U.S. perceptions of what-needs-to-be-done in the "American lake," 
i.e. Western Pacific, are not always shared by the regional states. 
Most nations in the area, says Olsen, fully appreciate the 
maritimeness of their geo-strategical and economic circumstances; 
however, they have so far failed to "co-sign" the American estimate of 
the Soviet danger, and remain uncertain of how exactly an American 
maritime strategy would cope with this danger. 

Oseald, Sir Julian, Adm. Royal Navy. "Maritime Concepts of 
Operations: New Thinking," The RUSI Journal . Summer 1988, pp. 
10-14. NATO's Commander-in-Chief, Channel and Eastern Atlantic 
considers how emerging maritime technologies will help keep the 
allied "forward maritime concept" affordable. 

Price, Alfred, Air Battle Central Europe . New York: The Free Press, 
1986. See Chapter 14, "Guardians of the Baltic Shore," on Federal 
German Naval Aviation forward air-to-surface warfare concepts in 
the Baltic, and Chapter 15, "Protecting the Lifeline," on air defense of 
the seas surrounding the United Kingdom. 

Pruijs, A., Capt., RNLN, "De verdediging van de Noordflank is meer 
dan de verdediging van Noord-Noorwegen" ("The Defense of the 
Northern Flank is More Than the Defense of Northern Norway"), 
Marineblad (The Hague), April 1987, pp 9Q-107. A review of the 
importance of the Nordic region to the security and defense of Central 
Europe. A maritime forward defense, says this serving officer in the 
Dutch Navy, is codified in the 1982 NATO Defense Planning 
Committee-approved Concept of Maritime Operations 
(CONMAROPS). Western European navies and amphibious forces 


must be prepared to respond to a crisis quickly and in force, pending 
the arrival of the U.S. carrier reinforcements. 

Richey, George, Britain's Strategic Role in NATO . London: 
MacMillan, 1986. Argues for Britain's return to a classic Maritime 
Strategy, as Ambassador Robert Komer, Senator Gary Hart and 
William Lind (but not the U.S. Navy) use the term. 

Riste, Olav and Tamnes, Rolf, The Soviet Naval Threat and Norway . 
Oslo: Research Center for Defense History (FHFS), National Defense 
College Norway, 1986. See especially pp 18-22. Two Norwegian 
defense specialists see recent U.S. naval and other efforts as 
providing "from the Norwegian point of view. ..a considerably 
improved probability that the supply lines to Norway will be kept 
open." See also Tamnes' "Integration and Screening," (also FHFS 
1986), on Norwegian attitudes in the 1970s and 1980s. 

"Royal Navy Edges Closer to Kola," Defense Attache . 4/1985, pp 9-10. 
On actual complementary contemporary Royal Navy North 
Norwegian Sea strategy. 

Schlim, V.Adm. A.J.P., BN, "Mine Warfare in European Waters," 
NATO's Sixteen Nations . February-March 1986, pp 20-28. By the 
Belgian CNO. How NATO plans to use mines and mining against the 
Soviets. Excellent complementarity with the Maritime Strategy. 

Secretary of State for Defense (UK), Statement on the Defense 
Estimates 1986:1 . London: HMSO, 1986. See especially pp 29, 34, and 
60-61. "...enemy attack submarines are successfully to be held at 
arm's length from the critical Atlantic routes. Defense against these 
submarines would begin when they sailed; the availability of U.S. 
ships in the Eastern Atlantic at the outbreak of hostilities cannot be 
assumed; U.S. and European navies are continuing.. .to ensure the 
preservation of an essential margin of allied maritime superiority in 
key ocean areas." 

Secretary of State for Defense (UK), Statement on the Defense 
Estimates 1987:1 . London: HMSO, 1987. See especially p 25 for 
reaffirmation of previous year's policy statements and commitment 
to Royal Navy "forward deployment operations in the Norwegian 

Shadwick, Martin, "Canada's Commitments to NATO: The Need for 
Rationalization," Canadian Defense Quarterly . Summer 1985, pp 22- 
27. The range of options for future Canadian deployment strategies, 
any of which would affect the Maritime Strategy. 

Small, Adm. William N., "The Southern Region: The Key to Europe's 
Defense," Armed Forces . January 1986, pp, 12-13. By the NATO 


Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe. NATO's plans for 
defense of its Southern Region, including allied and U.S. Navy Sixth 
Fleet/STRIKEFORSOUTH Mediterranean operations and Turkish 
Black Sea operations. 

Sokolsky, Joel J. "Canada's Maritime Forces: Strategic 
Assumptions, Commitments, Priorities," Canadian Defense 
Quarterly . Winter 85/86, pp 24-20. By a leading Canadian civilian 
defense and naval specialist. See especially pp 28-29, regarding 
similarities between the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s and NATO 
naval strategy of the 1950s. Also see Francis, David R., "Canada 
Ponders Major Shift in Defense Policy," Christian Science Monitor . 
February 4, 1987, p 9, for update of Sokolsky' s views. 

** Sokolsky, Joel, "The U.S. Navy and Canadian Security: Trends in 
American Maritime Strategy," Peace and Security . Spring 1987, pp 
10+. Sees the Maritime Strategy as creating problems for Canada. 
Advocates a Canadian Naval build up. 

Stavridis, Cdr. James, "The Global Maritime Coalition," 
Proceedings . April 1985, pp. 58-74. Also "Comment and Discussion," 
October 1985, p 177. On role of allies in Maritime Strategy by a former 
OP-603 staffer. 

Stryker, Russell F., "Civil Shipping Support for NATO," NATO 
Review . February 1986, pp 29-33. By a U.S. Maritime Administration 
official and member of the NATO Planning Board for Ocean 
Shipping. On the shipping that i to use the North Atlantic SLOC. 

Teitler, G., "The Maritime Strategy: Uitdaging ook aan de 
bondgenoten" ("The Maritime Strategy: Challenge for the Allies"), 
Marineblad (The Hague), June 1986, pp 332-38. One of the most astute 
Dutch commentators on international maritime affairs advises the 
Royal Netherlands Navy to answer the "challenge" of the American 
maritime strategy, and make up its minds whether to "sign on," or 
maintain its preoccupation with the "southerly defense" of the 
Atlantic SLOCs. Without active participation in the maritime 
strategic debate, warns Teitler, the Dutch Navy is likely to find itself 
relegated to "specialized" tasks such as sweeping mines in the North 
Sea and English Channel. See also the commentary by Veassen and 
Van Waning in the September 1986 issue of Marineblad . 

The North Atlantic Assembly, NATO Anti Submarine Warfare: 
Strategy. Requirements and the Need for Cooperation . Brussels: 1982. 
Good survey of the issues, with a call for resolution of the debate over 
mission priorities. 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures (10th and 
subsequent editions), Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1981 and 


subsequently. The basic official public document of NATO policy and 
strategy. See especially latest (1984) edition, pp 108-111, 143-144 and 
380. "The primary task in wartime of the Allied Command Atlantic 
would be to ensure security in the whole Atlantic area by guarding 
the sea lands and denying their use to an enemy, to conduct 
conventional and nuclear operations against enemy naval bases and 
airfields and to support operations carried out by SACEUR. NATO's 
forces (have) roles of neutralizing Soviet strategic nuclear 
submarines, safeguarding transatlantic sea lines and in general 
preventing the Warsaw Pact from gaining maritime supremacy in 
the North Atlantic." 

Thorthon, T.E., Lt. Cdr. RN, "Have We Really Got It Right? 
Reflections on NATO's Naval Strategy," Armed Forces (London), 
August 1987, pp 349-50. A British naval officer warns that NATO is 
without enough grey hulls to afford the risk of an early forward 
offensive and should, therefore, plan on "establishing the strongest 
possible blockade in the vicinity of the GIUK gap." 

** Till, Geoffrey, "Maritime Power: The European Dimension," Naval 
Forces . 11/1987, pp 88-104. Excellent and comprehensive survey by a 
European of how European naval power complements the Maritime 
Strategy in supporting overall NATO Maritime Strategy. A partial 
antidote to Bing West's concerns. 

Tokinoya, Atsushi, The Japan-U.S. Alliance: A Japanese Perspective 
(Adelphi Paper #212), London," IISS, Autumn 1986. 

Tonge, David, "Exposure Troubles NATO's Northern Commanders," 
Financial Times . October 27, 1982, p 3. Reports NATO Northern 
Region ground commanders' concerns that carrier battle groups 
may not arrive in the Norwegian Sea early enough. 

Toyka, Cdr. Viktor, FGN, "A Submerged Forward Defense," 
Proceedings . March 1984, pp 145-147. Complementary German 
Maritime Strategy for the Baltic. 

Train, Adm. Harry, "U.S. Maritime Power," in Coker, Christopher, 
U.S. Military Power in the 1980s . London: MacMillan Press, 1983 pp 
107-114. SACLANT provides details on the 1981 NATO Maritime 
Concept of Operations (CONMAROPS), one of the building blocks of 
the Maritime Strategy. 

Ulman, Neil, "Defending NATO's Northern Flank," Wall Street 
Journal . June 3, 1982, p 29. One reporters impression of Norway and 
Sweden's perception of the Nordic threat. 


Urban, Mark, "New Navy Plan to Attack Soviet Subs Near Bases," 
The Independent (London). April 14, 1987. Commander-in-Chief of 


the British Fleet, Adm. Hunt, on forward Royal Navy and NATO 
submarine, including anti-SSBN operations. 

Vaessen, Jules J., "Defensie van de Noordflank is meer dan de 
verdediging van Noord Noorwegen" ("Defense of the Northern Flank 
Means More Than the Defense of Northern Norway"), Marineblad . 
(The Hague) December 1986/January 1987, pp 609-21. Compares the 
Soviet and Western stakes in Europe's northern region. Includes a 
discussion of NATO's plans for a "defense-in-depth" of Denmark and 
the Danish Straits. 

Vaessen, Jules, J., Capt., RNLN, "The Maritime Strategy en de 
bondgenoten" ("The Maritime Strategy and the Allies"), 
Commentary on Teitler's "The Maritime Strategy: Uitdaging ook aan 
de bondenoten," Marineblad (The Hague), September 1986, p 471. 
Writes that the American maritime strategy's emphasis on 
threatening the Soviet flanks is a move in the right direction, away 
from NATO's myopia with defense on the ground in Europe's center. 
If it does not want to find itself a minor partner to the British Navy, 
warns Vaessen, his service had better take an active role in the 
development of a new Atlantic maritime concept. 

Van Eekelen, W.F., "De Noordflank van NAVO" ("The Northern 
Flank of NATO") Marineblad (The Hague), December 1986/January 
1987, pp 599-600. The Dutch defense minister takes note that the 
'Nordic Balance" is a political concept in need of a military balance, 
including an allied naval presence. Van Eekelen supports the 
Norwegian position that the creation of a Nordic nuclear-free zone 
(NFZ) cannot be isolated from a much broader agreement on 
European de-nuclearization. 

Van Reijn, J.A. and Teitler, G., "Maritieme stragegie in the 20e 
eeuw: een conceptie in beweging." ("Maritime Strategy in the 20th 
Century: An Evolving Concept"), Marineblad (The Hague), Vol. 99:3, 
March 1989, pp 103-109. The authors find that naval forces are the 
instrument par excellence for war prevention, conflict management, 
and coercive diplomacy. 

Van Reijn, J.A., Lt. Col., Royal Netherlands Marines, "De 
Koninklijke Marine naar het jaar 2000" ("The Royal Navy Toward the 
Year 2000"), Spiegel , Vol. 22, No. 87, 1987, pp 11-25. This article in the 
quarterly journal of the Royal Netherlands Naval Institute offers a 
prognosis of the domestic and international factors that the author 
believes will shape the roles, missions, and capabilities of the Dutch 
fleet during the final decade of the 20th century. Norway and the 
Norwegian Sea are labeled "the key to Europe's security." Confirmed 
is the Dutch Navy's northern "tilt." The author voices his belief that 
Dutch naval plans will be influenced increasingly by an emerging 
"European pillar" within NATO. Uncertainty about the continued 


pre-eminence of Europe in U.S. thinking, the questionable longevity 
of the U.S. Navy fleet build-up, and certain geographic considerations 
imply these European naval tasks in the Norwegian Sea: (1) a 
permanent peacetime presence, (2) crisis control and deterrence 
through increased presence, and (3) acting as the first-line-of-defense 
pending the appearance of U.S. reinforcements. On the out-of-area 
"problem," the writer emphasizes that, "it can hardly be maintained 
in the future that NATO's security interests... are limited to the 
Atlantic treaty area." The American plans for "horizontal 
escalation," he says, signify that US/Soviet out-of-area confrontation 
is not likely to leave Europe untouched, and that this alone is 
sufficient reason for the Europeans to participate in out-of-area crisis 
decision-making and deployments. 

Van Rooyen, Jules J.J., Cdr. Royal Netherlands Navy, "A Dutch 
View of Maritime Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings . 
September 1988, pp 46-48. Cdr. Van Rooyen is the deputy head of the 
Royal Netherlands Navy strategic planning division, and a key 
participant in the NATO Eurogroup's "European Maritime Concept 
2010" series of regional maritime security studies. His article should, 
therefore, be read as an authoritative portrayal of his Navy's view of 
the strategic demands for crisis management and deterrence in the 
North Atlantic Region. That view holds that a credible NATO 
deterrent depends as much on "a relationship of greater 
(US/European) understanding," as on military capabilities per se . 
Allied solidarity and the adverse time-distance relationship between 
NATO's northern arena and American reinforcements dictate that a 
maritime strategical response to an evolving crisis rely initially on 
the forward movement of the European navies. 

Van Waning, J.J., Capt. RNLN, "The Maritime Strategy: 
Afhankelijk van de bijdrage van bondschappelijke marines" (The 
Maritime Strategy: Dependent on the Contribution of the Allied 
Navies"). Commentary on Teitler's "The Maritime Strategy: 
Uitdaging ook aan de bondgenoten," Marineblad (The Hague), 
September 1986, pp 472-77. Disagrees with Teitler's contention that 
the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy is a plan for going-it- alone. Cites 
extensively from the U.S. Naval Institute's "White Paper" of January 
1986 to "prove" the strategy's coalitional intent. 

Veassen, Jules J., Capt., RNLN, "De maritieme expansie van de 
Sovjet Unie: Schoolvoorbeeld van geintegreerd maritiem beleid: ("The 
Maritime Expansion of the Soviet Union: Textbook Example of an 
Integrated Maritime Policy"), Marineblad (The Hague), March 1987, 
pp 56-65. Voices strong support for the U.S. Navy's plans to defend 
NATO's northern flank through a forward offensive. National and 
coalition interests mandate that the Dutch Navy team up with its 
British and possibly West German sister services, and join the U.S. 


maritime strategy, and, in the event of a crisis, act as a European 
"gap filler" force preparatory to the arrival of the U.S. battlegroups. 

Wemyss, R.Adm. Martin Lat., RN, "Naval Exercises 1980-81," Jane's 
Naval Annual . 1981, pp 151-158. Highlights problems in interallied 
naval cooperation resulting from U.S. Navy communication and 
intelligence systems advances. 

Wemyss, R.Adm. Martin Lat., RN, "Submarines and Anti- 
submarine Operations for the Uninitiated," RUSI Journal . 
September 1981, pp 22-27. Restatement of classic Royal Navy 
arguments for focusing allied ASW efforts around expected afloat 
targets, instead of US Navy-spearheaded forward operations. 

Wettern, Desmond, "Maritime Strategy: Change or Decay?" Navv 
International . May 1986, pp 304-08. Speculating that Gorshkov's 
successor, Admiral Chernavin, may shift Soviet Navy Strategy to 
planning for a massive U-boat style Atlantic tonage campaign, 
Wettern urges that the European NATO navies must choose between 
a large increase of convoys escort forces or joining the American 
preference for forward strategy. If the latter course is chosen, he 
concludes, the Europeans must ipso facto prepare to join in "global 
strategy," including active participation in -out-of-area hostilities. 

Wettern, Desmond, "NATO and Maritime Strategy," Navv 
International . December 1987, pp 472-75. Questions the apparently 
discrepant NATO reinforcement and resupply shipping 
requirements as variously reported by CINCHAN, SACLANT, and 
the 1986 NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS). Quotes 
the outgoing CINCHAN, Admiral Sir Nicholas Hunt, to the effect 
that Allied maritime forces share the U.S. Maritime Strategy's intent 
to "operate forward defense... behind enemy lines in enemy waters." 

Woodward, Sir John, V. Adm., RN, "Strategies, Concepts, and Their 
Maritime Implications," The RUSI Journal . June 1986, pp 11-14. The 
commander of the British task force during the Falklands war 
reports that the existing mix and quality of the Royal Navy's 
capabilities is just about the right one, that can and must be 
maintained with proper management and in spite of a zero-growth 
defense budget. Since Britain cannot cut back on its maritime 
commitments in the NATO area and elsewhere, its naval planners 
must emphasize a greater rationalization of effort, including longer 
production runs, standardization of equipments, closer international 
collaboration, etc. 

Yost, William J., Ed., In Defense of Canada's Oceans . Ottawa, 
Canada: Conference of Defense Associations Institute, 1988, 59 pp. 
This is a collection office essays, first presented at a January 1988 
seminar, sponsored by the Canadian Conference of Defense 


Associations in the wake of the country's recently-published White 
Paper on Defense, which included the announcement of Canada's 
controversial nuclear submarine buying plan. Individual 
contributors include: General P.D. Manson, Chief of Defense Staff, 
W. Harriet Critchley of the University of Calgary, Derek Blackburn, 
MP and Defense Critic for the New Democratic Party, Rear Admiral 
F.W. Crickard, former Deputy Commander of Maritime Command, 
and Rear Admiral A.P. Gay, a retired French naval officer. Most 
relevant to the American maritime strategy is Crickard's "The U.S. 
Maritime Strategy — Should Canada Be Concerned?" Crickard's 
answer is "yes," and he notes that, "At the navy-to-navy level, there 
was neither prior consultation with the US on its maritime strategy 
nor, to my knowledge, has there been any organized naval or defense 
assessment of it in Canada." 

Young, Thomas-Durell, "Australia Bites Off More Than the RAN 
Can Chew," Pacific Defense Reporter . March 1986, pp 15-17. See also 
his "Self-Reliance and Force Development in the RAN," Proceedings . 
March 1986, pp 157-161, and "Don't Abandon Radford-Collins," 
Pacific Defense Reporter . September 1986, p 16. On Australian and 
New Zealand ASW and Naval Control/Protection of Shipping roles in 
the Indian and Southwest Pacific Ocean. 



U. S. and allied Maritime Strategy is not a game of solitaire. The 
Soviet threat, along with U.S. national and allied interests and geo-political 
realities, is one of the fundamental ingredients of that strategy. No attempt 
can be made here, however, to recount the considerable literature that 
exists on Soviet naval affairs. The focus in the relatively few works listed 
below is how the Soviets view their own maritime strategy as well as ours, 
and how correctly we have divined their views. A critical issue is which 
missions they see as primary and which they see as secondary, for their 
navy and for those of the west, and whether these priorities will change 
soon. Much material on the Soviets also can be found in other entries in this 

** Balev, B., "The Military-Political Strategy of Imperialism on the 

World Ocean," World Economics and International Relations . April 
1986, pp 24-31. A Soviet perspective on the Maritime Strategy — 
"novaya morskaya strategiya." The three national phases restyled as 
"Keeping Oneself on the Verge of War, Seizing the Initiative," and 
"Carrying Combat Operations into Enemy Territory." 

** Breemer, Jan, "U.S. Maritime Strategy: A Re-appraisal," Naval 

Forces . 11/1987, pp 64-76. discusses the background behind and the 
issues surrounding current U.S. Navy thinking on Soviet naval 

Bystrov, R.Adm. Yu., "U.S. Games in the World Ocean," 
Literaturnava Gazeta . September 4, 1985, p 14. Soviet public reaction 
to exercise Ocean Safari 85 and other forward exercises. 

Christman, Timothy J., "Sen. Quayle Favors Exploiting Soviet 
Weaknesses," Defense News . May 11, 1987, p 31. Reports the 
inclusion in the 1988 authorization bill of the requirement of SECDEF 
to report on progress and implementation of the "competitive 
strategies" concept. 

Dalaere, Martijn, "De Verbetering van de Russische 
Onderzeeboottechnologie en de Amerikaanse Maritieme Strategie" 
("The Improvement of Soviet Submarine Technology and the 
American Maritime Strategy"), Marineblad (The Hague), October 
1988, pp. 419-27. This Dutch author argues that a U.S. strategic ASW 
campaign against the Soviet SSBN bastions is no longer credible in 
light of recent Soviet advances in submarine quieting, and urges that 
the United States and its allies turn instead to protecting the Atlantic 
SLOCs by means of barrier and escort strategies. Yet, having 
concluded on the improbability of a successful anti-SSBN campaign, 
the writer then turns around to warn how American success could 
trigger a Soviet use-them-or-lose-them strike! 


** Daniel, Donald C.F., "The Soviet Navy and Tactical Nuclear War at 
Sea," Survival . July/August 1987, pp 138+. The Director of the Naval 
War College's Strategy and Campaign Department concludes, inter 
alia , that Soviet decision makers will use nuclear weapons at sea 
only if they have already been used ashore, or if NATO uses them at 
sea first. 

** Elliott, Frank, "Soviets Knew of Maritime Strategy Before Lehman, 
Watkins Publicized It," Defense Week May 4, 1987, p 5. Reports on 
important Seminar on Soviet views of the Maritime Strategy. See also 
Seminar transcript, Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1987. 

Falin, Valentine, "Back to the Stone Age," Izvestia (Moscow), 
January 24, 1986. Condemns the U.S. Navy for planning to use 
forward deployment as a means for "taking any dispute to a global 
level," and using "non-nuclear means against the other side's 
nuclear forces and thus improving its own nuclear position." 
American naval planners, says Falin, do not expect the Soviet Union 
to respond with nuclear means, but he asks, how would the United 
States react if Soviet Navy forces were to apply "naval and air 
pressure in the spirit of Watkins' concept against American ships, 
bases and territory?" The author provides his own answer: "They 
(American decision makers seize on nuclear weapons in response 
not even to a threat to their arsenals, but to minor inconveniences for 
U.S. Policy." Highlights opposing arguments by Barry Posen. See 
also commentary by Manthorpe, Capt. William, USN (Ret.), "The 
Soviet View: The Soviet Union Reacts," Proceedings . April 1986, p 

Fitzgerald, Capt. T.A., "Blitzkrieg at Sea," Proceedings . January 
1986, pp 12-16. Argues Soviets may use their Navy as a risk fleet for a 
"Blitzkrieg," and not for sea-denial. A view shared by many U.S. 
Navy operators. 

** Friedman, Norman, "Soviet Naval Aviation," Naval Forces. No. 

1/1986, pp 92-97. Sees Soviet Naval Aviation as perhaps the greatest 
threat to NATO navies. 

** George, James L., (ed.), The Soviet and Other Communist Navies: 
The View from the Mid-1980s . Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
1986. An outstanding collection of papers from a 1985 CNA-sponsored 
conference of top experts in the field, including several references to 
the Maritime Strategy. See especially Brad Dismukes' discussion of 
the contending views on Soviet Navy missions; the authoritative 
judgments of R.Adm. William Studeman, R. Adm. Thomas Brooks, 
and Mr. Richard Haver, the nation's top naval intelligence 
professionals; and the contrasting views of Adm. Sylvester Foley and 
Adm. Harry Train, two former "operators." Wayne Wright's "Soviet 


Operations in the Mediterranean" is especially good on the interplay 
of Soviet and U.S. Maritime Strategy. The excellent paper by Alvin 
Bernstein of the Naval War College and the paper by Anthony Wells 
have also been reprinted elsewhere: the former in National Interest . 
Spring 1986, pp 17-29; the latter in National Defense . February 1986, 
pp 38-44. 

Gorshkov, R.Adm. Serge G., The Sea Power of the State . Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1979. See especially pp 290 and 329. "The 
employment of naval forces against the sea-based strategic systems of 
the enemy has become most important in order to disrupt or blunt to 
the maximum degree their strikes against targets ashore...." 

** Komenskiy, Captain First Rank V., "The NATO Strategic Command 
in the Atlantic" and "Combat Exercises of the Combined NATO 
Forces in 1985," Zarubezhnove Vovennove Obozrenive . April 1986, pp 
47-53 and August 1986 pp 45-51. Includes discussion of roles and 
missions of NATO naval forces in the context of the Maritime 
Strategy. See also Rodin, Colonel V. "The Military Doctrines of 
Japan," August 1986, pp 3-9. 

Leighton, Marian, "Soviet Strategy Towards Northern Europe and 
Japan," Survey . Autumn-Winter 1983, pp 112-151. Sees "striking and 
disquieting similarities" between recent "patterns of Soviet coercion 
against northern Europe and Japan." 

** Manthorpe, Capt. William, USN (Ret.), "The Soviet View: More Than 
Meets the Eye," Proceedings . February 1987, pp 117-118. Sophisticated 
analysis of October 3/4, 1986 Red Star article on potential changes in 
Soviet doctrine, strategic thinking and planning that, if adopted, will 
have important implications for Soviet response to the Maritime 

** Manthorpe, Capt. William, USN (Ret.), "The Soviet View: RimPac- 
86," Proceedings . October 1986, p 191. The Soviets see linkages 
between the Maritime Strategy and allied exercises. 

Mayer, Charles W., Jr., Cdr., USN, "Looking Backwards into the 
Future of the Maritime Strategy, Are We Uncovering Our Center of 
Gravity in the Attempt to Strike at Our Opponent's?" Naval War 
College Review . Winter 1989, pp 33-46. Citing the "lessons" the Soviets 
have presumably learned from the U-boat wars of World Wars I and 
II, the author warns that the wartime practice of Soviet Naval 
Strategy may be much more offensive than the planners of the 
maritime strategy seem to anticipate. Recommends that U.S. naval 
planners be prepared with the Soviet Navy's capability to stage a 
massive submarine onslaught against the Atlantic sea routes. 


MccGwire, Cdr. Michael, RN (Ret.), Military Objectives in Soviet 
Foreign Policy . Washington: Bookings, 1987. Individualistic, 
iconoclastic and debatable. 

MccGwire, Cdr. Michael, RN (Ret.), "Soviet Military Objectives," 
World Policy Journal . Fall 1986, pp 667-695. Adapted from his book, 
cited below. Much that goes against the grain of contemporary 
informed conventional wisdom regarding Soviet intentions, 
including the naval threat. Mediterranean seen as particularly 
important. See especially pp 676-680. 

McConnell, James M., "The Soviet Shift in Emphasis From Nuclear 
to Conventional," Vols I and II, Alexandria, VA, Center for Naval 
Analyses, CRC 490, June 1983. Includes alternative views of Soviet 
Naval Strategy. 

** Mozgovoy, Aleksandr, "For Security on Sea Routes," International 
Affairs (Moscow, 1/1987, pp 77-84, 103. See especially p 83, on the 
Maritime Strategy as "an unprecedentedly impudent document, even 
given the militaristic hysteria reigning in Washington today." 

Norwegian Atlantic Commission, "The Military Balance in Northern 
Europe," Marineblad (The Hague), December 1986/ January 1987, pp 
655-77. A thorough listing of the NATO-Warsaw Pact order of battle, 
including reinforcement plans and capabilities, in the Northern 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, 
Understanding Soviet Naval Developments (Fifth Edition), 
Washington: USGPO, 1985. Latest in a series of official U.S. Navy 
handbooks on the Soviet fleet. See also critique by Norman Friedman 
in Proceeding s. November 1985, pp 88-89. 

Perov, I., Lt. Gen. Soviet Army, "Aggressive Essence of New U.S., 
NATO Concepts," Zarubezhnove Vovennove Obozrenive . No. 2, 
February 1988. Detailed appraisal of NATO's alleged plans to 
integrate emerging technologies (ETs) and "more aggressive 
concepts of warmaking" into "air-land" (Air-Land Battle, FOFA) and 
"air-sea" (Maritime Strategy) "operations." Central to the new 
American "sea strategy," says the writer, are plans for "mass 
employment of cruise missiles against naval and coastal targets 
together with deck-based tactical and strategic aviation." Perov is 
evidently painfully aware of the SLCM "revolution" at sea. 

Petersen, Charles C, "Strategic Lessons of the Recent Soviet Naval 
Exercise," National Defense . February 1986, pp 32-36. A leading 
strategy analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses sees Soviets' 
strategy threatening U.S. ports and SLOCs in addition to defending 
SSBNs close to their homeland. Urges USN strategic homeporting, 


mine warfare, and shallow-water ASW initiatives, in addition to 
"carrying the fight to the enemy." 

Rabe, Heinz, Lt. Col., Volksarmee of the German Democratic 
Republic, "U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Norwegian Sea?" Volksarmee 
(GDR), No. 32, 1986. East German condemnation of the American 
"illusion of limiting war in Europe and being able to keep their own 
territory away from counterstrikes," while creating the "murderous 
concept" of a "Sixth Fleet" in the Norwegian Sea. 

Ries, Tomas and Skorve, Johnny, Investigating Kola; A Study of 
Military Bases Using Satellite Photos . Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk 
Institute, 1986. See especially pp 21-49, on the place of Fenno-Scandia 
and adjacent waters in the context of overall Soviet strategy. 

Rosenberg, David Alan, "It is Hardly Possible to Imagine Anything 
Worse" Soviet Thoughts on the Maritime Strategy," Naval War 
College Review . Summer 1988,p 69-105. Excellent summary and 
interpretation of Soviet commentary on U.S. maritime strategy 
between 1986 and 1988. Principal findings include: (1) the Soviets do 
not appear to have acknowledged the maritime strategy as a 
"doctrine" or "strategy" of national standing but instead as an 
example of "naval art" designed to perhaps influence U.S. national 
policy; (2) Soviet discussions of the U.S. Navy's "new strategy" are 
used mostly to highlight the U.S. Navy's capabilities and not the 
strategy's strategic significance; and (3) the maritime strategy may 
have generated or accelerated a heightened Soviet interest in naval 
arms controls. 

Rumyantsev. R.Adm. A., "The Navy in the Plans of the Pentagon's 
New Military Strategy," Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye . June 
1982, pp 59-64. Soviet public interpretation of Reagan Administration 
naval policy, including Norwegian Sea Battle Group operations and 
Arctic SSN anti-SSBN operations. Soviets fully expectant of a USN 
anti-SSBN campaign. 

Schandler, Herbert Y., "Arms Control in Northeast Asia," The 
Washington Quarterly . Winter 1987, pp 69-79. Wide-ranging article 
which gives the context within which the Maritime Strategy operates 
in the Pacific. Highlights "the ever-looming nightmare of a two-front 
war" as gaining in credibility for the Soviet Union. "This two-front 
threat is enormously important to Soviet psychology and provides the 
United States with a major pressure point on Soviet leaders." 

Sharpe, Richard, Capt. RN (Ret.), "Will We Have the Forces With 
Which to Counter Soviet Naval Strategies?" Navy League of the 
United States, The Almanac of Seanower 1989 . Arlington, VA, 
January 1989, pp 28-42. The editor of Jane's Fighting Ships voices 
skepticism with the accepted Western view of the Soviet Navy as a 


"defense" force that, in time of war, will be preoccupied with the 
protection of its SSBN bastions. 

"Soviet Naval Activities: 1977-1984," NATO Review . February 1985, pp 
17-20. A series of charts reflecting recent Soviet exercise activity in 
the North Atlantic. 

Stalbo, V.Adm. K., "U.S. Ocean Strategy," in Morskov Sbornik . 
November 10, 1983, pp 29-36. The Soviet Navy's leading theoretician 
writes in its official journal. Reaction to the Proceeding s October 1982 
issue on the Soviet Navy, and to statements by the Secretary of the 
Navy. Criticizes the "new U.S. Naval Strategy" for its geopolitical 
roots, its global scope, and for its aims of "isolating countries of the 
Socialist community from the rest of the world." 

Strelkov, Captain First Rank V., "Naval Forces in U.S. Direct 
Confrontation Strategy," Morskov Sbornik . No. 5, 1983, pp 78-82. 
Highlights maritime roles of allies and sister services as well as 

Sturua, G., "Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare," USA: Economics. 
Politics and Ideology . February 1985. Strategic ASW viewed as a 
primary USN mission. 

Sturua, G.M., "The United States: Reliance on Ocean Strategy," 
USA: Economics. Politics and Ideology . November 1982. A prominent 
Soviet civilian defense analyst's views on the U.S. Navy's Maritime 
Strategy. He sees it as primarily a nuclear counter-force strategy, 
employing submarine and carrier-launched nuclear weapons. 

Tritten, Cdr. James J., Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare: 
Weapons. Employment and Policy . Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986. By 
the acting Chairman of the National Security Affairs Department at 
the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Examination of Soviet Naval 
missions, including implications for U.S. Naval Strategy. 
Anticipates Soviet Navy wartime bastion defense, anti-carrier 
warfare, strategic anti-submarine warfare, and, controversially, 
anti-SLOC operations. See also his "Defense Strategy and Offensive 
Bastion," Sea Power . November 1986, pp 64-70. 

Trofimenko, Genrikh, "The Blue Water Strategy," excerpt from The 
U.S. Military Doctrine . Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986, pp 193-99. 
A prolific Soviet commentator on U.S. National Security Policy, 
Trofimenko claims that, until the 1979s, U.S. Navy policy had been 
dominated by the twin goals of bolstering the threat of its SSBN fleet, 
and the projection of power in the Third World. Since then, it has 
paid increasing attention to "domination of the high seas," including 
the control of chokepoints and the projection of "general purpose" 
power against the shores of the Soviet Union. "Of course," says the 


author, "The U.S. military cannot fail to understand that any direct 
attack by a US naval vessel against a Soviet ship entails the risk of 
this isolated incident escalating to a conflict between the two 

Trofimenko, Ginrikh, The U.S. Military Doctrine. Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1986. See especially pp 34-36 on Mahan, geopolitics, and 
restraining Russia; and pp 193-201 on the alleged "Blue Water 
Strategy" of today. 

U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, "Current Intelligence 
Issues," Washington: Department of Navy Office of Information, 
March 1987. See especially pp 1-4 on the anticipated employment of 
Soviet naval forces in wartime. 

U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Ninety-Eighth Congress, 
First Session. Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization 
for FY84: Part 6 . Washington, GPO, 1983, pp 2935 and 2939. R. Adm. 
John Butts, new Director of Naval Intelligence, gives authoritative 
U.S. Navy view of Soviet Navy Strategy, April 1983. See also updates in 
Butts testimony of 1984 and 1985. 

Van Tol, Robert, "Soviet Naval Exercises 1983-1985," Naval Forces . 
VI/1986, pp 18-34. Most useful in its discussion of the interactions 
between NATO and Soviet Strategies and between NATO and Soviet 

Watson, Cdr. Bruce W., and Watson, Susan M., (eds.), T he Soviet 
Navv: Strengths and Liabilities . Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986. See 
especially chapters by Richard Fisher, "Soviet SLOC Interdiction," 
and Keith Allen, "The Northern Fleet and North Atlantic Naval 
Operations," which see SLOC interdiction as more likely than most 
other knowledgeable experts expect, since Soviet thinking is seen as 
evolving toward greater consideration of protracted conventional 

Weinberger, Caspar, Soviet Military Power 1987 . Washington: 
USGPO, March 1987. More extensive analysis of Soviet strategy and 
operational concepts than in previous editions. 

Yashin, R.Adm. B., "The Navy in U.S. Military-Political Strategy," 
International Affairs (Moscow), #2, 1982. Sees "new U.S. Naval 
Strategy" of Secretary Lehman as deriving from the "ocean strategy" 
of Admirals Zumwalt and Turner. 



Most of the above works deal principally with use of the Navy in 
general war. What follows are books and articles of the 1970s and 1980s 
discussing the uses of the U.S. Navy in peacetime, crises, and "small wars" 
(the "Violent Peace" of the Maritime Strategy). Many of these derive from 
the increased discussion of peacetime presence as a naval mission 
engendered by Admirals Elmo Zumwalt and Stansfield Turner in the early 
1970s. Thus, the contemporary era of U. S. Navy thought on peacetime 
presence operations began about five years prior to that on forward global 
wartime operational concepts. Both bodies of thought, however, have built 
on the earlier literature of the late 1950s and 1960s on the role of the U.S. 
Navy in limited war. 

While most of the items listed below focus on the U.S. Navy, some of 
the most important elements on the peacetime/crisis/"small war" activities 
of the Royal Navy and the Soviet Navy have also been included. In addition, 
certain of the "White Papers" and "Defense Reports" published by various 
defense ministries around the world routinely highlight the peacetime 
operations of their naval forces. Especially notable in this regard are the 
annual British "Defense Estimates" and Canadian "Annual Reports." 

Allen, Capt. Charles D., Jr., USN (Ret.), The Use of Navies in 
Peacetime . Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980. 
Excellent short analysis, with typology. Focus on postwar U.S. Navy 
and on escalation. 

Arnott, Cdr. Ralph E. and Gaffney, Cdr. William A., "Naval 
Presence: Sizing the Force," Naval War College Review . March-April 
1985, pp 18-30. Seeks to develop a rational structured approach to 
choosing a force tailored to respond to a particular crisis, so as to 
achieve the desired outcome with minimum effect on scheduled fleet 

Baker, Caleb, "Retired Admiral Complains of Lack of Realization in 
Navy," Defense News . September 19, 1988, p 45. The Navy's former 
(1973-78) Fiscal and Budget Director, Rear Admiral Stanley Fine, 
USN (Ret.) criticizes the Navy's alleged preoccupation with the Soviet 
threat in force and strategy planning as symptomatic of a "lack of 
realization." Fine believes that if the Soviet periphery must be 
attacked, it can be done easier with land-based airpower than carrier 
aviation, and concludes that the service's most likely preoccupation 
in the future will be the same that has been the main business since 
World War II, i.e. deterrence and crisis control in the Third World. 

Barnett, Capt. Roger W., "The U.S. Navy's Role in Countering 
Maritime Terrorism," Terrorism . Vol 6, No 3, 1983, pp 469-480. A 
primary architect of the Maritime Strategy argues that while the 
U.S. Navy is well prepared against attacks on its own ships and 


installations, its role in deterring terrorist attacks on U.S. merchant 
ships or overseas facilities "cannot be suggested to be a large one." 

Bentinck, M.R.O., "NAVO's Out-of-Area Problematiek" ("NATO's 
Out-of-Area Problems"), Marineblad (The Hague), May 1988, pp 185- 
191. Good discussion of the complexity of NATO solidarity on the "out- 
of-area" issue. According to the author, permanent yet manageable 
dilemmas are (1) the diverseness of interests and vulnerabilities of 
the member states, (2) different expectations among the allies on the 
need and/or obligation for consultation, and (3) the obligation of allies 
to compensate for the out-of-area efforts of one ally. 

Blechman, Barry M., and Kaplan, Stephen S., Force Without War: 
U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument . Washington: 
Brookings Institution, 1978. Utility of USN vs. other U.S. armed 

Booth, Ken, Law. Force and Diplomacy at- Sea . London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1985. Peacetime naval strategy and the Law of the Sea, and 
much more. Rebuts Elizabeth Young arguments of a decade earlier, 
pp 66-68. 

Booth, Ken, Navies and Foreign Policy . London: Croon Helm, 1977. 
Magisterial treatment. 

Bull, Hedley, "Sea Power and Political Influence," in Power at Sea: I. 
The New Environment . Adelphi Paper Number 122, London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974, pp 1-9. "The period 
we are now entering will be one in which opportunities for the 
diplomatic use of naval forces, at least for the great powers, will be 
severely circumscribed." 

Bush, Ted, "Sailors Spending More Time at Home Under 
PersTempo," Navv Times . February 9, 1987, p 3. On naval presence 
and morale. The U.S. Navy tries to balance conflicting requirements. 
See also Philpott, Tom and Burlage, John, "Stepped Up Operations 
May Cut Home Port time," Navv Times . June 22, 1987, pp 1+8; and 
Burlage, John, "CNO Trost: No Retreat on OpTempo." Navv Times . 
July 13, 1987, pp 1+26. 

Cable, James, Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited 
Naval Force . New York: Praeger, 1970. First of a spate of useful books 
seeking to list, classify and describe peacetime uses of navies. 
Surveys 20th century activities of all major navies. Updated in 1981. 

Cable, Sir James, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Future," Proceedings . 
August 1986, pp 36-41. Forcefully argues that the days of gunboat 
diplomacy are by no means over. Denigrates those who have said 


Cable, Sir James, "Showing the Flag," Proceeding s. April 1984, pp 
59-63. The utility of ship visits. 

Cable, Sir James, "Showing the Flag: Past and Present," Naval 
Forces, No. III/1987, pp 38-49. Update of Cable's thought on this 
particular aspect of peacetime naval operations. Cf his views in the 
April 1984 Proceedings , cited above. 

Cohen, Raymond, International Politics: The Rules of the Game . 
London, Longman, 1981, pp 41-48. One of the few general works on 
international relations by an academic political scientist to deal in 
any depth with the peacetime and crisis uses of navies. Navy force 
movements seen as part of the "vocabulary of international politics." 

Congressional Budget Office, "U.S. Naval Forces: The Peacetime 
Presence Mission," Washington: 1978. How it could allegedly be done 
with fewer CVs. 

Coutau-Begarie, Herve, "The Role of the Navy in French Foreign 
Policy," Naval Forces . VI/1986, pp 36-43. By probably the most 
important contemporary French writer on naval strategy. The recent 
French global experience, one not often discussed in an English- 
language literature dominated by U.S., British, and Soviet examples. 

Daniel, Donald C, and Tarleton, Gael D., "The Soviet Navy in 1984," 
Proceedings/Naval Review . May 1985, pp 90-92, 361-364. Snapshot of 
one year's Soviet global peacetime activity. See subsequent Naval 
Reviews for updates. 

Dismukes, Bradford and McConnell, James M., (eds.), Soviet Naval 
Diplomacy . New York: Pergamon Press, 1979. Comprehensive 
surveys and analyses. 

Eldredge, Capt. Howear S., "Nonsuperpower Sea Denial Capability: 
The Implications for Superpower Navies Engaged in Presence 
Operations," in Ra'anan, Uri et al (eds.), Arms Transfers to the 
Third World . Boulder, CO: Westview, 1978, pp 21-64. Argues that 
growing sea denial arsenals of littoral nations are complicating the 
risk calculations of the superpowers in using naval forces to further 
their interests. Focus on anti-ship missiles and submarine 

** Elliot, Frank, "Battleships Assume Some Carrier Duties," Navv 

Times . March 31, 1986, pp 25, 28. Role of Battleships vis-a-vis carriers 
in the presence mission. 

Etzold, Thomas H., "Neither Peace Nor War: Navies and Low- 
intensity Conflict," in Ullman, Harlan K., and Etzold, Thomas H., 


Future Imperative: National Security and the U.S. Navv in the Late 
1980s, Washington: CSIS, 1985. Argues low-intensity USN 
contingencies and peacetime operations are on the increase. 

Harris, Cdr. R. Robinson, and Benkert, L.Cdr. Joseph, "Is That All 
There Is?" Proceeding s. October 1985, pp 32-37. Contrasts peacetime 
and global war strategy requirements, with focus on surface 

Hickman, L.Cdr. William J., "Did it Really Matter?" Naval War 
College Review . March-April 1983, pp 17-30. By a future OP-603 
staffer. On limitations and misuses of USN naval presence 
operations. Indian Ocean case study is useful counterpoint to 
McGruther article a decade earlier, above. 

Hill, Capt. J.R., RN, "Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea," 
Survival . March/April 1975, pp 69-72. Takes issue with Young's 
article. Suggests that "in the turbulent future, maritime forces are 
likely to be more rather than less in demand both at home and away." 

Hill, R.Adm. J.R., RN, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers . 
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986. Chapter 6, "Normal 
Conditions," pp 88-110, describes the various roles of navies, 
especially those of medium sized countries in peacetime. Chapter 7, 
"Low Intensity Operations," pp 88-131, covers operations somewhat 
higher up on the scale of violence. 

Howe, Cdr. Jonathan, Multicrisis: Sea Power and Global Politics in 
the Missile Age . Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1971. The 1967 Mideast 
Crisis, the 1958 Quemoy crisis, and the effectiveness of conventional 
naval forces as foreign policy instruments by a future flag officer and 
political-military affairs sub-specialist. Argues for a strong global 
naval posture especially in the Mediterranean. 

Howe, R.Adm. Jonathan T., "Multicrisis Management: Meeting an 
Expanding Challenge,": in Uri Ra'anan and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, 
Jr., (eds.), Security Commitments and Capabilities: Elements of An 
American Global Strateg y. Hamden CT: Archon Books, 1985, pp 125- 
137. Reflections on America's ability to manage "multicrises," 
through naval as well as other means, by the U.S. naval officer who 
popularized the term 15 years earlier. 

James, Lawrence, "Old Problems and Old Answers: Gunboat 
Diplomacy Today," Defense Analysis . December 1986, pp 324-327. On 
its limitations, past and present. 

Joint Senate/House Armed Services Subcommittee. Ninety-First 
Congress, Second Session. Hearings on CVAN-70 Aircraft Carrier . 


Washington: USGPO, 1970, pp 162-165. Listing of uses of USN in 
wars/near-wars 1946-1969; takes negative view of same. 

Jordan, Col. Amos A., USA (Ret.), "A National Strategy for the 
1990s," The Washington Quarterly . Summer 1987, p 15. The 
president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies sees 
Third World peoples as increasingly uncowed by "gunboat diplomacy 
and other similar kinds of hollow threats." 

Kaplan, Stephen S., Diplomacy of Power; Soviet Armed Forces as a 
Political Instrument . Washington: Brookings Institution, 1981. Does 
for the Soviets what Blechman and Kaplan did for the U.S. 

Lehman, John F., Jr., "An Absolute Requirement for Every 
American," Sea Power . April 1985, p 13. SECNAV argues high USN 
peacetime operating tempo is partly self-generated. See also 
Washington Post . October 6, 985, p A12, and Virginia Pilot/Ledger 
Star . October 27, 1985, p Al. 

Levine, Daniel B., Planning for Underway Replenishment of Naval 
Forces in Peacetime (CRM 85-77) . Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval 
Analyses, September 1985. Much more than underway 
replenishment. Examines U.S. Navy fleet exercises, crisis response 
and surveillance operations. Analyses them by ocean area, 
frequency, and number/types of combatants used. 

Luttwak, Edward N., The Pentagon and the Art of War . New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1984, pp 222, 247-248. Sees diminishing value of 
peacetime deployments. 

Luttwak, Edward N., The Political Uses of Sea Power . Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. Short treatment sponsored by 
V.Adm. Turner. Typology and analysis based on concept of 
"suasion." focus on the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean. 

Madison, Cdr. Russell L., "The War of Unengaged Forces — 
Superpowers at Sea in an Era of Competitive Coexistence," Naval 
War College Review . March-April 1979, pp 82-94. Thoughtful piece 
seeking to integrate naval peacetime and wartime missions into one 
framework: the "Theory of Unengaged Force Warfare." 

Mahoney, Robert B., Jr., "U.S. Navy Responses to International 
Incidents and Crises, 1955-1975," Washington: Center for Naval 
Analyses, 1977. Survey of USN crisis operations and summaries of 
incidents and responses. 

Mandel, Robert, "The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy," 
International Studies Quarterly . March 1986, pp 59-76. "The most 
effective gunboat diplomacy involves a definitive, deterrent display of 


force undertaken by an assailant who has engaged in war in the 
victim's region and who is militarily prepared and politically stable 
compared to the victim." 

Martin, Laurence, "The Use of Naval Forces in Peacetime," Naval 
War College Review . January -February 1985, pp 4-14. A lecture 
summarizing many contemporary themes on the subject. 

MccGwire, Cdr. Michael, RN (Ret.) and McDonnell, John (eds.), 
Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions . New 
York: Praeger, 1977. See especially chapters by MccGwire, Booth, 
Dismukes and Kelly. 

MccGwire, Cdr. Michael, RN (Ret.), "Changing Naval Operations 
and Military Intervention," in Stern, Ellen P., The Limits of Military 
Intervention . Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977, pp 151-178, and reprinted in 
Naval War College Review . Spring 1977, pp 3-25. Sees numerous 
constraints now in place on the "almost casual use of force which 
used to be the norm" in military intervention by sea. 

McGruther, L.Cdr. Kenneth, "The Role of Perception in Naval 
Diplomacy," Naval War College Review . September-October 1974, pp 
3-20. Part of the initial Zumwalt-Turner new look at USN "Naval 
Presence" mission. Includes Indian Ocean case study and a 
"cookbook" by a future OP-603 staffer. 

McNulty, Cdr. James, "Naval Presence — The Misunderstood 
Mission," Naval War College Review . September-October 1974, pp 21- 
31 . Another reflection of the initial Zumwalt-Turner focus on 
presence. See also Turner, V.Adm. Stansfield, "Challenge," pp 1-2 in 
the same issue. 

Moore, Capt. J.E., RN, "The Business of Surveillance," Navv 
International . June 1974, pp 9-10. Rationale for peacetime 
surveillance operations at sea. 

Nathan, James A. and Oliver, James K., "The Evolution of 
International Order and the Future of the American Naval Presence 
Mission," Naval War College Review . Fall 1977, pp 37-59. Sees 
political and technological changes as necessitating revision to 
contemporary thinking on naval presence, just when that thinking 
had begun to solidify. 

"Navy Cuts Carrier Presence in Mediterranean, Gulf Areas," 
Washington Times . November 24, 1986, p 4-D. On adjustments to U.S. 
Navy routine forward presence posture to enhance Navy flexibility 
and reduce individual ship OPTEMPO. 


Neutze, Cdr. Dennis R., JAGC, "Bluejacket Diplomacy: A Juridical 
Examination of the Use of Naval Forces in Support of United States 
Foreign Policy," JAG Journal . Summer 1982, pp 81-158. By the legal 
advisor to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and 
Operations. Very comprehensive examination of the lawfulness of 
the political uses of U.S. naval power in terms of domestic and 
international law, going back to the framers of the Constitution. Sees 
such political uses as expanding in the future. 

New York Times . September 12, 1988, "The Naval Gap in the Persian 
Gulf," p A-18. Lead editorial that acknowledges the Navy's "critical 
role in ending the Iran-Iraq war," but that criticizes the service for 
what is called its failure to build a "balanced fleet" suitable for 
contingencies other than war with the Soviet Union on the high seas. 
See also Adm. Trost's rebuttal in the October 8, 1988 issue of the New 
York Times . 

Parritt, Brigadier Brian, Violence at Sea: A Review of Terrorism. 
Acts of War and Piracy, and Countermeasures to Prevent Terrorism . 
Paris: ICC Publishing, 1986. See especially Paul Wilkinson's 
"Terrorism and the Maritime Environment," pp 35-40, on the role of 
navies in combating terrorism and the kinds of naval force required. 

Pyle, Richard, "Persian Gulf Taught U.S. Navy Important Lessons," 
Davton Daily News . November 13,1988, p 18. Reports the Gulf 
"learning experience" for a fleet "whose strategies are built on long- 
range ocean warfare." 

Smith, Edward Allen, Jr., "Naval Confrontation: The 
Intersuperpower Use of Naval Suasion in Times of Crisis," Phd 
Dissertation, American University, 1979. Examination of U.S. and 
Soviet use of their navies in six postwar crises. Heavily influenced by 
Luttwak's concept of naval suasion." 

Taylor, Col. William J., Jr., USA (Ret.), and Cottrell, Alvin J., 
"Stability, Political Decay, and Navies," Orbis . Fall 1982, pp 579-592. 
Limitations of naval interventions. 

Trost, C.A.H., Navy's Strategic Victory in the Gulf," New York 
Times . October 8, 1988, p 26. Rebuts the Times editorial of September 
12, 1988, claiming that the Gulf war "validated the Navy's choices at 
the lower end of the spectrum in the most demanding and realistic 
environment — combat." 

Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Naval Chief Disputes Columnist," 
Philadelphia Inquirer . February 18, 1989, p 8. The CNO rejects 
criticism by columnist Richard Reeves in the January 21, 1989 edition 
of the Inquirer that the 600-ship fleet build-up has been "unbalanced" 


at the expense of sufficient mine counter-measures and sealift 

Truver, Scott C, "New International Constraints on Military Power: 
Navies in the Political Role," Naval War College Review . July-August 
1981, pp 99-104. Sees regular employment of major naval combatants 
and large-deck carriers as becoming less tenable in Third World 
areas for the remainder of the century, for a variety of reasons. 

* U.S. Senate, Armed Services Committee, Ninety-Ninth Congress, 

First Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization 
for Appropriations for Fiscal year 1986. Part 8 . Washington: USGPO, 
1986, pp 4409-4448. V.Adm. James A. Lyons on "Global Naval 
Commitments," February 28, 1985. The official policy enunciated by 
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and 
Operations (OP-06). 

** Vlahos, Michael, "The Third World in U.S. Navy Planning," Orbis . 
Spring 1986, pp 133-148. By a former Naval War College faculty 
member. Argues the U.S. Navy has recently refocused its attention 
on its contributions to a global allied campaign against the Soviets, to 
the detriment of planning for more likely and qualitatively different 
Third World contingencies. 

Wright, Christopher C, III, "U.S. Naval Operations in 1982." 
Proceedings/Naval Review . May 1983. Excellent survey and analysis. 
Includes general introduction to USN concepts of operations, 
deployment patterns, tempo of operations, as well as review of actual 
deployments. See also annual updates in subsequent Naval Reviews . 

Young, Elizabeth, "New Laws for Old Navies: Military Implications 
of the Law of the Sea," Survival . November-December 1974, pp 262- 
267. Forecasts the demise of naval diplomacy. 

Zakheim, Dov S., "Maritime Presence, Projection, and the 
Constraints of Parity," in Equivalence. Sufficiency and the 
International Balance . Washington: National Defense University, 
August 1978, pp 101-118. Argues for a combined arms approach, vice 
solely naval focus, re: U.S. maritime presence. 

Zelikow, Philip D., "force Without War, 1975-82," Journal of Strategic 
Studies . March 1984, pp 29-54. Updates Blechman and Kaplan book. 
Also provides listing of incidents when USN was used. 



Geographic flexibility is one of the great strengths of naval power. 
Yet, the U.S. Navy's global posture since World War II has often looked like 
a series of hard-and-fast theater commitments, more appropriate to less 
flexible land-based types of forces. The articles and letters below illustrate 
current problems of implementing a balanced global Maritime Strategy 
with limited naval forces in the face of competing regional demands. They 
were selected because of their focus on the need for hard choices by the Navy 
regarding fleet balance; articles merely trumpeting the importance of an 
area or discussing regional priorities solely at the geopolitical level are 

Babbage, Ross, "The Future of the United States Maritime Strategy 
and the Pacific Military Balance." Paper presented at the Conference 
on Maritime Security and Arms Control in the Pacific Region, 
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada, May 19, 
1988, 33 pp. This paper considers a number of "wild cards" that, 
according to the Australian author, might' upset some of the key 
assumptions that underlie the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy for the 
Pacific theater. Those assumptions concern the likelihood of nuclear 
escalation, Soviet avoidance of a two-front (Atlantic and Pacific) war, 
the collaboration of America's Pacific allies, and the future of 
American superiority in ASW. Based on his conversations with 
Chinese officials, Babbage reports that China might choose the"kick- 
in-the-door" option, and launch an assault against the Soviet Far 
East if the Soviet Union were to lose a conflict badly and its 
disintegration appeared likely. In any case, concludes Babbage, 
Soviet fear of such an eventuality could exert "substantial war- 
termination leverage." 

* Baggett, Lee, Jr., Adm. USN, "NATO at Sea: Future Maritime 

Power," The RUSI Journal . Autumn 1988, pp 5-8. SACLANT 
describes the Soviet maritime threat to the North Atlantic Alliances 
as a "double envelopment" of self-serving naval arms control 
proposals on the one hand, and continued qualitative improvements 
of seagoing capabilities on the other. Both, says Baggett, are aimed at 
surrounding "our strategy, closing off all avenues of maneuver and 
leaving us with nothing but unacceptable options." As far as 
SACLANT's capabilities for war are concerned, reports Baggett, a 
shortage of forces to simultaneously support the Northern flank and 
directly defend Atlantic shipping, compels an early forward 
offensive. NATO presently possesses a large enough pool of shipping 
to support Re/Re and economic shipping needs, but the trend 
continues downward. 


Booth, Ken, "U.S. Naval Strategy: Problems of Survivability, 
Usability, and Credibility," Naval War College Review . Summer 1978, 
pp 11-28. Argues for withdrawal of Sixth Fleet. 

Borg, James C, "New Significant of the North Pacific," J ane's 
Defense Weekly . December 10, 1988, pp 1483-89. Report on the 
increased tempo and scope of U.S. Navy exercises in the northern 

Breemer, Jan S., "De-Committing the Sixth Fleet," Naval War 
College Review . November-December 1982, pp 27-32. 

Cole, Cdr. Bernard, "Atlantic First" Proceedings . August 1982, pp 
103-106. Also "Comment and Discussion:" December 1982, pp 86-87. 

Desh, Michael C, "Turning the Caribbean Flank: Sea-Lane 
Vulnerability During a European War," Survival (London), 
November/December 1987, pp 528-51. The author warns that a 
judiciously timed Cuban entry into a NATO-Warsaw Pact war could 
impose an intolerable strain on allied resupply and reinforcement 
capabilities, and even "tip the balance decisively in favour of the 
Warsaw Pact." The article posits a "menu" of alternative Cuban 
Caribbean SLOC interdiction scenarios, and potential U.S. counter 
options. The author concludes that the most credible and least 
resource-diverting U.S. response would be a combination of 
"defensive" SLOC protection, backed up by the withheld threat of 
retaliatory nuclear TLAM strikes. 

Deutermann, Capt. Peter, "Requiem for the Sixth Fleet," 
Proceedings . September 1982, pp 46-49. Also "Comment and 
Discussion:" November 1982, p 14; January 1983, pp 17-20; February 
1983, pp 80-81; March 1983, pp 12-17; July 1983, p 89. 

Dismukes, Bradford, and Weiss, Kenneth G., "Mare Mosso: The 
Mediterranean Theater," in James L. George (ed.), The U.S. Navv: 
The View From the Mid-1980s . Boulder, CO.: Westview. On timing 
reductions in U.S. Navy Mediterranean forces. 

Etzold, Thomas, "From Far East to Middle East: Overextension in 
American Strategy Since World War II," Proceedings/Naval Review 
1981, May 1981, pp 66-77. On the need to make hard strategic choices, 
especially between the Pacific and Indian Ocean. 

Foley, Sylvester, R., Adm., USN, "Strategic Factors in the Pacific," 
U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding s. August 1985, pp 34-38. The 
CINCPACFLT reviews the main international political "strategic 
factors" he believes will dominate the efficiency of his forces and war 
plans in the Pacific-Indian Ocean region. They are" (1) the ability of 
the National command Authorities (NCA) to respond promptly to 


ambiguous crisis indicators, (2) the stability of the U.S. relationship 
with Japan, China, and the Philippines, (3) the necessity for an 
Indian Ocean presence, and (4) the security of the Aleutian "rear 
area." Foley wonders whether the Soviet Pacific Fleet will restrict its 
operations to a defensive naval campaign on behalf of SSBN bastion 

** Gray, Colin S., "Maritime Strategy and the Pacific: Implications for 
NATO," Naval War College Review , Winter 1987, pp 8-19. A geo- 
political analysis and forecast of the US/Soviet/China-Japan 
triangular relationship in the Pacific and the implications thereof for 
US/NATO strategic planning in the European theater. Argues that 
the U.S. commitment to NATO ought to shift from reliance on 
nuclear threats to preparations to confront the Soviet Union with a 
protracted (maritime) two-front war. Suggests that the United States 
must hold-the-line in the Pacific pending the emergence of a 
China/Japan strategic condominium. 

Hayward, Tomas, B., Adm., USN (Ret.), and Hays, Ronald J., Adm., 
USN (Ret.), "It is in the Interest of the West to Make Percestroika 
Work Throughout the Pacific," Navy League of the United States, The 
Almanac of Seapower 1989 . Arlington, VA, January 1989, pp 44-58. A 
former CNO and VCNO team up to urge that future roles of U.S. 
Naval power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans be dominated by the 
twin goals of (a) seeking strategic stability among the maritime 
aspirations of the regional nations (mainly India and Japan), and (b) 
"easing tensions" with the Soviet Union. The authors specifically call 
for a U.S./Soviet dialogue on the possible adoption of naval 
confidence-building measures, including perhaps a re-consideration 
of the U.S. Navy's practice of fleet exercises close to Soviet shores. 

Heppenheimer, T.A., "Victory at Sea?" Science Digest . September 
1985. A journalistic account of how the United States intends to 
safeguard the Atlantic SLOCs in the event that, "for the third time in 
a century, the world is at war." 

Jampoler, Capt. Andrew, "Reviewing the Conventional Wisdom," 
Proceedings . July 1983, pp 22-28. Also "Comment and Discussion," 
December 1983, p 26. On refocusing the Atlantic Fleet from the 
Mediterranean to the North Atlantic. 

* Jane's Defense Weekly . "NATO's Southern Strategy Outlines," 

December 17, 1988, p 1547. CINCUSNAVEUR, Adm. James Busey, 
USN is quoted to the effect that NATO's maritime strategy on the 
Mediterranean flank will seek "strategic leverage" by taking the 
initiative at an "early stage" and "using NATO strength against 
Warsaw Pact vulnerability." 


Jordan, Robert, "The Maritime Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance," 
The RUSI Journal . September 1987, pp 45-54. A somewhat rambling 
account of the linkage between SACEUR's "regional" responsibilities 
on the ground, and the "global" thrust of the U.S. Navy's maritime 

Kennedy, William V., "Moving West: The New Theater of Decision," 
Naval War College Review . Winter 1989, pp 19-32. Expands upon 
former NAVSEC Webb's theme that U.S. interests and military 
commitments ought to be re-focused from Western Europe to the Far 
East. Kennedy believes that the United States can best deter the Soviet 
Union from aggression, and, come war, achieve a favorable outcome, 
by exploiting its comparative military superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet 
military position in the Far East. He calls for a "North Pacific 
Strategy" that, with the help of 15 (1) carriers, and possibly in 
conjunction with China, would aim at no less than the occupation of 
the Siberian periphery, the defeat of Soviet power east of the Urals, 
and the post-war reconstitution of a Soviet "progressive government 
that could abide the opening of the entire Soviet Union to the free 
interchange of ideas, labor and investment." 

Kolodziej, Edward A., "The Southern Flank: NATO's Neglected 
Front," AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review . Vol 6 No 2, 1986, pp 
45-56, especially pp 48-50. A leading political scientist endorses Capt. 
Deutermann's views on re-orienting U.S. naval concentrations from 
the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. 

Komer, Robert W., "A Credible Conventional Option: Can NATO 
Afford It?" Strategic Review . Spring 1988, pp 33-38. A 
"continentalist's" solution for strengthening NATO's conventional 
war-fighting posture that calls for a build-up of up to 30 days of war 
reserves, the creation of additional reserve formations, and greater 
reliance on "deep strike capabilities." 

Kurth, James R., "The United States and the North Pacific," paper 
presented at the Conference on Security and Arms Control in the 
North Pacific, The Australian National University, August 1987. 
Evaluates the"dilemma of deterrence vs. provocation" that the author 
claims is part and parcel of a maritime strategy based on the forward 
deployment of naval forces during a US/Soviet crisis. Kurth 
recommends that the United States can limit the risk of premature 
crisis escalation and Soviet pre-emption by forward converging its 
naval and marine forces at locations within closing range of their 
intended targets, yet still at the limit of the Soviet Union's pre- 
emptive strike potential. Concludes that the "Reagan version" of the 
maritime strategy will probably change in form and in shape, but 
that naval forces will become an increasingly important element in 
Western defense planning. 


** Lee, Ngoc and Hinge, L.Cdr. Alan, RAN, "The Naval Balance in the 
Indian-Pacific Ocean Region," Naval Forces . 11/1987, pp 150-175. 
Views the U.S. Navy as under strength for warfighting in the 
Atlantic-Mediterranean threats, and over strength in the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans. Essentially an update of Hinge's August 1986 article, 
cited in Section II above. 

* Lehman, John, "Successful Naval Strategy in the Pacific: How We 
Are Achieving It, How We Can Afford It," Naval War College 
Review . Winter 1987, pp 20-27. Asserts that the Regan 
Administration's "common sense" approach to Pentagon and 
Department of the Navy management and procurement has resulted 
in more band-for-the-buck, thus permitting the Navy to meet national 
commitments in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters with sufficient 
assets simultaneously. 

Linn, Thomas C, Maj., USMC, "Amphibious Shipping Shortfall 
Undermines Maritime Strategy," Armed Forces Journal 
International. April 1989, pp 54-58. Makes a convincing case that 
current trends point to a widening gap between the U.S. Navy's 
strategic requirements for amphibious lifts, and the maritime 
strategy's programmatic goals. The author reports a strategic war- 
fighting need for two Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) — one each 
for the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, but fears that actual capabilities 
will soon fall short of even the 1983 program goals of one MEF-plus- 
MEB (Marine Expeditionary Brigade). The article also urges various 
technological steps to make future amphibious lift forces less 

* Lucas, Hugh, "Webb Calls for U.S. Defense Review," Jane's Defense 
Weekly . January 23, 1988. p 101. Reports on SECNAV Webb's 
advocacy, at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, of a "total 
review of U.S. defense security commitments," including a reduced 
"continental" involvement in Europe and a heightened military 
profile in the Pacific. American conventional forces should be re- 
structured away from a "static" theater orientation, and emphasis 
instead globally deployable (read Navy) "maneuver forces." 

Maiorano, Lt. Alan, "A Fresh Look the Sixth Fleet," Proceedings . 
February 1984, pp 52-58. Also "Comment and Discussion," July 1984, 
pp 28-33. Qn reducing the USN Mediterranean commitment, with 
USAF and allied forces filling any gaps. 

McGruther, L.Cdr. Kenneth R., "Two Anghors in the Pacific: A 
Strategy Proposal for the U.S. Pacific Fleet," Naval Review 
1979 /Proceedings May 1979, pp 126-141. On re-orienting the Pacific 
Fleet primarily northward for wartime operations, and secondarily 
westward, for peacetime presence, by a former OP-603 staffer. 


Ortlieb, Cdr. E.V., "Forward Deployments: Deterrent or 
Temptation." Proceedings . December 1983, pp 36-40. Also "Comment 
and Discussion," February 1984, p 22. On reducing the Sixth and 
Seventh Fleets while increasing the Second and Third. 

Pay, David J., "The U.S. Navy and the Defense of Europe," Naval 
Forces. No. 1, 1988, pp 28-35. Good critique of maritime strategic 
critics whose arguments and reservations, says the author, "seem to 
be based on a mistaken choice between maritime and continental 
forces and a rather strange assessment of nuclear risk." Disagrees 
that the U.S. maritime strategy and 600-ship fleet build-up have come 
at the expense of the American NATO commitment. The maritime 
strategy, concludes Pay, may be a "symptom" of a U.S. re-assessment 
of global priorities away from Western Europe, but it is hardly the 

Sestak, L.Cdr. Joseph, "Righting the Atlantic Tilt," Proceedings . 
January 1986, pp 64-71. 

Snyder, Jed C, "Strategic Bias and the Southern Flank," The 
Washington Quarterly . Summer 1985, pp 123-42. A critique of 
NATO's Central Region-oriented "prism" addressing the 
Mediterranean basin, the author concludes that a multiplicity of 
crisis points, the growth of local Soviet naval power, and the lack of 
political and military cohesion, have brought about an area where 
"NATO is weak where the Soviet incentive to strike may be 

Till, Geoffrey, and King, Richard, "A Standing Naval Force for 
Northern Waters?" Naval Forces . No. 5, 1987, pp 16-18. NATO must 
prevent Soviet naval power in the Norwegian Sea from becoming a 
"kind of perceived maritime dominance" by default. In order to 
counter such a development, Till and King believe that the idea of a 
Standing Naval Force for Northern Waters (STANAVFORNOR), 
patterned after STANAVFORLANT, is worth thinking about. 

Train, Harry, Adm., USN (Ret.), "Maritime Strategy in the 
Mediterranean, " Adelphi Paper (London), No. 229: "Prospects for 
Security in the Mediterranean," Part 1, Spring 1988, pp 49-60. 
Excellent account of the strategical interconnectedness between the 
Mediterranean and Atlantic theaters, and, as a consequence, the 
inter-theater wartime flexibility of U.S. naval forces on forward 
deployment in the Mediterranean. Train believes that, with the 
possible exception of the Mediterranean's easternmost portion, 
NATO command of the Mediterranean is virtually guaranteed even if 
COMSTRIKFORSOUTH's battlegroups may need to be swung into 
the Atlantic. Also a good overview of NATO's naval command 
hierarchy in the Mediterranean area. 


Van der Meulen, J.W., "Zuid-Afrika's Strategische Betekenis voor 
het Westen" ("South Africa's Strategic Significance for the West"), 
Marineblad (The Hague), May 1988, pp 214-22. Excellent overview of 
the Western interest, past and present, in South Africa as a potential 
military-strategic partner. The author concludes that neither South 
Africa's military potential, nor the country's importance as a source 
of strategic minerals (or for that matter, the nature of the Soviet 
threat) warrant a closer association with the Pretoria Government. 



As is well discussed in previous sections, U.S. and allied navies, 
other services, and joint and allied commands have a variety of means at 
their disposal in peacetime to test the wartime validity of aspects of the 
Maritime Strategy, besides debate and discussion. They actually participate 
in fleet exercises, advanced tactical training, and "real world" peacetime 
and crisis operations, and they conduct extensive operations analyses and 
war games. Most of these avenues are generally inaccessible to the public, 
however, save one: gaming. There are over a half-dozen commercial board 
and computer games now available that can provide players with insights 
into modern maritime strategic, operational, and tactical problems and 
potential solutions, and thereby further enhance players' understanding of 
the Maritime Strategy. Like all simulations, however, they each have their 
limitations, and even built-in inaccuracies (as the various reviews point 
out). Thus, they cannot by themselves legitimately be used to "prove" 
validities or demonstrate "outcomes." Nevertheless, playing them is the 
nearest many students and theorists of Maritime Strategy can even come to 
actually "being there," and, therefore, is an activity that can only be 

** Balkoski, Joseph, Second Fleet . New York: Victory Games, 1986 
(Board Game). Reviewed by U.S. Naval History Center historian 
Michael A. Plamer, Proceedings . March 1987, pp 160-162. "Those of 
us without access to the War College's computers can test the waters 
north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap and 
gain insight into the problems and opportunities inherent in the 
application of the Maritime Strategy." Can be played simultaneously 
with Sixth Fleet , with forces shifted from one set of maps to the the 
other, in a simulation of war in both Northern and Southern 
European waters and adjacent areas. 

Balkoski, Joseph, Sixth Fleet . New York: Victory Games, 1986 (Board 
Game). Reviewed by U.S. Naval History Center historian Michael A. 
Plamer, Strategy and Tactics . January-February 1986, pp 51-52. "The 
inclusion of random elements into the system, the addition of logistic 
rules, and the key role of Soviet naval aviation made the Sixth Fleet 
game an excellent operational level naval wargame." 

Connors, L.Cdr. Tracy D., USNR, "Gaming for the World," 
Proceeding s. January 1984, pp 106-108. On the Naval War College's 
Global War Game series, a principal research tool for identifying 
critical Navy, joint, and allied Maritime Strategy issues. See also 
Murray, Robert J., "A War-Fighting Perspective," Proceeding s. 
October 1983, pp 66-81; and Eulis, Cdr. James, "War Gaming at the 
U.S. Naval War College," Naval Forces . 1985/V, pp 96-103. 

Grigsby, Gary, North Atlantic '86 . Mountain View, CA: Strategic 
Simulations Inc., 1983 (Apple Computer Game. Reviewed by John 


Gresham and Michael Markowitz, Proceedings . July 1984, pp 116- 
117. Entering premise in the initial failure of NATO, U. S., and the 
Maritime Strategy: "The great war in Europe is over. As expected, 
Russia won' it now controls all of Germany and Norway. Its next 
plan: complete domination of the North Atlantic through the 
isolation of Great Britain." 

Herman, Mark, Aegean Strike . New York: Victory Games, 1986 
(Board Game). Reviewed by U.S. Naval History Center historian 
Michael A. Plamer, Strategy and Tactics , (forthcoming in 1987). The 
eastern Mediterranean. "Few, if any, games... better integrate the 
strengths and weaknesses of land, air, and naval assets." 

Nichols, W. J., Fifth Escadra . Bridgewater, Nova Scotia: Simulations 
Canada, 1984 (Apple Computer Game). Soviets vs. NATO in the 
Mediterranean. Five levels of conflict ranging from rising tensions to 
global nuclear war. 

Nichols, W.J., Grev Seas. Grev Skies . Bridgewater, Nova Scotia: 
Simulations Canada, 1983 (second edition forthcoming in 1987) 
(Apple Computer Game). Reviewed by Hohn Gresham and Michael 
Markowitz, Proceedings . July 1984, pp 116-117. Seven "pre-built" 
scenarios, including Japanese destroyers versus Soviet submarines 
in the Kuril Islands, a Soviet amphibious group versus West German 
forces in the Baltic, U.S. versus Soviet carrier battle groups off the 
North Cape, and similar clashes in the Western Pacific and the 
Mediterranean. Focus is more tactical than the other games listed 

Nichols, W.J., Seventh Fleet . Bridgewater, Nova Scotia: Simulations 
Canada, 1985 (Apple Computer Game. Soviets vs. U.S. and Japan. 
Includes Sea of Okhotsk, Sea of Japan and South China Sea 

** Perla, Peter C, "Wargaming and the U. S. Navy," National Defense . 
February 1987, pp 49-53. By a leading Center for Naval Analyses war 
gamer. "The Navy is continuing a process of using wargaming, 
exercises, and analysis to address the aspects of major issues fo 
which they are best suited...a classic example of this process can be 
seen at work in the 2nd Fleet. Taking the promulgated maritime 
strategy as his starting point, the commander, 2nd Fleet, proposed a 
concept for operating the NATO Striking Fleet in the Norwegian Sea. 
A wargame was held at the Naval War College to explore this 
concept, and analysis was undertaken to quantify some of the issues 
raised by the game. Then an exercise was -held in the area of interest, 
which confirmed some assumptions and raised new questions. A 
new series of games and analysis was capped by a second major 
exercise, as the process continues." See also his "What Wargaming 
is and is Not," co-authored by L.Cdr. Raymond T. Barrett, Naval War 


College Review . September-October 1985, pp 70-78 and "In My 
View..." commentary, Naval War College Review . Autumn 1986, pp 
105-108; and "War Games, Analyses, and Exercises," Naval War 
College Review . Spring 1987, pp 44-52; and endorsement by former 
CNO Adm. Thomas Hayward, USN (Ret.), in August 1987 
Proceedings . 



The general and historical literature on naval strategy is admittedly 
vast. What is presented here are only books that describe earlier strategies, 
conceptualized, planned and/or implemented, which are analogous to key 
aspects of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy today. The materials are 
generally listed chronologically, by historical period covered. 

** Breemer, Jan S., "The American Origins of the Maritime Strategy," 
Marineblad (The Hague), November 1987, pp 410-15. Reviews the 
recent (mid-1970s to early 1980s) historical antecedents to the U.S. 
Navy's maritime strategy, and concludes that it is up to the European 
navies to clarify which parts of the maritime strategy meet with their 
approval and which not. 

Callwell, Major C.E., BA, The Effect of Maritime Command on Land 
Campaigns Since Waterloo . Edinburgh: William Blackwood and 
Sons, 1897, especially pp 178-182 and 196-197); Barker, A., J., The War 
Against Russia, 1854-1856, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1970; Curtiss, John Shelton, Russia's Crimean War . Durham, N.C.: 
Duke University Press, 1979; and Rich, Norman, Why the Crimean 
War? A Cautionary Tale . Hanover, NH: University Press of New 
England, 1985, especially pp 124-126, 136-137, 158-159, 178, 201-202, 
206-209. Successful maritime global forward coalition strategy 
against Russia 130 years ago, with operations in Barents, Baltic, and 
Black Seas, and off Kuriles and Kamchatka. Component of a larger 
military strategy, which blocked subsequent Russian expansion for 
over 20 years. 

Cave Brown, Anthony (Ed.), Dropshot. The American Plan for World 
War III Against Russia in 1957 . New York: Dial Press, 1978. 1949 
JCS study: good example of early post-war strategic thinking. See 
especially pp. 161-165, 206-211, 225-235. Not to be read without 
examination of review by David Rosenberg and Thomas E. Kelly III, 
Naval War College Review . Fall 1978, pp 103-106. 

Comptroller General of the United States, Implications of the 
National Security Council Study "U.S. Maritime Strategy and Naval 
Force Requirements" On the Future Naval Ship Force (PSAD-78-6A) . 
Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, March 7, 1978. 
Discusses in detail, and in highly unsympathetic terms, the 
classified 1976 NSC study often cited by Secretary of the Navy John 
Lehman as triggering his thinking on U.S. naval strategy and force 
levels. See also Rumsfeld, Donald, "Which Five-Year Shipbuilding 
Program?", Proceedings . February 1977, pp 18-25. 

Defense/Space Daily . "Findings of Sea Plan 2000," April 4 through 7, 
1982 issues. Four part summary of the "Sea Plan 2000" Carter 
Administration progenitor to the Maritime Strategy, including the 


idea of a "second-front" Pacific strategy aimed at relieving Soviet 
pressure in Central Europe, and safeguard the allied SLOCs. 

Erickson, John, The Road to Stalingrad (Vol. I) and The Road to 
Berlin (Vol. II), Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983. See especially 
Vol. I, pp 14, 55-57, 218, 237-240, 271-272, 295; Vol. II, pp 43, 132, 156. 
Effect of Far East operations, or lack thereof, on Central/East Europe 
Front in World War II. 

** Friedman, Norman, The Postwar Naval Revolution . London: 

Conway Maritime Press, 1986. See especially Chapter 10 "Epilogue," 
pp 212-218. On allied naval developments in the first post- World War 
II decade, including relationships to the Maritime Strategy developed 
three decades later. 

Gordon, Michael R., "John Lehman: The Hard Liner Behind 
Reagan's Navy Buildup," National Journal . October 3, 1981, pp 1763- 
66. Profiles the then newly-appointed SECNAV's previous careers 
with the National Security Council staff and the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and predicts that Lehman's views on 
the Navy's needs have "the makings of a harmonious relationship 
with the Navy. 

Gough, Barry M., "Maritime Strategy," The Legacies of Mahan and 
Corbett as Philosophers of Sea Power," The RUSI Journal . Winter 
1988, pp 55-62. A comparison of the two premier Anglo-American 
theorists of seapower with reference to their respective contributions 
to the understanding of (a) the relationship between naval power and 
global power, and (b) the significance of historical "lessons" for 
contemporary maritime strategy. The author finds that neither 
Mahan or Corbett, nor their modern-day successors, can always 
provide the correct answers to naval strategic problems, but that 
history can provide a framework for asking the "right" questions 
about the objectives of naval force in both peace and in war. 

Gray, Colin S., The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland. 
Rimland. and the Technological Revolution . New York: Crane 
Russak, 1977. Analyzes and updates geopolitical grand theory. 
Stresses maritime aspects of the Western alliance and global nature 
of Western security problems. 

Huntington, Samuel P., "National Policy and the Transoceanic 
Navy," Proceedings . May 1954, pp 483-93. Clearly foreshadows the 
basic outline of the Maritime Strategy. An analysis generally as 
relevant today as then. 

Keegan, John, The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval 
Warfare . New York, NY: Viking Penguin, Inc., 1988. Patterned after 
his highly acclaimed The Face of War . Kegan's The Price of 


Admiralty is a brilliant evocation of how the maritime strategies of 
the past have been fought at the strategical, tactica, material and, 
most important, human levels. The author narrates four critical 
naval battles of the past — Trafalgar, Jutland, Midway and the 
Atlantic U-boat campaign, each representing contemporary "capital" 
naval technology — the ship-of-the-line, the dreadnought, aircraft 
carrier, and submarine. The description of how the crews that fought 
at Trafalgar alone is worth the book's reading. No doubt, many 
readers will find Keegan's most controversial observation in the final 
chapter, "The Empty Seas," which predicts that the future of 
seapower rests with the submarine. 

Lehman, John, Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices . Beverly Hills: 
Sage, 1978. Codification of Lehman's thought on naval strategy before 
become SECNAV. Much more than carriers, especially Chapter II. 
See also his March 1989 testimony in U.S. Senate, Committee on the 
Budget, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session, Hearings on 
National Defense: Alternative Approaches to the U.S. Defense 
Program . Washington: USGPO, 1980, pp 208-253. 

Love, Robert B., Jr. (Ed.), The Chiefs of Naval Operations . Annapolis: 
U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1980. See sections on post=World War II 
CNOs' views on strategy, especially Rosenberg piece on Arleigh 

** Mahan, Capt. Alfred Thayer, "The Problem of Asis," in his The 
Problem of Asis and Its Effect Upon International Politics . 
Cambridge, MA: University Press, 1900, pp 1-146. Mahan on 
"Restraining Russia," the central problem of the Maritime Strategy: 
"The Russian centre cannot be broken. It is upon and from the 
flanks. ..that restraint, if needed, must come," p 26; "Hence ensues 
solidarity of interest between Germany, Great Britain, Japan and the 
United States," p 63. See also Trofimenko in Section VI above, and 
Crowl, Philip A., "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," in 
Paret, Peter (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to 
the Nuclear Ag e. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp 
444-477, especially p 477. A Naval War College professor emeritus 
asserts the Maritime Strategy is antithetical to Mahan's teaching, 
especially as regards the role of other services, in a book which 
otherwise, and to its detriment, pays scant attention to makers of 
modern maritime strategy. Trfimenko gets the linkage between 
Mahan and the Maritime Strategy right. Crowl gets it wrong. 

Marolda, Edward J., "The Influence of Burke's Boys on Limited 
War," Proceedings . August 1981, pp 36-41. By a prominent Navy 
Department historian on the influence of the Navy officer corps on 
national strategy a generation ago. "Between 1956 and 1960, the Navy 
added its considerable influence to the intellectual campaign within 


the national defense community for a reorientation in strategic 

** Miller, Edward S., War Plan Orange. 1897-1945: the Naval Campaign 
Through the Central Pacific . Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
forthcoming in 1988. History's most successful pre-war plan, with 
lessons for the complex problems of naval strategic planning of the 
1980s. See also Dyer, V.Adm. George C, On the Treadmill to Pearl 
Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson. USN 
(Retired) . Washington: Naval History Division, Department of the 
Navy, 1973, Chapter XIV: "War Plans'" and Shelton, Cdr. Michael 
W., CEC, "Plan Orange Revisited," Proceeding s. December 1984, pp 
50-56; and "Comment and Discussion," March 1985, pp 73 and 79. 
Draws false parallels between the Western Pacific in 1941 and the 
Norwegian Sea today, i.e. between a purely naval, unilateral, theater 
problem and one portion of a joint, allied, global problem. Advocates 
ceding the Norwegian Sea, Norway, and Iceland to the Soviets. Bad 
history and worse strategy. 

Nimitz, F.Adm. Chester, "Future Employment of Naval Forces," 
Vital Speeches . January 15, 1948, pp 214-217. Also, in Brassev's 
Naval Annual: 1948 . and Shipmate . February 1948, pp 5-6+, as "Our 
Navy. It's Future." Argues for a projection strategy and a Navy 
capable of land attack early in a war. 

Palmer, Alan, The Gardeners of Salonika . New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1965. See especially pp 226-247. Southern Flank Maritime 
Strategy in action. WWI allies advance to the Danube from 
beachhead in Greece in 1918 knocking Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Turkey out of the war. Gallipoli concept vindicated. 

** Palmer, Michael A., Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American 
Naval Strategy in the First Postwar Decade . Washington: Naval 
Historical Center (fothcoming in 1988). An important discussion of 
the similarities and differences in U.S. naval strategic thought 
between the first and fifth postwar deceased, the two postwar eras 
most characterized by U.S. Navy concern with problems of naval 
warfighting vis-a-vis the Soviet Union itself. 

** Reynolds, Clark G., "The Maritime Strategy of World War II: Some 
Implications?" Naval War College Review . May/June 1986, pp 43-50. 
Prescribes certain "principles" of maritime strategy learned from 
World War II, but cautions that, "in strategy making, the greater 
danger than a complete ignorance of history is its misapplication." 

Rosenberg, David, "American Postwar Air Doctrine and 
Organization: The Navy Experience," in A.F. Hurley and R.C. 
Ehrhart, et al. Air Power and Warfare . Washington: USGPO, 1970. 


Antecedent naval postwar air strike strategies by a leading historian 
of U.S. Navy postwar strategy. 

Rosenberg, David, Arleigh Burke and the United States Navv. Vol I: 
War and Cold War . Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, (forthcoming 
in 1988). By a Naval War College faculty member. "Maybe it would 
help us sell the Navy's case if we could make a presentation on how 
the Navy could function in the first 90 days of a war, and keep that 
presentation up-to-date," R.Adm. Burke in 1952 after relieving as OP- 
30, now Op-60. 

** Rosenberg, David, U.S. Navy Long-Range Planning: A Historical 
Perspective . Washington: USGPO (forthcoming in 1988. 

Ro skill, Stephen W., Naval Policy Between the Wars. Volume I: The 
Period of Anglo-American Antagonism. 1919-1929 . New York: 
Walker, 1968. Chapter III: "The War of Intervention in Russia, 1918- 
1920"; and Dobson, Christopher, and Miller, John, The Day Thev 
Almost Bombed Moscow: the Allied War in Russia. 1928-1920 . New 
York: Atheneum, 1986, pp 42-47, 72-73, 247-266, and 274-276. Poorly 
devised global, allied, forward maritime operations against the 
Soviets 70 years ago. which, however, did achieve independence for 
the Baltic states. 

Ryan, Capt. Paul USN (Ret.), First Line of Defense . Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1981. Mainstream USN perspectives on post-war 
defense policies through the Carter Administration. 

Schilling, Warner R., "Admirals and Foreign Policy, 1913-1919," 
Phd. dissertation, Yale University, 1954. "Maritime Strategy" of the 
1980s was not first time this century U.S.Navy developed a coherent 
preferred strategy. 

Spykman, Nicholas John, The Geography of the Peace . New York: 
Harcouurt, Brace, 1944. Basic geopolitical reference. See especially 
maps, pp 50-54. 

Starr, Chester G., The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History . 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989, 105 pp. This is a 
fascinating small volume that throws much light on the interaction 
between a land and seapower in the Mediterranean world of 
antiquity. It is so in particular because the findings and conclusions 
sharply contradict the author's starting premise. The latter takes 
issue with Mahan's claim that the power and wealth of the classical 
thalassocracies (Greece, Rome, Carthage) were historical "proof of 
the decisive influence of seapower on history. Not so, says Starr. The 
rise and fall of the classical empires originated on land. Ironically, 
however, the author finds that the Greek and Carthaginian 
maritime empires fell because at the same time that both permitted 


their fleets to decline, their continental opponents (Sparta and Rome, 
respectively) made the conscious choice to build up naval power. 
Similarly, as long as Rome possessed the world's first "standing 
fleet" the empirial sealines of communications and coastlines were 
secure. The later empire's vulnerability to barbarian raids and 
invasions can be blamed perhaps as much by the decline of that fleet 
as by the overextension of the legions on land. One is tempted to draw 
this lesson: a maritime power may not be able to overcome a strong 
landpower, but the reverse is certainly true if the continental 
opponent takes to the sea as well. 

Teitler, G., "De slagvloot en de SLOCs" ("The Battlefleet and the 
SLOCs"), Marineblad (The Hague), October 1986, pp 521-25. Relates 
the offensive thrust of the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy to the Navy's 
Pacific war experience, the Mahanian philosophy of the "big battle," 
and, indirectly, the British Navy's tradition of securing the SLOCs by 
"indirect" means, i.e., seeking out and defeating the opponent's 
battlefleet. The British tradition on "indirect" defense is contrasted 
with the Dutch tradition of "direct" defense, i.e. the protection of 
shipping by way of escort strategies. The author concludes that even 
a 600-ship U.S. fleet will make an early forward offensive against the 
center of Soviet military strength in the North a high-risk substitute 
for reliance on a mix of direct and indirect SLOC defense strategies. 

Teitler, G., "Van de Krim naar Kola: Algemene en Bijzondere 
Beschouwing over Maritime Strategie" ("From the Crimea to Kola: A 
General and Special Consideration of Maritime Strategy," 
Marineblad (The Hague), June 1988, pp 261-67. The 19th century 
Crimean War is used to illustrate the essence of grand and maritime 
strategy as the exploitation of assymetries, including assymetries in 
timing (surprise), space (maneuver), and escalation (e.g., the 
"second front option"). The key to NATO's strategic success, says 
Teitler, will be to offset the Soviet Union's assymetrical advantage on 
the Central Front with the West's (maritime) ability to (a) deny the 
Soviets a "short war," (b) threaten Moscow's vulnerabilities outside 
the European area, and (c) threaten to regain nuclear dominance by 
placing the Soviet SSBNs at risk. Teitler reminds his readers, 
however, that few assymetrical advantages come at no cost. Excellent 

Till, Geoffrey, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age . (Second 
Edition), New York: St. Martin's, 1984. Basic one-volume historical 
and topical survey. 

** Turner, Adm. Stansfield, USN (Ret.), "Victory at Sea: Bull Halsey at 
Leyte Gulf." Washington Post Book World . December 15, 1986, pp 1 
and 13. Review of E.B. Potter's Bull Halsey. Draws analogies to 
today's military problems, especially regarding "the offense and the 
defense." Of a piece with Turner's other writings. 


U.S. Navy, Sea Plan 2000: Naval Force Planning Study (Unclassified 
Executive Summary) . Washington, DC: March 18, 1978. A progenitor 
of the Maritime Strategy. Whereas the latter stresses the role of the 
Navy in a global conventional war with the Soviets, however, the 
former tended more toward emphasizing the extent of the range of 
potential uses of naval power. 

** Vlahos, Michael, "Wargaming, an Enforcer of Strategic Realism: 

1919-1942," naval War College Review, March- April 1986, pp 7-22. By 
a former Naval War College faculty member. How wargaming 
prepared the U.S. Navy for war in 1941, and how it is doing so again 
today, including linkage between gaming and planning. 

Wylie, Capt. J.C., "Why a Sailor Thinks Like a Sailor," Proceedings . 
August 1957, pp 811-817. By the Navy's leading public strategist of the 
1950s and 60s. Remarkably similar to the views expressed in the 
Maritime Strategy a generation later. 

Wylie, R.Adm. J. C, Military Strategy . New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1967. Codification of views of USN's most 
prominent post-war strategic theorist. 



Barlett, Henry C, "Approaches to Force Planning," Naval War 
College Review . May-June 1985, pp 37-48. By a Naval War College 
faculty member. Provides eight approaches to Force Planning, but 
each such "approach" can, and does apply to the drafting of Strategy 
as well. They are presented by the author as pure types, stark 
alternatives, but in actual practice (for example, in the development 
of the Maritime Strategy) their influence on the strategist is often 
simultaneous to a greater or lesser degree. His list of approaches: 
"top-down, bottom-up, scenario, threat, mission, hedging, technology 
and fiscal." The first four were probably the most important 
influences on the Maritime Strategy of the late 1940s/early 1950s and 
the 1980s; "Mission" and "hedging" were relatively more important 
from the late 1950s through the mid-1970s. "Threat" influences 
tended to be driven more by preceived capabilities in the 1940s 
through the 1970s and more by perceived intentions in the 1980s. 
Critics tend to focus on "technology" and budget" influences. There is 
actually also a ninth approach, "historical/academic" approach, 
which tends to focus the strategist on "lessons of history" and/or the 
great classics of military thought. All these approaches coexist with 
the organizational and psychological influences on war planning 
identified by Jack Snyder. The remaining citations in this section 
give examples, drawn primarily from the Maritime Strategy debates. 

** Froggett, Cdr. S.J., "The Maritime Strategy: Tomahawk's Role," 
Proceeding s. February 1987, pp 51-54; Williams, R.Adm. J.W., Jr., 
"In My View...Corss Training," Naval War College Review . March- 
April 1985, pp 96-97; and Chipman, Dr. Donald D., and Lay, Maj. 
David, USAF, "Sea Power and the B-52 Stratofortress," Air 
University Review . January-February 1986, pp 45-50. Good examples 
of the "technology" approach to strategy. Focus is on one system, in 
these cses the cruise missile, the nuclear submarine, and the land- 
based heavy bomber; and arguments on strategy are built around it. 
But cf Tavlor. Philip A., "Technologies and Strategies: Trends in 
Naval Strategies and Tactics," Naval Forces . VI/1986, pp 44-55. "The 
consensus among senior military officers is that .has 
not, nor is it likely to determine military strategy." 

Holloway, Adm. James L., Ill, USN (Ret.), "The U.S. Navy— A 
Functional Appraisal," Oceanus . Summer 1985, pp 3-11. Focus on 
"Mission" by the 1974-78 CNO: "The organization of fleet battle 
strategy reflects the mission, functions, roles, and deployment of the 
U.S. Navy." See also Williams, Cdr. John A. "Jay," USNR, "U.S. 
Navy Missions and Force Structure: A Critical Reappraisal," Armed 
Forces and Society . Summer 1981, pp 499-528; and Bryron, Cdr. John, 
"Sea Power: The Global Navy," Proceedings January 1984, pp 39-33. 
Alternative views of the Navy's "Missions" by two officers who later 
contributed to the Maritime Strategy's development. Also see 


"Commentary," Armed Forces and Society . Summer 1982, pp 682-684 
for official Navy response to Williams on the eve of Maritime Strategy 
development, and Williams' rejoinder. Williams' updated views are 
in th'The U.S. and Soviet Navies: Missions and Forces," Armed 
Forces and Society . Summer 1984, pp 507-528. 

Hughes, Capt. Wayne P., USN (Ret.), "Naval Tactics and Their 
Influence on Strategy," Naval War College Review . January- 
February 1986, pp 2-17. The strategy- tactics interface. The bottom-up" 
view of strategy-building. See also his Fleet Tactics; Theory and 
Practice , cited in Section II above; and Hill, R.Adm. C.A. "Mark," 
Jr., USN (Ret.), "Congress and the Carriers," Wings of Gold. Spring 
1987, pp 6-8. But cf "In My View...: Tactical Skills," Naval War 
College Review . May- June 1986, p 91, "The best plans are not those 
developed through top-down or bottom-up approaches. Strategists 
and tacticians need to keep in mind that the road to sound planning 
is a two-way, not one-way thoroughfare." 

Jampoler, Capt. Andrew, "A Central Role for Naval Forces? 
Support The Battle," Naval War College Review. November-December 
1984. By a member of the 1983-84 Strategic Studies Group at Newport. 
Argument is distilled from a "scenario" approach. See also fictional 
treatments by Clancy, Hackett and McGeoch et al . and Hayes et al . 
cited in Sections I and II above. 

Johnson, Capt. W. Spencer, "Comment and Discussion Strategy: 
Ours vs. Theirs," Proceedings . September 1984, p 107. One of the 
initial drafters of the Maritime Strategy elaborates on the necessity, 
utility and existence of a national military strategy from which the 
Maritime Strategy is derived. The "top-down" view of strategy- 
building written in response to McGruther's "threat-based" 
approach, cited below. See also "Comment and Discussion," 
Proceedings . April 1984, p 31. 

Jordan, Frank E. Ill, "Maritime-Continental Debate: A Strategic 
Approach," National Defense University, Essavs on Strategy V . 
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988, pp 205- 
234. An excellent Clausiwitzian critique of what the author contends 
is the artificiality of the "Mahan vs. Mackinder" framework of the 
contemporary maritime-continental debate over American national 
security goals and means. The appropriate U.S. strategy, concludes 
Jordan, is one that "is neither purely continental nor purely 
maritime, but rather one of global (yet strategically limited) 
integrated naval and land campaigns directed toward preserving the 
critical US center of gravity." The latter includes the Eurasian 
rimlands and narrow seas, and the capabilities, naval and 
otherwise, needed to protect their security. Conversely, the Soviet 
center of gravity encompasses the Soviet regime and its war-making 
mechanism, mainly the Red Army and strategic nuclear forces; the 


necessity for escalation control demands that U.S. strategy exclude a 
direct attack against this Soviet center of gravity. 

McGruther, Cdr. Kenneth R., "Strategy: Ours vs. Theirs." 
Proceedings . February 1984, pp 344-39. By a former member of the 
Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603). Calls for a strategy based on 
defeating Soviet strategy, a "threat-based" approach. Unlike Barlett, 
however, McGruther's approach is rooted in intentions as well as 
capabilities. Cf Vlahos chapter, cited in Section I above. 

Moodie, Michael, and Cottrell, Alvin J., Geopolitics and Maritime 
Power . Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981. A good example of "hedging" focus. 
Regards Lehman's "Major change" as not enough. Also wants 
greater naval activity in the Carribean, periodic visits to the South 
Atlantic, an enhanced fleet in the Western Pacific and continuing 
large-scale activity in the Indian Ocean. See also Sea Plan 2000 . cited 
in Section X above. 

Nailer, Peter, "The Utility of Maritime Power: Today and 
Tomorrow," The RUSI Journal . September 1986, pp 15-21. Discusses 
the changes in the elements that have characteristically made up 
"maritime power" (fighting fleet, a trading fleet, bases). Changes 
such as increasing warship cost and complexity, and the 
internationalization of merchant shipping, says Nailer, are making 
it progressively more difficult to convincingly state-the-naval-case. 

Neustadt, Richard E. and May, Ernest R., Thinking in Time: The 
Uses of History for Decision-Makers . New York: The Free Press, 
1986. Seeks to focus decision-makers/users of the "historical" 
approach. Has direct relevance for strategists, a sub-category of 
"decision-makers." For example, the "cases" highlighted in Section 
VIII of this addendum and in its predecessor, The Crimea, Salonika, 
the Russian Intervention, World War II, etc., can all be profitably 
examined using the Neustadt-May methodology. 

Peter Swartz, Capt., USN, "Floating Bases Moving Out to Sea?" 
NATO's Sixteen Nations . April 1989, pp 65-69. A "founding father" of 
the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy proposes a variety of alternative 
basing schemes for solving the prospective gap between U.S. global 
commitments and the dwindling number of readily accessible 
foreign host-country gases. Concludes that no single technological or 
political option is likely to answer the case, so that the future 
American overseas basing infrastructure will probably be a mix of 
facilities on foreign soil, complemented by novel floating base 
concepts, fast sea and airlift, and space-based systems. 

Sagan, Scott D., "1914 Revisted: Allies, Offense, and Instability," 
International Security . Fall 1986, pp 151-175. An excellent piece. 
Takes issue with literature on the alleged "Military Bias for the 


Offensive. Offensive military doctrines are needed not only by states 
with expansionist war aim, but also by states that have a strong 
interest in protecting an exposed alley." See also Synder, Jack and 
Sagan, Soctt D., "Correspondence: The Origins of Offense and the 
Consequences of Counterforce," Winter 1986-87, pp 187-198. 

Snyder, Jack, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision- 
Making and the Disasters of 1914 . Ithaca,, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1984. Chapter I. On how military strategy gets made and why. 
Geopolitical, bureaucratic, and personal factors. View military as 
predictably and unfortunately biased toward offensive strategies. See 
also his "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914," in Robert 
Jervis, et al . (eds.), Psychology and Deterrence . Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1985, pp 162-164. Summarizes the 
literature on the alleged "Military Bias for the Offensive." 

** Ullman, Cdr. Harlan K., USN (Ret.), "Gramm-Rudman: A Fiscal 
Pearl Harbour," Naval Forces . II/1986, pp 10-11. Congressional 
budget actions seen as potentially disastrous for both 600-ship Navy 
and the Maritime Strategy. Exhibits all pitfalls of a solely "fiscal" 
approach. See also Ullmn, Harlan, U.S. Conventional Force 
Structure at a Crossroads . Washington: Georgetown University 
CSIS, 1985; and the annual volumes issued by the Brookings 
Institution and the Committee for National Security, cited in Sections 
I-III above. 

* Webb, James H., Jr., "For a Defense That Makes Sense," New York 
Times . May 21, 1989, p 38. Calling the post World War II retention of 
large U.S. military forces in Europe and South Korea a "historical 
anomaly," the former SECNAV appeals for an end to "our strategic 
rigidity" and a return instead to the country's "historical role as a 
maritime nation." Webb insists that, even while all the parties 
involved, including the Europeans and the United States, agree that a 
European war is extremely unlikely, institutional conservatism and 
"rice bowls" paralyze U.S. decisionmakers from undoing the heavy 
financial and security burden on the Continent. He concludes that 
the key element to the future deterrence of a Soviet attack against 
Western Europe ought to be the American retaliatory threat of 
second-front operations in the Pacific. 

* Webb, James H., Jr., Untitled remarks at the National Press Club, 
Washington, DC, January 13, 1988. Calls for the United States "to 
take a fresh look at the world and our place in it, and to seriously 
debate the posture of the U.S. military in that context." Maintains that 
post- World War II shifts in the global economic and military balance 
dictate a re-allocation of U.S. military forces away from "static" 
positions in NATO-Europe, and in favor of globally mobile naval and 
amphibious "maneuver" forces. 



The Maritime Strategy was originally drafted primarily, although 
certainly not exclusively, by U.S. naval officers for U.S. naval officers. Not 
only were agreed national, joint, and allied intelligence estimates and 
concepts of operations utilized as fundamental "building blocks," but great 
importance was also attached to long-held views of the U.S. Navy and 
Marine Corps leadership, to the concepts of operations of the fleet 
commanders-in-chief, and to the views of thinkers in uniform (active duty 
and reserve) at the Naval War College and the Center for Naval Analyses. 

Much of what is in the Maritime Strategy is hardly new, and would 
be especially recognizable to naval officers who developed U.S. and allied 
naval warfighting concepts in the late 1940s and 1950s. Likewise, elements 
from key strategy products of naval officers and civilian thinkers of the late 
1970s, e.g. the 1976 National Security Council Maritime Strategy study, 
naval reservist John Lehman's 1978 Aircraft Carriers , and the Navy's 1978 
Sea Plan 2000 and Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navv (NWP 1 , Rev.A), are 
also evident in the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s. 

Much of what is new in the Maritime Strategy is the linked, coherent 
discussion of (a) global warfare, rather than separate service and theater 
operation; (b) warfare tasks, e.g. anti-submarine, anti-air, anti-surface, 
strike, amphibious, mine and special warfare, rather than traditional 
"platforms" or "unions"; (c) the specific geopolitical problems facing the 
U.S. Navy, and other maritime elements of the 1980s; and (d) the current 
conventional wisdom regarding Soviet Navv capabilities and intentions. 
This approach was largely driven by the primacy of the need for the 
Strategy to satisfy current global operational requirements of fleet and other 
force commanders, over the future requirements of competing 
bureaucracies in Washington. Its effect in fostering common reference 
points for all portions of the contemporary officer corps, especially junior 
officers, is already being felt. 

While much of the robustness of the Maritime Strategy derives from 
its roots thoughout the U.S. Navy and Marine Crops and elsewhere, both 
over space and over time, it owes a high degree of its current utility to its 
initial approval and promulgation by successive Chiefs of Naval Operations 
in Washington and to its codification by their staffs (OPNAV). These 
include especially the successive Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for 
Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06), heads of the Strategic Concepts 
Branch (OP-603), and staff officers in that branch. OPNAV is the one 
organization tasked to focus on maritime strategy, and to view it not only in 
a balanced global manner but also within the bounds of actual current 
national military planning parameters. 

OPNAV's capabilities in this endavor are due in part to the existence 
of the Navy Politico-Military/Strategic Planning subspecialty, education, 
screening, and utilization system. This personnel system, while somewhat 
imperfect, has been identifying, training, and using naval officers in a 
network of strategists, in Washington, Newport, the Fleet, and elsewhere, 
for over a decade and a half. 


Nevertheless, despite the clear postwar historical roots of the 
Maritime Strategy and its codification in and dissemination from 
Washington by some of the best minds in the national security affairs 
community today, a number of publications appeared in the last decade 
decrying a lack of strategic training and thinking in the Navy, past and 
present, and ignoring or misunderstanding the critical role in strategy 
development of naval officers in staff positions. This literature, as well as 
some counters to it, is briefly outlined below. 

A. The Public Debate: Criticisms and Kudos 

"413 Named as Proven Subspecialists," Navy Times . September 9, 
1985, p 58. The Navy system for identifying the "pool" of naval 
strategists. Results of the seventh biennial U.S. Navy selection board 
that identifies "proven" subspecialists for further mid-and high-level 
assignments in the eight fields of naval Political-Military/Strategic 
Planning. Earlier lists appeared in Navy Times back into the 1970s. 
Includes many of the builders of the Maritime Strategy. Note that 
these names constitute not only the "Corps of Naval Strategists," but 
also the Navy's Politico-Military and Regional Affairs experts. 

Brooks, Captain Linton F., "An Examination of Professional 
Concerns of Naval Officers as Reflected in Their Professional 
Journal," Naval War College Review . January/February 1980, pp 46- 
56. A future primary contributor to the development and articulation 
of the Maritime Strategy decries the paucity of articles on strategy in 
the Navy professional literature of the late 1960s. This era was 
admittedly dominated by Vietnam and an internal professional view 
of the Navy as primarily an infinitely flexible limited war fire 
brigade, but it did, however, also see the publication of R.Adm. J.C. 
Wylie's Military Strategy . R.Adm. Henry Eccles' Military Concepts 
and Philosophy and Adm. Joseph J. Clark's coauthored Sea Power 
and Its Meaning . 

Bruins, Berend D., "Should Naval Officers Be Strategists?" 
Proceedings . January 1982, pp 52-56. Also "Comment and 
Discussion," March 1982, p 27; April 1982, p 20; May 1982, p 17. The 
Proceeding s throws three more retirees and an active-duty non- 
strategist into the public fray. Meanwhile, fleet plan staffs, the 
Strategic Studies Group at Newport, and the one intelligence officer 
and nine line officers (six with PhDs) assigned to OP-603 were at the 
time actively laying the groundwork for the Maritime Strategy. 
Illustrative of the limited public visibility of actual naval strategic 
thinkers before 1982-83. 

Buell, Cdr. Thomas B., USN (Ret.), "The Education of a Warrior," 
Proceedings . January 1981, pp 40-45. Also "Comment and 
Discussion," February 1981, p 21; March 1981, p 15; April 1981, pp 21- 
23; June 1981, pp 77-79; July 1981, pp 78-80; August 1981, pp 71-75; 


November 1981, pp 84-87; January 1982, p 76; March 1982, p 27; April 
1982, p 20. Posed the questions, "Where will we get our future 
strategists?" Implied that the Navy had no real answer to the 
question, a view shared by most of the eight commenters and 
discussants chosen for publication by Proceedings , only one of whom 
was familiar with actual Navy practice in this area. Illustrative of 
the limited public visibility of true U.S. Navy strategic thought before 

** Burdick, Capt. Howard, "Sons of the Prophet: A View of the Naval 

War College Faculty," Naval War College Review . May- June 1986, pp 
81-89. On the Naval War College, its faculty, and the Maritime 
Strategy, by the Dean of Academics at the Naval War College. 

** Bush, Ted, "Libyan Exercise Exemplifies New Navy Strategy," Navy 
Times . February 10, 1986, pp 45-46. OPNAV strategists illuminate a 
variety of aspects of the Maritime Strategy and its origins. Note that, 
unlike open-literature authors, actual practicing strategists usually 
remain nameless to the general public. This hardly means, however, 
that they are somehow less important. 

** Clark, Charles S., "In Person: Fred H. Rainbow: Charting a Course 
for the Navy's Debates," National Journal . February 21, 1987, p 435. 
On the role of the Proceedings in orchestrating "some heated 
forensics over the Navy's trumpeted Maritime Strategy (while) 
similar Air Force and Army journals often reflect the blandness of 
official restraints." The Institute has come a long way in just a few 
short years. Like the Naval War College and the Naval War Colleg e 
Review , the Naval Institute and the Proceedings are clearly at the 
cutting edge of maritime strategy debate today. 

** CNA Annual Report: 1985 . Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval 

Analyses, 1986, especially pp 7-12 and 29-30. On CNA's contribution 
to the development of the Maritime Strategy and on its use of that 
strategy in planning its research programs. Also, CNA analysts' 
views on Soviet maritime strategy. 

Crackel, Lt. Col. Theodore J., USA (Ret.), "On the Making of 
Lieutenants and Colonels," Public Interest . Summer 1984, pp 18-30. 
"The services have produced no strategic thinkers at all." He is 
especially hard on War College faculties, including the Naval War 
College: "None of the war college faculties is in the forefront of 
development in any of the military disciplines they teach." Actually, 
no group has been more in the "forefront of development in the 
"discipline" of Maritime Strategy (SECNAV, the CNO, the OP-06 
organization, and the Strategic Studies Group aside) than the Naval 
War College faculty, as is evidenced by their prominence in this 
biolography. Crackel is a military historian by training with little 
apparent experience in actual strategy or policy-making, and with an 



almost exclusively U.S. Army-oriented academic and operational 
record. Unlike most practicing U.S. naval strategies, he has 
apparently self-fulfilled his prophecy and "discovered that the think- 
tanks in and around Washington are a more congenial 

Davis, Capt. Vincent, USNR (Ret.), "Decision Making, Decision 
Makers, and Some of the Results," in Cimbala, Stephen, (ed.), The 
Reagan Defense Program: An Interim Assessment . Wilmington, 
DE, Scholarly Resources, 1986, pp 23-62. A somewhat anachronistic 
characterization of the contemporary Navy as one with "too few 
thinkers," driven by acrimonious debates among factions of naval 
officers. "Rancorous disputes simmer among its 'big three unions — 
the carrier, submarine and surface- warfare admirals." Thus, the 
seminal thinker and writer on naval strategy and bureaucratic 
politics of the 40s, 50s and 60s sees no essential change in the Navy of 
the mid-80s, despite conscious Navy efforts to take his earlier counsel 
to heart in its development of a transcendent Maritime Strategy. Qf 
articles by V.Adms Demars, Schoultz, and Dunn, leaders of the 
submarine and air warfare communities, and by Lts. Winnefeld, 
Peppe and Keller, the rising generation, cited in Sections II and III 

Gallotta, Capt. Richard USN (Ret.), et al . Assessment of Maritime 
Strategy Education and Training in the Department of the Navv . 
McLean, VA: The BDM Corporation, December 31, 1986. A 
comprehensive balanced survey, with recommendations. 

Hanks, R.Adm. Robert J., USN (Ret.), "Whither U.S. Naval 
Strategy?" Strategic Review . Summer 1982, pp 16-22. An outstanding 
OP-60 of the 1970s challenges the U.S. Navy to develop a coherent 
strategy, an activity being vigorously pursued even as the article was 

Hattendorf, John, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of 
the U.S. Naval War Colleg e. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 
1984. Chronicles the important supporting role of the Naval War 
College in the development and dissemination of U.S. Navy strategic 
thought. See especially pp 201-202, 237, 312-219. 

Hearding, L.Cdr. David, "A Requiem for the Silent Service," 
Submarine Review . July 1987, pp 73-78. An important article 
stressing the need for broader integration of U.S. Navy submarine 
officers into the Navy as a whole, in part as a result of the advent of 
the Maritime Strategy. 

Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr., "Naval Strategy for the Next Century: 
Resurgence of the Naval War College as the Center of Strategic Naval 
Thought," National Defense . April 1983, pp 27-30. Covers the 


resurgence of the Naval War College, although without describing 
the linkages between that institution and the strategic planners in 
Washington, through which Naval War College thinking is actually 
translated into Maritime Strategy elements. Also see 1983 Murray 
article cited in Section I above. 

Lehman, John F., Jr., "Thinking About Strategy," Shipmate . April 
1982, pp 18-20. SECNAV's charge to the officer corps. 

** Leibstone, Marvin, "US Report," Naval Forces . 11/1986, p 94. Alleges 
"an unusually large number of naval officers do not recognize fully 
the switch from 'defense' to 'offense' that the Navy's high command 
believes is necessary." But cf "The United States Navy: On the Crest 
of the Wave," The Economist . April 19, 1986, p 49 cited above: "What 
is certain is that an entire generation of junior and middle-grade 
naval officers now believes that the first wartime job of the Navy 
would be to sail north and fight the Russians close to their bases." 

* Marryott, R.Adm. Ronald F., "President's Notes," Naval War College 

Review . November/December 1985, pp 2-4. By the 1985-86 President of 
the Naval War College and 1983-84 Director of Strategy, Plans, and 
Policy (OP-60), the Navy's principal global strategist. On development 
of the Maritime Strategy, and the Naval War College's vital 
supporting contribution. 


Metcalf, V.Adm. Joseph, "Metcalf Speaks Out: On the Navy's New 
Offense, Ship Design and Archimedes," Navv News and Undersea 
Technology . July 18, 1986, p 2. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
for Surface Warfare views Maritime Strategy as of little concern to 
Navy junior officers. Not a common view. 

Milsted, L.Cdr. Charles E., Jr., "A Corps of Naval Strategist," 
Masters Degree Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 1983. Based 
on the somewhat skewed open literature available during this period. 
As with Bruins, above, "strategy" and "long-range planning" not 
well differentiated. Proposed establishment of a network of 
specifically educated and trained naval strategists responsible for 
long-range planning. Following his own model, Milsted was 
subsequently assigned to OP-603 from 1983 to 1985, where he became 
a key contributor to the codification of the Maritime Strategy. Qf U. S. 
Navy, First Annual Long Range Planners' Conference cited in 
Section I above. 

Murray, Williamson, "Grading the War Colleges," National 
Interest . Winter 1986/7, pp 12-19. Antidote to Crackel. "The best of the 
war colleges, the Naval War College at Newport, sets the standard by 
which the other war colleges should be measured. The strategy and 
policy curriculum has justifiably acquired a reputation as the 
premier course in the United States, if not the Western world, for the 


examination of strategy. So high is the Naval War College's 
reputation, that over the course of the past few years it has attracted a 
number of the best young military historians and political scientists 
in national security affairs to Newport." < 

Stavridis, L.Cdr. Jim, "An Ocean Away: Outreach from the Naval 
War College," Shipmate . November 1985, p 8, on the role of the Naval 
War College in contributing to OP-603's codification of the Maritime 
Strategy and in "getting the word out" to mid-grade naval officers. By 
a former OP-603 member. 

** Tritten, Cdr. James, "New Directions," Naval War College Review . 
Spring 1987, p 94. By the Chairman of the Naval Postgraduate School 
National Security Affairs Department and a former OP-60 staffer. On 
the revitalization of Naval history and strategy studies at the "PG 

** Wirt, Robert T., "Strategic ASW," Submarine Review . July 1986, pp 
50-56. Calls for a comprehensive ASW plan, driven by submarines to 
support the Maritime Strategy. Unionism is not quite dead yet. 

Woolsey, R. James, "Mapping U.S. Defense Policy in the 1980s," 
International Security . Fall 1981, pp 202-207. By the 1977-1980 Under 
Secretary of the Navy. "The other side of the coin." A call to bring the 
"American academic intellectual establishment" and the military 
establishment more in touch with each other by focusing the efforts of 
the former on the actual "defense policy" problems of the latter, vice 
exclusively on "(a) the politico-military situation in the four corners 
of the globe and (b) nuclear and arms control theology." For similar 
disconnects that have occurred even within the field of "nuclear 
theology" itself, see Rosenberg, David, "U.S. Nuclear Strategy: 
Theory vs. Practice," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists . March 1987, 
pp 20+. "Theorists and consultants have had little impact on the 
development of nuclear weapons policies. Rather, strategic planning 
should be seen as a governmental process, carried out largely by 
military officers and civilian bureaucrats." 

B. The Public Record: OP-603 

From 1982 to the present, the primary U.S. Navy organization 
charged with codifying, refining, and articulating the consensus in the 
Navy regarding the Maritime Strategy has been the OPNAV Strategic 
Concepts Group (OP-603). Organized by V.Adm. William J. Crowe (then 
OP-06) and R.Adm. Robert Hilton (then OP-60) in 1978, OP-603 evolved into 
an office of about a dozen post-graduate educated, trained, professional 
operator-strategists, including U.S. Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and 
Central Intelligence Agency officers. 

" Almost invisible to the general and national security affairs 
academic publics, especially when contrasted to the Secretary of the Navy, 


the Chief of Naval Operations, OP-06 and OP-60, the operational 
commanders, the Strategic Studies Group and the Naval War College, 
these officers have nevertheless been those principally responsible for the 
development of the Maritime Strategy as a unified, coherent, global 
framework and common U.S. and allied naval vision. 

As with war planners, but unlike war college faculties, their output 
is largely classified. Nevertheless, they, and their superiors, OP-60 and OP- 
60B, have also achieved respectable open publication records. Typically, 
their writings prior to assignment to OP-60/603 reflect their diverse 
operational and academic interests and achievements; their publications 
during and after their assignment as strategists usually reflect their work 
on the Maritime Strategy. For the latter, see the entries cited earlier in this 
bibliography by R.Adms. Hanks, Maryott, and Pendley; Capts. Barnett, 
Brooks, Johnson, McGruther and Swartz; Cdrs. Hickman, Kalb and 
Milsted, and L.Cdrs. Pocalyko and Stavridis. For the former, see the entries 
below. They represent, admittedly, only a portion of the record, limited only 
to the products of those officers who were specifically and principally 
assigned to codify the Maritime Strategy, generally the Op-603 "Branch 
Heads" and "Maritime Strategy Action Officers" serving from 1982 through 
1986. They are provided only to illustrate the breath of experience and depth 
of thought members of the U.S. Navy's current, functioning "Corps of 
Naval Strategists" bring with them when they report for duty. 

Barnett, Capt. Roger W., "Soviet Strategic Reserves and the Soviet 
Navy," in Currie, Maj. Kenneth M. and Varhall, Maj. Gregory, " The 
Soviet Union: What Lies Ahead? Military Political Affairs in the 
1980s . Washington: USGPO, 1985, pp 581-605. The operator and 
Sovietologist as future strategist. A 1980 paper by the 1983-84 OP-603 
Branch Head. See also his "Their Professional Journal" (with Dr. 
Edward J. Lacey), Proceedings . October 1982, pp 95-101. 

Daly, Capt. Thomas M. and Myers, Cdr. Albert C, "The Art of 
ASW," Proceeding s. October 1985, pp 164-165. Operators and warfare 
specialists as strategists. The 1985-86 OP-603 Branch Head and his 
primary Maritime Strategy Action Officer discuss their primary 
warfare specialty. See also Daly Proceedings articles on the Iran-Iraq 
ar, July 1984 and May and July 1985, and on the Bikini A-Bomb tests, 
July 1986. 

** Hattendorf, John B., "The Evolution of the Maritime Strategy: 1977 to 
1987," Naval War College Review . Summer 1988, pp 7-26. Excellent 
and insightful discussion of the institutional origins of the U.S. 
Navy's strategical thinking that resulted in the development, "for the 
first time in many decades," in a "concept of national maritime 
strategy," and that the Navy's leadership agreed could be a 
"reasonable basis upon which to plan and prepare for a possible 
future war with the Soviet Union..." A "must" reading. 


Parker, L.Cdr. T. Wood, "Thinking Offensively," Proceeding s. April 
1981, pp 26-31; "Theater Nuclear Warfare and the U.S. Navy," Naval 
War College Review . January/February 1982, pp 3-16; and 
"Paradigms, Conventional Wisdom, and Naval Warfare," 
Proceedings . April 1983, pp 29-35. The operator and War College 
student as future strategist. Three prize-winning essays by the 1984- 
85 principal OP-603 Maritime Strategy Action Officer. 

Seaquist, Cdr. Larry, "Memorandum for the Commander. Subject: 
Tactical Proficiency," and "Tactics to Improve Tactical Proficiency," 
Proceedings . July 1981, pp 58-61 and February 1983, pp 37-42. The 
operator and tactician as future strategist. By a member of the 1983- 
84 Strategic Studies Group and 1984-85 OP-603 Branch Head. 

Weeks, L.Cdr. Stanley B., "United States Defense Policy Toward 
Spain, 1950-1976, unpublished PhD dissertation, American 
University, 1977; and Johnson, L.Cdr. William S., "Naval Diplomacy 
and the Failure of Balanced Security in the Far East — 1921-1935, and 
"Defense Budget Constraints and the Fate of the Carrier in the Royal 
Navy," Navv War College Review . February 1972, pp 67-88 and May- 
June 1973, pp 12-30. Operators and international relations specialists 
as future strategists. By the OP-60 co-drafters of the initial 1982-1983 
U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy briefings and testimony. 



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